Adonis Diaries

Archive for October 31st, 2014

Update on Syrian refugees conditions and status in Lebanon

As in all data, Lebanese are not equipped to gather data, Not in matters of critical issues such as “How many Lebanese live in Lebanon”, How many people live in Lebanon, how many are jobless, what exactly is our deficit… and least of all

How many Syrian refuges have selected Lebanon as a harbour for security”

The UN registered Syrian refugees is about 1,250,000. The exact number is over 2 million or half our population.

The minister of education and minister of interior’s comments may have only been five days apart, but they reveal just how wide the gulf is within the government over how to manage Lebanon’s swelling Syrian refugee population. 

A very angry public backlash ensued as politicians from across the spectrum reassured citizens that they remained wholeheartedly against establishing camps

As the violence across the border morphed from a civilian led uprising to a full blown civil war and families began to flee the country en masse, NGOs and the United Nations became convinced that camps in Lebanon would be the easiest way to safely house and feed hundreds of thousands of vulnerable people.

But from the outset concerns were voiced by politicians and ordinary Lebanese about how long Syrians would stay if they had the opportunity to live in formal sites.

Fears were implicitly tied to the history of Palestinian refugees in the country, whose camps, built as temporary settlements 60 years ago, still stand today and are often branded as hubs of instability and militancy. Whatever their practical merit, camps for Syrian refugees have slipped down the political agenda and, in recent years, been largely dismissed.

published this Oct. 29, 2014

Children make up half the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon

Children make up half the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon

It came as something of a shock when Social Affairs Minister Rashid Derbas announced in mid-September that an agreement had been reached to build two pilot refugee camps on the border, one at the Masnaa crossing and the other at Abboudieh, a northern crossing.

However, this apparent political breakthrough was short lived.

A very angry public backlash ensued as politicians from across the spectrum reassured citizens that they remained wholeheartedly against establishing camps. Five days after the initial announcement, the ministry performed an effective U turn. A spokesperson for Derbas was rolled out to say that their construction was being “put on hold,” later clarifying that the two camps would not be built at all.

Executive sat down with figures across the political divide to try and wade through the apparent contradictions and confusion at the cabinet level. While the border sites have now been definitively ruled out, frantic deals are currently underway to secure fresh endorsements for camps inland as one of the most divisive refugee issues is dragged unceremoniously back to center stage.

At the heart of this sea-change lies one key variable: Arsal.

The Arsal crisis

“Arsal has been hijacked,” says Khalil Gebara, advisor to Nouhad Machnouk, interior minister and member of the Saad Hariri-led Future movement, who has been working alongside his coalition colleague Derbas to push the camps agenda.

In the worst spillover of violence since the beginning of the Syrian war, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and their rival Islamists, ISIS, teamed up to fight the Lebanese Army for control of the border town in August.

In the ensuing battle, some 12 civilians were killed and hundreds injured. (And how many soldiers were killed and injured?)

The militants took dozens of soldiers captive (how many exactly?) and have so far executed three.

Although the Islamists have been ostensibly pushed out of the town into the Qalamoun mountains, the Army believes that terrorist cells are still living among refugees in informal tented settlements (ITS) and raids are still commonplace.

“The Lebanese and some refugees are finding themselves trapped between the militants and the Army. That is a serious problem …We must act,” Gebara says. With the town virtually on lockdown, aid agencies and the UNHCR are also struggling to reach the refugees.

It is only these very particular security concerns in Arsal that have pushed the contentious camps debate back into the spotlight. 

“We are not talking about establishing several medium sized formal camps, like the initial plans of UNHCR and MOSA [Ministry of Social Affairs] from a couple of years ago. We are not talking about formalizing informal settlements … We are not trying to solve the whole refugee problem here. We are talking about something very specific. Today our priority is Arsal and the security threat. You need to ease the pressure on Arsal and one of the ways to do that is to reduce the number of refugees by at least half, so we propose to take 30,000 or 40,000 refugees and put them in camps,” Gebara explains.

Yet, despite vocal opposition, Gebara maintains that the U turn on the border sites was not down to political maneuverings, but rather to security and financial challenges.

After Derbas announced that he had managed to scrape together enough support within the cabinet for his pilot camps, a team of technical assessors from MOSA and the UNHCR traveled to the proposed sites. Their conclusions were not what the minister had hoped: as Masnaa was just a few kilometers from Syrian army positions, it was deemed too dangerous and would likely cost $10 million to keep 10,000 refugees safe. The Abboudieh site, meanwhile, was simply too small.

Political stalemate

Makram Malaeb, however, who worked as an advisor to Derbas at the time he spoke to Executive, admits that political maneuverings played a part in the collapse of the plan.

“What are the guarantees that [with the new camps] we are not disseminating terrorists among civilian populations in other villages?”

“There was political progress and then there was political backing away,” Malaeb says, cryptically. “At the crisis cell [which includes the prime minister, the MOSA and the interior and foreign affairs ministries], the decision was taken to establish these camps. Then there were some reservations at the cabinet level, so we withdrew the offer.”

The advisor refused to be drawn on exactly who had given a tentative nod to the plans and then withdrawn support, but the former Labor Minister Salim Jreissati says that his party, the Free Patriotic Movement, has remained vehemently against establishing camps, whether for Arsal or in general. The party holds two cabinet seats, but with its allies, the eight-strong bloc wields significant veto power.

The [informal Arsal] camps have effectively bred jihadists who are now fighting against the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese population, taking our soldiers hostage, and causing problems all along our borders … This is why we say we have no intention at all to create camps,” Jreissati says. “What are the guarantees that [with the new camps] we are not disseminating terrorists among civilian populations in other villages?”

Over the past few weeks, Machnouk has been engaged in determined consultations to try and win around FPM and Hezbollah leaders. While Gebara tells Executive that progress has been made, Jreissati says the meetings have not been positive and he does not envisage his party changing their official stance. He also slams Machnouk’s lack of combat experience, saying it contributed to his inability to meaningfully tackle the Arsal crisis.

He is an honest man, but he has no military experience. That is my problem [with him] … Hezbollah shares our point of view and our fears. They are fighting terrorists in Syria, they know about the whole issue. They are in the field. This is the difference between Machnouk and Hezbollah.”

Meanwhile, Machnouk’s advisor Gebara — without explicitly pointing his finger at the FPM or its allies — admits that he was frustrated with the inflexible attitude of many of the political elite toward camps.

“I really don’t understand this complete boycott of any discussion of camps. I might understand concerns about a general strategy to scatter camps all over Lebanon … But this [Arsal proposal] is not bringing in new people, it is simply moving people who are already here. So we are not changing demographics; the demography has already been changed,” he says, referring to widespread concerns that Syrians, like Palestinians, are mostly Sunni and that a prolonged stay in Lebanon could threaten the country’s unique religious coexistence, which sees power carefully divided along sectarian lines. 

Rabih Shibli, director of the Community Projects and Development Unit at the American University of Beirut, who has worked extensively with refugees and Lebanese host communities, says that he would be “extremely astonished” if the Future Movement’s ministries find backing for their project.

“To many Lebanese, the Palestinian question is a cause of much anxiety. The sectarian balance is very fragile and people feel conscious of that,” he says. “[Meanwhile] the political situation is extremely polarized … The only way [an agreement] will be possible is if [Machnouk] reaches a regional agreement with Hezbollah; everything in Lebanon has a regional link. Without this, the stalemate will continue.”

NGO response

While the political debate rumbles on, aid agencies say they are on standby to begin construction as soon as an agreement is reached for Arsal. Dana Sleiman, spokesperson for UNHCR, says that the body “stands ready” to act.

By amassing several thousand families in one space, the sites would also offer more logistically manageable mechanisms of distributing aid

Niamh Murnaghan, country director of the Norwegian Refugee Council, an organization that works closely with shelter projects for refugees, also reiterates that most NGOs “will have preparedness plans in place” in the event of a breakthrough. But she also believes that “there is still significant resistance to camps in Lebanon. I would say that if there is an agreement, it is likely to be carefully framed to be limited to just the Arsal situation. I don’t yet see the formalizing of ITS or trying to group refugees more together.”

Camps could be a cheaper way to manage the refugee population, the NRC’s Camp Management Advisor Kristin Vestrheim says, as within formal sites “you can access so many more, and you can particularly reach the most vulnerable who often cost more to reach.”

Official settlements would be built on government land, meaning residents would have so called ‘security of tenure’, protecting them from the whims of landlords, who currently have the right to evict refugees from informal outposts.

By amassing several thousand families in one space, the sites would also offer more logistically manageable mechanisms of distributing aid, and enable the monitoring of women and children who could be at risk of sexual exploitation.

No room at the inn?

While a virtual stalemate on camps for those in Arsal persists and constructing sites for refugees across the board continues to be dismissed out of hand by many, the government has turned to a series of alternative draconian measures to stem the flow from Syria.

And whatever the disputes about camps, when it comes to these fresh plans to slice the refugee numbers, it seems there is support across party lines.

Malaeb, the advisor to Derbas, tells Executive that the current government’s overarching refugee strategy is twofold: to significantly reduce the numbers of Syrians entering Lebanon and to properly manage those who are here. “At least one of those plans seems to be working,” he says.

Malaeb was referring to a proposal signed off in February — but only made public when it began in August — to drastically reduce the numbers entering through Lebanon’s four official borders. Strict new measures mean that people will only be allowed in if they can prove the following: they are using Lebanon to transit to another country; they are in need of medical treatment; or they have the financial means to support themselves. All others are being turned away.

We are of the opinion that Lebanon cannot host any more refugees. Since we have a quarter of our population, or even 30 percent, as Syrian refugees and considering that Jordan and Turkey have effectively closed their borders, we should be able to close ours if we choose,” Malaeb says.

According to a source at General Security, the average number of people crossing the Masnaa border dropped by roughly three quarters during September, with men between 16 and 30 being the most likely to be turned away.

The policy has alarmed human rights observers, but Malaeb argues that statistics show the number of Syrians crossing into the country has been decreasing significantly since November of last year. He also emphasizes that restrictions would be eased in the event of a major outbreak of violence near the border.

We believe that most people who want to flee violence [to Lebanon] have already fled.”

In tandem with the harsh restrictions, the Interior Ministry has announced plans to strip Syrians of their refugee status if they cross the border several times in a month, hoping to catch out those who the ministry says are supported by the Lebanese state and the UN, but are still able to partially work and live inside Syria.

Although Gebara says the policy is directed at Syrian business people accused of leeching off the state, the move will likely also bar refugees who take regular trips to Damascus to visit family or check on property.

A widespread legalizing of refugees’ permits has also taken place in recent months.

It is a proposal that the Interior Ministry says is designed to help refugees who fear being stopped by the police with expired papers, but Malaeb concedes that the architects of the scheme hope it will also encourage Syrians to return home voluntarily, easing pressure across the country and particularly in Arsal.

These proposals to incentivize Syrians to return, and in some cases force them out, appear to represent the government’s way of tackling the refugee crisis while the camps stalemate persists. And it is here, if on little else, that the FPM and Future parties appear united.

Jressati tells Executive: “Our position is that since there are large areas in Syria that are completely secure and that aren’t affected by war … the idea would be for [refugees] to return to villages and cities that haven’t been completely destroyed.”

“All of the political factions that once accused us of racism have now come to us and say we were right at the time to ask for stricter regulation of this enormous influx of refugees coming into our country. That is not a racist position. That is the only solution.”

Blatant bus racial segregation: How could it be motivated by “security” concerns?

Israel’s top legal officer has ordered Moshe Ya’alon, the country’s defence minister, to explain a decision that effectively bans Palestinian workers from travelling to their West Bank homes on the same buses as Jewish settlers.

The demand, from Yehuda Weinstein, the Attorney General, follows criticism that the move – officially justified on “security grounds” – amounted to racial segregation.

Mr Ya’alon’s order will make it illegal from December for Palestinian labourers working in Tel Aviv and central Israel from boarding the Trans-Samaria bus, which travels through the occupied West Bank to the settlement of Ariel.

Moshe Ya’alon ordered to explain ban

Decision by Israel’s defence minister has led to accusations of racial segregation despite official insistence that it is motivated by “security” concerns

The defence minister's justification contradicts the stance of the Israeli army, which has said it does not consider the Palestinian workers' presence on the buses a threat

The defence minister’s justification contradicts the stance of the Israeli army, which has said it does not consider the Palestinian workers’ presence on the buses a threat Photo: AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Instead they will have to enter the West Bank through the Eyal checkpoint, far removed from many Palestinian populations centres, and then continue on separate buses.

The defence minister’s justification contradicts the stance of the Israeli army, which has said it does not consider the Palestinian workers’ presence on the buses a threat, since only those who have been given security clearance are allowed into Israel.

Now the Attorney General’s office has asked the defence ministry to list the facts and considerations – including legal advice – that prompted Mr Ya’alon’s decision, amid criticisms that he was motivated by a desire to curry favour with settlers’ groups.

The liberal Haaretz newspaper accused him of “kowtowing” to settler opinion while giving ammunition to those who characterise Israel as an “apartheid state“.

“The minister’s decision reeks of apartheid, typical of the Israeli occupation regime in the territories,” the newspaper wrote in an editorial headlined “Welcome Aboard Israel’s Apartheid Bus”.

One of the most blatant symbols of the regime of racial separation in South Africa was the separate bus lines for whites and blacks. Now, Ya’alon has implemented the same policy in the occupied territories.”

A source in Mr Ya’alon’s office defended the move as “purely a security-related matter”. “Its purpose is to supervise the entries and exits into Israeli territory, thereby reducing the chances of terror attacks inside Israeli territory,” the source told Ha’aretz.

Israel’s transport ministry came under fire last year for introducing “Palestinian only” buses from Israel to the West Bank following complaints from settlers.

The latest controversy came as Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, hit back at international criticism of a decision to proceed with plans to build 1,060 new settlers homes in East Jerusalem, which is claimed by the Palestinians as their future capital.

The European Union and the US both condemned the move – apparently agreed in an attempt to appease pro-settler ministers in Mr Netanyahu’s coalition – as harmful to prospects for peace.

Mr Netanyahu dismissed the criticisms as “disconnected from reality”. “The EU and the US are applying a double standard when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” he said on a visit to the port city of Ashdod.

“When Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority] incites murder of Jews in Jerusalem, the international community remains silent. And when we build in Jerusalem, they become indignant. I don’t accept that. Just as the French build in Paris and the British build in London, Israelis build in Jerusalem.”

What do you feel about genetically modified produce? Affect heuristic and slave to emotions

Best to consider the pros and cons separately on critical issues.

List the possible benefits, their importance and get their respective probabilities that these advantages will occur.

If the probability of a benefit is very low (in the tails of the distributions), take the benefit out of the list. Why?

Since you lack the necessary information on this rare event, you don’t need to complicate your decision process. Especially that this event is not related to serious health consequences.

In the cons lists, you need to consider the rare event probabilities linked to serious health consequences.

How much harm to health and how serious is the harm in the long term should take priorities in any assessment.

The expected values is the product of the probabilities by the amount of benefits or disadvantages.

Though why it must be a simple multiplication and addition is a contentious concept for me in decision theory.

Actually, when it comes to personal issues, not many mathematicians and decision makers take the trouble of evaluating any decision based on expected values.

The automatic, one-dimensional impulse in any event prevent us from taking the trouble of listing the advantages and risks.

It is our emotional reactions, initial spontaneous behaviors, to issues that determine our assessments.

If we feel we like something then we diminish the probability of risks.

Though in reality risks and benefits are Not dependent and should not be treated as such in our evaluations.

Tweaking facts to fit our “likes” lists is one of the deleterious effects on our decisions.

Smiling faces, a shining sun, an attractive appearance, a lovely encounter… all change our disposition during the daily decision making, even in the stock market performance.

Against our best intentions, we are ready to substitute “What do I think” with “How do I feel about this“.

And our future depend on our emotional reactions.





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