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Archive for August 1st, 2014


Are “Terror Tunnels” mere Israeli propaganda?

Apparently, this is the first war that the real engagements are done underground.  The Israeli air force is totally helpless attacking fighters dug underground and counterattacking from behind the “enemy lines” through tunnels…  Or that’s how the stories are being disseminated.

After Palestinian fighters attacked a military staging area on Monday night of July 28, killing several Israeli soldiers, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu said, “We will not complete [Operation Protective Edge] without neutralizing the tunnels, the sole purpose of which is the destruction of our civilians and the killing of our children.”

In a New York Times report from the same day, Lt. Col. Oshik Azulai of the Israeli army’s Southern Gaza Division told journalist Jodi Rudoren that Hamas militants “want to use these tunnels to attack women and children.” (Very funny Azulai)

Joel Gillin posted this July 31st, 2014

The existence of these so-called “terror tunnels” have become the alleged impetus behind Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza, which began on July 8. Israeli officials are unwilling to say how many of these tunnels they believe Hamas has built, but a vague estimate of “several dozen” has been given.

(Israel didn’t start this preemptive war against any the tunnels. The military usage of Gaza fighters of these tunnels, primarily used for trade, to hit Israeli troops behind their lines got Israel to change their objectives)

The tunnels did not, however, trigger Israeli’s latest operation in Gaza. Instead, Netanyahu’s pretext for the invasion was the alleged Hamas-sanctioned kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. Despite initial claims by the Israeli government, the incident was almost certainly not a Hamas operation. But any excuse was a good excuse, it would seem.

(It turned out that an Israeli adolescent was behind the kidnapping and killing and the Shin Beth knew the story from the start)

Since the bombing first began, the objectives of Operation Protective Edge have notably shifted, as journalist Gregg Carlstrom has pointed out.

First, Israel sought to achieve a “quieting” of Hamas rockets, then the destruction of the alleged tunnel threat (the tunnels themselves have been known about for years), and now the complete disarmament of Hamas. As Carlstrom argues, Israel’s operation in Gaza has become “an open-ended military campaign yoked to the ever-more-difficult political objective of sustaining an unsustainable status quo.”

Use of the “terror” label is but one of many tactics the Israeli government has yet again employed to drum up support among its citizens and the international community for its war in Gaza. The U.S. media has openly embraced Israel’s problematic “terror tunnel” narrative; CNN’s Wolf Blitzer even paid a visit to these subterranean structures to show just how much effort went into building them.

In compiling his report, Blitzer allowed Lt. Col. Azouli to go unchallenged in his claims that the tunnels facilitate attacks on “regular people, children, women, men” in Israel.

Thus far, the U.S. media has willfully failed to mention or even notice the obvious lack of evidence showing the tunnels have ever been used for terrorism. Virtually all international organizations that deal with the conflict in Israel/Palestine recognize that rocket fire from Gaza is illegitimate because of its inherently indiscriminate nature.

Failing to distinguish between civilian and military targets means rocket attacks violate the laws of war. To date, however, no civilians have been killed via incursions launched from the tunnels, which run from Gaza into Israel. Nor does Hamas appear to be using the tunnels to target Israeli civilians in any way.

Hamas’ first known use of the tunnels came in 2006, when it exploited the passageways to capture Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, during a flare-up of hostilities before Israel’s military campaign against Lebanon.

Since the start of the latest conflict, all those killed as a result of Hamas’s tunnel attacks have been combatants (i.e. Israeli soldiers), who are permissible targets under the laws of war. Despite the rhetoric and many distorted media reports on the topic, there is no evidence Hamas has used the tunnels to attempt an attack on civilians or civilian objects.

The website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs currently lists four incidents of alleged Hamas violence attempted from these tunnels, none of which were successful. In all its descriptions of these incidents, the website includes the distance between the opening of the tunnels and the nearest kibbutz. This information is ostensibly given to make it appear the tunnels are being used to target particular civilian villages. Gaza’s border with Israel is, however, lined with small Israeli kibbutzim, making it difficult for Hamas fighters to emerge anywhere but near one of these areas.

As the government website claims, on July 17th, militants emerged “only 1.5 km (less than a mile) away from Sufa, a kibbutz,” where the tunnel opening was just 250 meters from the border.

While Israeli President Shimon Peres claimed Hamas had planned a “wholesale slaughter” of the kibbutz, the video of the incident released by Israel fails to show the gunmen more than a few meters away from the tunnel’s opening. Israeli military sources claimed – without evidence – that “the gunmen evidently planned to attack the kibbutz, killing and possibly kidnapping civilians.”

In its report, “Trouble Underfoot on Israeli Kibbutz Near Border,” The New York Times seemed to take the Israeli military at its word, although the article acknowledged the attacks were only “presumably” planned against Sufa. Even the normally careful writer Greg Mitchell appeared to believe that a “planned attack by a handful of men on the kibbutz had been thwarted.”

Contrary to the Israeli government’s claims, all evidence indicates combatants have been the only targets of Hamas’ tunnel operations. In an incident on July 21st, just days after the alleged Sufa attack, several militants struck an Israeli army vehicle before being killed themselves. Footage of the incident showed Hamas members laying an ambush for the IDF, and not heading toward a kibbutz. The most recent attack on July 28th was more successful for Hamas fighters, who killed several soldiers before returning to Gaza through one of the tunnels.

In an about face, a senior Israeli intelligence officer is now claiming that “Hamas operatives aim primarily to abduct soldiers and not to penetrate into civilian communities along the border with Gaza,” according to the Times of Israel.

In a revealing admission, the officer pointed out that none of the tunnels actually reaches civilian communities, even though they could easily do so. Indeed, Hamas is likely seeking to attack and/or capture Israeli soldiers through these tunnels.

Captured soldiers are an incredibly powerful bargaining chip for the group, as demonstrated by the release of over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit in 2011.

But this Hamas strategy cannot justify the pummeling of Gaza’s civilian population and infrastructure. Combatants are lawful targets during war. In an attempt to minimize or end these attacks, the Israeli government has no grounds for pursuing civilians, private homes, schools, hospitals, power plants and other civilian and humanitarian installations, which cannot be lawfully targeted under humanitarian law and which Israel has indiscriminately bombed.

In its framing of the “terror tunnels,” the Israeli government has essentially claimed that all military action by Hamas, including attacks against Israeli soldiers, are inherently illegitimate and illegal. This is precisely why Israel is demanding the demilitarization of Gaza, even though this would be a non-starter in any negotiations for a sustainable ceasefire.

Without a shred of evidence, much of the U.S. media has repeated Israeli government claims about the nature and purpose of these tunnels.

In part, it is because of the media’s failure to challenge this propaganda that a majority of Americans blame Hamas for this round of violence and continue to support Israel even as its bombs kill Palestinians by the hundreds and render them homeless by the hundreds of thousands.

 Impossibility for Palestinians to travel abroad, since 1990:  How Dashed could be their Hope?

Did you know that since the 1990s, it has been nearly impossible for Palestinians to travel abroad  to study , to work  or go on holiday?

They can get foreign visas through consulates and embassies, but Israel very rarely allows them passage into Israel to travel abroad. According to International law, a country must allow people to transit through it to other destinations.

What this has meant for Palestinians, is that they get places, scholarships, and job opportunities at top universities and institutions, they get their visa, but are then not allowed to leave Gaza or the West Bank.

I remember once going to a 10 day summer camp with people from all over the world.

A Palestinian participant rocked up 2 days before the end of the camp. Her transit permit through Israel took months. This is the story another palestinian, Saleh.

After I was chosen for a week summer school in New York from among more than 15,000 applicants , I got jubilant to the extent that I couldn’t study for my final exams.
I got so happy that I involuntarily kissed my brother before even telling him that I was chosen; I rushed and kissed my parents and my little brother as well. I promised my little brother to buy him the best gift I could get from the U.S.
My friends, my true ones, were so happy that I got such an opportunity of lifetime. I planned to have sheets on which my friends’ names to be written and to picture these sheets on front of the Stature of Freedom- I don’t know why I just smiled mockingly while typing “Freedom”.
As soon as I was done with my exams, I started the long process of filling the U.S. visa application.
I refused to take any courses for the summer semester so that I could have some space to finish the traveling procedures and to enjoy my summer in an unprecedented manner.
I was confused; I did not know what to choose: the Egyptian way or the israeli one.
Unfortunately, I couldn’t fathom that I am living in Gaza which means both ways are banned to go through, which means to strive to live confined in your country, or more precisely in the largest open-air prison in the world.
How dare I think of traveling? How dare I have some hope, even if for a week?
How dare I think of freedom while I am occupied by such a maniac terrorists!
By an entity willing to kill around a THOUSAND people, to injure around 5 THOUSAND others, and to leave unknown number of victims under the rubbles with cold blood in less than three weeks! ow did I forget how my cousin DIED while he was waiting to get an israeli permit to receive medical treatment.
How did I forget how he died in his bed out of his exacerbating illness?
Egypt claims that Palestinians are responsible for Egypt’s instability! israel claims an adbuction and killing of three teens by Palestinians, without even an evidence or a photo for the “dead”!
Both countries, as usual, impose the colloective punishment on whoever has a Palestinian blood running in the arteries.
I just could not “apply” for a permission to go out of the beseiged Gaza. Who on earth feels how I feel?
Who on earth could see a brighter life than I do? Yes, I see it bright. You know why? Because this is the only thing that keeps us, Palestinians, alive. If we try to contemplate and commiserate about our endless problems, we would have died out of deep grief from time immemorial.
And now I only blame myself for “thinking” of a chance to breathe in another place out of this prison.
I should have got it in the first place from the description given for my country in the participants list. Occupied! Occupied! Occupied


Story of Gaza Tunnels: Motivated by incarceration in this large concentration camp

Israel’s “soft quarantining” of Gaza—the steadily tightening restrictions on the movement of persons and goods into Israel—began with the Oslo peace process and in preparation for the establishment in the Strip of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994.

After Oslo’s signing, Israel built a barrier around Gaza. Though access continued through Israel’s terminals, periodic closures led Gazans to seek alternatives.

The perimeter barrier was among the first targets of protestors when the Al-Aqsa intifada broke out in September 2000, but by June 2001 Israel had replaced it with a higher, grimmer, more impenetrable upgrade.

Frequent lockdowns at Israel’s terminals and the destruction of Gaza’s seaport and airport in 2001, coupled with the militarization of the intifada, intensified the drive for outlets south.

Hence the expansion and upgrading of the tunnels, which for the first time served as safety valves for wholesalers to alleviate the artificially created shortages.

Given their quest for weapons and the need for funds to finance operations during the intifada, the various Palestinian political factions operated the longest and deepest tunnels.

The cash-strapped PA sought to co-opt clans along the border where tunneling was easiest.

Sami Abu Samhadana, a senior PA security official and prominent Fatah leader in Gaza, himself from a Bedouin clan straddling the Rafah frontier, oversaw much of the expansion. This fusion of security and business interests, of militia activity and private entrepreneurship, was to become a hallmark of future development.”

This is the section of the long article pertaining to the Gaza tunnels


The underground lifeline for Gaza’s population was no less a salvation for the Hamas government, which struggled to survive efforts by multiple foes to engineer its collapse or stoke social unrest by means of a siege.

Over time, the tunnels enabled Hamas to consolidate its hold on the Strip and to circumvent U.S.-led international financial restrictions. According to banking sources, the TAC raised $150–$200 million in revenues in 2009, a figure that continued to climb in 2010 as the tunnel traffic grew, but then tapered off after Israel relaxed its closure and Egypt restricted fuel bound for Gaza.

As a result, Hamas became increasingly immune to the financial leverage both of the international community and—significantly—its own Damascus-based leadership.

As noted above, the government increasingly consolidated its hold on revenues over time. Following the 2007 takeover of the Strip, the Interior Ministry reasserted Hamas government control over the commercial tunnels in place of the IQB.

From then on, the ministry not only regulated the tunnels but also took charge of collecting the tunnel revenues, depositing them directly into its own account to cover its budgetary expenditures. While any excess funds were transferred to the central government, other ministers grumbled that the Interior Ministry’s prior claim on tax receipts was less than satisfactory.

In 2011 the government, with support from the Hamas movement and the Palestinian Legislative Council, reached an agreement whereby the ministry would deposit all receipts into a single treasury account but would be given priority in disbursements. With the situation thus regularized, National Economy Minister ?Ala’ Rif?ati was able, soon after his appointment in 2011, to post two hundred customs and excise officers to the tunnel enclave alongside Interior Ministry employees to enforce levies.

Through its growing tax base, Hamas increased its economic independence from Israel and the PA, although the latter continued to make salary payments to the some seventy thousand employees on its payroll. Hamas even made some progress delivering on its 2006 campaign promise to free Gaza from Oslo’s 1994 Paris Protocol, which gave Israel virtually full control over the Palestinian economy.

The development of direct trade ties with Egypt also enhanced Hamas’s ideological vision of fostering ties with the Islamic world and downgrading relations with Israel. According to a Hamas official, “The siege is a blessing in disguise. It is weaning us off of Israel and 60 years of aid, and helping us to help ourselves.”

Armed with resources to govern from the tunnel proceeds, Hamas transformed itself from a nonstate actor with a social and charitable network, underground movement, and guerrilla force into a governing authority with a well-equipped internal security force, bureaucracy, and economy. The commercial tunnels and the Sinai population’s growing economic dependence on trade with Gaza gave Hamas the soft power to project its influence into the Sinai Peninsula, even as the factional tunnels enabled its military wing to augment this “soft” influence by exercising its own leverage there.

Overall, the eclipse (at least temporarily) of Egypt’s internal security force in the peninsula and the simultaneous increase in Gaza’s military capabilities—combined with Gaza’s economic, social, and cultural pull—led observers close to Hamas to describe the movement as gaining strategic depth inside Egypt’s periphery. If indeed the enclave emerges as a regional center of gravity, all parties hoping to establish stability in the Sinai will have to take it into account.

That said, the tunnel economy has also tarnished Hamas’s reputation for transparency, accountability, and financial propriety. “This is not the old style radical movement,” notes a Gaza economist; “Hamas has acquired a business venture.” The Hamas authorities were widely criticized from the outset for making tunnel licenses conditional on appointing its members to the boards of tunnel cooperatives, often on preferential terms. The government’s decision to wash its hands of the pyramid scheme for tunnel investment mentioned earlier, which had been endorsed by prominent Hamas preachers and had left numerous investors bereft of their savings, marked the first major dent in its domestic credibility.

Thereafter, Islamist and secular opponents alike adopted the discourse of corruption that Hamas had hitherto used to undermine Fatah. Some elements of the IQB, meanwhile, acquired a reputation for profiteering much like that associated with Muhammad Dahlan’s Preventative Security Forces that preceded them, dispensing with the resistance activities that were once their hallmark. Several prominent officials, including Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhum, come from families with strong ties to the tunnel economy and were viewed as protecting their tunnel holdings. A Salafi jihadi from Gaza’s Middle Areas expressed it thus:

Before entering government, Hamas acolytes focused on religious sermons and memorizing Qur’an. Now they are most interested in money, tunnel business and fraud. Hamas used to talk about paradise, but now they think about buying land, cars and apartments. After the evening prayers, they would go to study, now the Imam looks at ways to make money. Before they prayed in the mosque, now they pray at home.

Hamas’s lack of transparency about its use of its tunnel earnings compounds suspicions. While Hamas officials say local revenues comprise half the government’s $750 million annual budget for 2011, local businessmen calculate the earnings to be considerably higher, raising questions about where the funds go and why there are repeated shortfalls in monthly civil-service salary payments.

Calls for accountability have mounted as the Haniyeh government has increased the tax burden. (National Economy Minister ?Ala’ Rif?ati, who upon taking office called for Gaza’s withdrawal from the Paris Protocol to spare the population Israeli-level tariffs, four months later declared his intention to raise tariffs in line with Paris Protocol rates.)

A similarly cavalier approach to child labor and tunnel fatalities damaged the movement’s standing with human-rights groups, despite government assurances dating back to 2008 that it was considering curbs. During a police patrol that the author was permitted to accompany in December 2011, nothing was done to impede the use of children in the tunnels, where, much as in Victorian coal mines, they are prized for their nimble bodies. At least 160 children have been killed in the tunnels, according to Hamas officials. Safety controls on imports appear similarly lax, although the TAC insists that a sixteen-man contingent carries out sporadic spot-checks.

All told, the tunnels have been a mixed bag for Hamas. While its detractors praise—albeit begrudgingly—its success in reducing the impact of Israel’s stranglehold, perceptions of corruption inside the organization have intensified. During the renewed fuel shortages of spring 2012, there were widespread allegations that Hamas leaders received uninterrupted electricity and that gasoline stations continued to operate for the exclusive use of Hamas members. True or not, they fed a growing mood of recrimination that Hamas had profited from the siege.


While the tunnels have spared Gaza’s economy from collapse and made possible some reconstruction, concerns that their utility might have peaked are rife. Despite the construction boom, the tunnels have not equipped Gaza with the tools required to rebuild and sustain a productive society. The manufacturing base remains hobbled by the ongoing ban on exports. Once its housing stock is restored, Gazans ask, what then? Where will the workers go? Tunnels were always a remedial answer to the blockade, not an economic solution. The high costs of food and other aid, ultimately borne by international donors and passed on to their taxpayers, can only be avoided when the border opens to normal commercial trade for both imports and exports.

To date, Gaza’s mercantile elite and foreign donors have looked to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and the reestablishment of PA control inside Gaza to end Israel’s five-year blockade. But even in the most favorable of circumstances, it is hard to see how trade and labor markets can return to their pre-2000 highs. Despite significant improvement following Operation Cast Lead, truckload entries in February 2012 represented less than half the average 2005 monthly entry of 10,400 trucks.

Moreover, even if Israel fully opened its crossings, tunnel operators might continue to enjoy some inbuilt advantages over formal trade, including the ability to smuggle subsidized Egyptian produce and the absence of red tape. As long as Gaza is vulnerable to the vagaries of Israel’s use of economic tools to cajole Gaza’s rulers, the tunnels will likely remain a strategically important safety valve and back door.

For its part, Hamas continues to look southward to Egypt. Its hopes of capitalizing on the rise of its parent and sister movements in North Africa have so far failed to materialize. Travel to and trade with Egypt are certainly easier, but with goods still transported underground, the enclave remains psychologically and physically under siege. Despite the election of a senior Muslim Brotherhood official as the new Egyptian president, Egypt’s military apparatus retains, at least for now, control over the country’s security and borders.

High-level intelligence officers continue to view Gaza’s Islamist leaders as a threat to national security and have used restrictions on the entry of goods—particularly fuel—into Sinai in an attempt to bring them to heel. How the power struggle between President Muhammad al-Mursi and the SCAF plays out will be critical to determining the extent to which Egypt and Gaza can normalize their political and trade relations and end Gaza’s state of siege. While Mursi’s election was greeted ecstatically by Hamas’s rank-and-file, a sober realism and even hint of frustration at the tweaks to existing Egyptian policy rather than an overhaul continues to mark the statements of some Hamas officials.

That said, there are pointers that keep the hope of a sea change in ties with Egypt and the broader region alive. In February 2012, North Sinai’s Chamber of Commerce was the first official trade delegation to visit Gaza since the Hamas takeover in 2007. Others have followed, holding out the prospect that trade already legalized in Gaza could become so in Egypt as well. Ironically, any attempt to legalize trade above ground would likely result in both governments rendering the tunnels illegal and taking steps to terminate smuggling.

Both governments have already discussed bringing the underground economy to the surface, opening the Rafah terminal to trade, and opening a free-trade zone straddling the Egypt-Gaza border. Gazan businessmen, together with counterparts from Ismailia’s Chamber of Commerce, have since formed the Egypt-Palestine Company, aimed at establishing a 1,000 dunam free-trade zone. Egyptian officials suggest that the resulting trade could reach $2 billion annually, more than doubling current bilateral trade and surpassing the country’s U.S. military aid. In an attempt to show a cooperative spirit, Hamas returned five stolen cars to Egypt and pledged to stop (temporarily) the unlicensed import of cars.

Though small and reversible, such steps have kept alive a vision of Gaza’s exit from its pariah status and integration into the region’s emerging new order. In February 2012, Hamas announced agreements in principle with Egypt’s petroleum and energy ministries to link Gaza to Egypt’s electricity grid and gas pipelines, with the assistance of a $70 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank.

Though subsequently overturned by SCAF, these agreements offer a pointer of how relations could evolve. Hamas ministers have drawn up plans to link Gaza to the region’s labor and export markets as well as its transport system. “Within two years, you’ll be able to take the bus all the way from Gaza to Morocco,” predicts Hamas Agriculture Minister Mahmud al-Agha. Others speak of reviving the old railway that ran from Cairo through Gaza. Ismail Haniyeh’s recent audience with President Mursi resulted in what Palestinians said were a series of Egyptian commitments to increase passenger traffic through Rafah and fuel supplies.

Winding down the tunnel trade could provoke clashes with key vested interests both within the movement and without, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. The tunnels have fostered common interests between Sinai’s Bedouin traders, transporters, and tunnel owners and Gaza’s consumers, which will not be easily decoupled. But the benefits of winding down would be considerable. Stemming smuggling would strengthen Hamas’s preelectoral claims to promote good governance and counter corruption, and possibly would revive tourism.

Indeed, Gaza’s rulers have committed to closing the tunnels in the event Egypt’s opens its border for formal overland trade. For Egypt, too, there would be benefits in overland trade, for the tunnels, a key component of the country’s black economy, have been a driver of corruption of state officials, encouraged the proliferation of weapons, and strengthened Sinai’s centrifugal forces. In short, while the tunnels have served as the homemade driver of Gaza’s reconnection to the region, the final realization of this goal can best be served by their demise.



Nicolas Pelham is a writer on Arab affairs for The Economist and the New York Review of Books. He is the author of A New Muslim Order (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008) and coauthor of A History of the Middle East (London: Penguin, 2004), and has reported on Gaza extensively over the past six years.

More in this paper:


Gaza’s Tunnel Phenomenon: The Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s Siege


Proofs: Gaza Children specifically targeted by Israeli snipers

IDF Sniper Admits On Instagram To Murdering 13 Gaza Children


An Instagram post by an Israel Defense Forces sniper boasts of murdering 13 Gazan children in one day.

An IDF Combat Engineering Corps Soldier, specifically, David D. Ovadia posed with a Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifle.

Ovadia posted his comments on the Instagram account of Palestinian Sherrii ElKaderi.

The image was quickly screen captured in case Ovadia came to his senses and realized that he could be prosecuted for his admission of war crimes.

It is unclear and perhaps unlikely that the Barrett was used in the commission of such crimes, as this weapon is usually reserved for the best of the best marksmen.

In any event, Ovadia is in active deployment and openly confesses to killing Gazan civilian children.

While not specifying what weapon he used, the posting of himself with the .50 caliber rifle was obviously meant to be visually intimidating to Palestinians.

In the mean time, while more information is gathered on Ovadia, the “hacktivist” group “Anonymous” took control of his Instagram account, deleting it entirely.

For “good measure” Anonymous sources said that they hacked the websites of the Mossad intelligence agency in Israel “for the brave IDF Sniper”, in reference to Ovadia.

By 11:30, they had taken down the Israeli Ministry of Defense as well, and similarly attributed it as a response to Ovadia’s confessions.

If you agree that Ovadia’s admission of war crimes against Gazan children needs to be FRONT PAGE NEWS, share this with someone you know who cares!

(Article by Ari Simeon and Isa Abu Jamal)

Zana Messia posted 
Israel-Gaza conflict: time-lapse shows air strikes destroying entire neighbourhood in an hour -…






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