Liquidity is meant for the Internal market. Competitiveness is for External market?
Posted April 16, 2014
on:Liquidity is meant for the Internal market. Competitiveness is for External market?
Should the level of “Life-Style” be the same among the competitive and the challenged productive states within a Union?
This is not a fair condition to impose on States that managed to sacrifice and work hard for better life conditions.
States in financial crisis must have ready lists of 4 categories of enterprises:
1. The public institutions that are critical in the smooth transmission of liquidity to the various economic sectors
2. The mixed State/Private entities that have locations in many regions of the State and employ many citizens
3. The nationwide private companies
4. The medium and small productive companies that serve their local provinces
It is well know that medium and small productive companies constitute 70% of State production that cater for the internal market needs.
Any shortage in liquidity in these small private companies and employment hit the roof and the citizens experience shortages in most commodities.
Giving priority to the local economies in the distribution (infusion) of liquidity is the first step in preventing mass unemployment.
There are public economic sectors that cater to the general public needs, such as energy, water and transportation… and the stabilization of these functional sectors in matter of maintenance is another urgent priority.
Before the internal market is reinvigorated and underway, it is of no use planning for the export sections to external markets in order to get the influx of “hard currencies”
Stability and security are the basis for a shift toward State development.
Having the autonomy to print money in period of liquidity shortage is the key for stabilizing the internal market.
The disadvantage resides in the society structure that favor the oligarchy and wealth disparity that eliminate the benefit of printing more money.
The crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy have demonstrated that it is a priority that a State has to reform its public service institutions to discard redundant and politically influenced service appointments.
Without a drastic realization that the political structure should be reformed, and for actually feel the pain associated with uneven equal rights to jobs and opportunities in the institutions, all the remaining reforms will be within the “patching” process.
The crisis in Greece was deep rooted because it lacked the two preconditions: Lousy political structure and not having the right to print money.
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy had political structures that could remedy to the “unfairly” political conditions and to reform the system within the single Euro currency.
The EU has learned the lesson:
1. First, the State that asks to join the union zone must demonstrate that it is serious to undertake political reforms and the structure be designed to react in timely manners to situations of political reforms.
Many States have been included based on historical and ideological “myths” that didn’t match their current unstable realities.
The EU dominant responsibility is to gradually transform the States who applied to join the union into politically viable structure.
The States in waiting must acknowledge that it takes time to achieve stable and valid political structure.
How a poor and unstable State can become competitive in the external market? This is an impossible condition to withhold liquidity infusion that is meant to support local companies.
The “productively challenged States” in the Euro zone should not expect the same level of life-style as the most competitive among them.
And equal rights in life-style is not an equitable and sustainable demand on State basis.
Leave a Reply