Adonis Diaries

Archive for May 31st, 2018

Do we strive to Prove the skeptics wrong?

“It’ll never last…”

“Someone with her background will never make a go of this…”

“Are you kidding me?” “Pathetic! Delusional!”

“Social media is a fad, the iPad is a toy, you’re never going to amount to anything…”

Seth Godin posted on July 10, 2013 “Proving the skeptics wrong”

Here’s the thing about proving skeptics wrong: They don’t care. They won’t learn. They will stay skeptics.

The ones who said the airplane would never fly ignored the success of the Wright Bros. and went on to become skeptical of something else.

And when they got onto an airplane, they didn’t apologize to the engineers on their way in.

I used to have a list, and I kept it in my head, the list of people who rejected, who were skeptical, who stood in the way.

What I discovered was that this wasn’t the point of the work, and my goal wasn’t actually to prove these folks wrong, it was only to do the work that was worth doing.

So long ago, I stopped keeping track: It’s not about the skeptics. 

It’s about the people who care about, support and enable.

Instead of working so hard to prove the skeptics wrong, it makes a lot more sense to delight the true believers.

After all, hey deserve it and they’re the ones that are going to spread the word for you.”

Note: Now is the time to ponder “what word you want to spread?” What is your passion?

To be Successful, Proportional Representation must be Accompanied by Party Reform 

Sami Atallah, LCPS executive director. May 2018

While there was genuine hope that adopting a proportional representation system could pave the way for political reform in Lebanon, its impact was largely confined to shifting the balance of power among the same political elite. (Not bad as a first in Lebanon, after 75 years of “Majority takes All” law) in every district

Many of the new faces in Lebanon’s recently-elected parliament are from the same political or social fabric as their predecessors, including many sons of politicians (mosly feudal families).

In some districts, the old guard has returned. Save one candidate, no individuals put forward by new political groups crossed the finish line, while women remain heavily under-represented in the country’s national legislature. (6 women deputy, one of them returned)

Granted, Lebanon’s new electoral law introduced pre-printed ballots for the first time; many lists competed against each other—averaging five in the fifteen districts—though on an unequal footing.

A record number of highly qualified women threw their respective hats into the ring (86 compared to only twelve in 2009).

However, this election exposed several deficiencies in the law, many of which we highlighted in an earlier article and need to be addressed to better represent different segments of society.

This election showed that while electoral reform is necessary, it is not sufficient. (As in all laws that need to be updated every now and then?)

There is an urgent need to address electoral strategies that parties have resorted to in order to manipulate voters’ behavior. This brings us to key questions regarding political party reforms and whether parties can transform themselves from being clientelistic to programmatic by forwarding and promoting policy prescriptions that address people’s concerns.

One of the key provisions of this law concerns the requirement that candidates be named on a single list. It was hoped that this would foster some policy coherence among candidates on the same list, something largely absent in Lebanese politics.

More alarming is the fact that many of these parties ran with and against the same parties in different districts.

For instance, the Amal movement ran with the FPM (who is the FPM again?) in Beirut II, Baabda, and Rachaya but against it in Baalbek-Hermel, Saida-Jezzine, Sour-Saida villages-Zahrani, and Bint Jbeil-Nabatiyeh-Hasbaya-Marjayoun.

The FPM ran with Hezbollah in Beirut II and Baabda but against it in Zahle, Baalbek-Hermel, Sour-Saida villages-Zahrani, and Bint Jbeil-Nabatiyeh-Hasbaya-Marjayoun.

The same holds true for the Future Movement, as it allied with the Lebanese Forces in Chouf-Aley, Akkar-Tripoli, and Baalbek-Hermel, but competed against it in Baabda, Zahleh, and Saida-Jezzine.

If all of this sounds confusing, it merely reflects the complexity of alliances that were struck—putting on hold personal as well as ideological and political differences—with the exclusive aim of winning seats at all costs.

Once lists were formed, the competition between them transformed, in many cases, into competitions among candidates on the same lists, as they scrambled to garner preferential votes.

Candidates sought preferential votes from their co-confessionalists, leading to the electoral system operating similarly to the “Orthodox law”, under which it had been proposed that citizens cast votes exclusively for candidates of the same confession.

This effectively reduces representation to largely contrived confessional concerns, ignoring all other aims, chief among them a national vision.

It also overlooks the fact that improvement in people’s welfare rests not on being governed by co-confessional leaders, but by the ability of citizens to hold their leaders accountable.

Compounding this is a lack of substantive and programmatic platforms on which parties campaign. (Only Hezbollah sounded serious about confronting the spoilage system in our budget and public funds)

While this has never been part of Lebanese political discourse, it was hoped that a PR system would inject some degree of public policy debate addressing socio-economic interests into campaigning.

Indeed, political parties drafted programs but most were too thin on evidence, rife with generalities, and short on specifics.

Most importantly, the programs lacked any sense of vision or direction. (No party dares project into the future the direction of their purpose)

Even when a position was articulated by a party, very few measures were suggested on how to reach a desired end. While many party programs ostensibly support the productive sector, reforming the tax system, and repairing the electricity sector, party members’ alleged consensus ends there and programs continue to languish where they serve parties best: On a web portal.

The lack of programmatic campaigning means political parties in 2018 resorted to what they do best: Coercing voters.

Stories circulated about vote buying, either through cash or the provision of services such as paying school tuition or securing medical treatments.

Others were promised public sector jobs by candidates if family members cast their votes for them.

Candidates sought to scare their constituents using fear of the “other” as a way to mobilize voters.

A Hezbollah MP warned constituents in Baalbek against allowing “others” to win Sunni and Christian seats, in reference to the Future Movement and Lebanese Forces, respectively. (These forces supported the Syrian factions during its civil war, even refusing to kick out these factions from Lebanon Eastern mountain chains)

In return, the minister of interior tried to mobilize Sunnis in Beirut to vote for his party so the Shiites “do not invade” the capital. (Mashnouk blatantly was kissing Saudi Kingdom for support and cash)

In the last few days of the election, Jumblatt, not wanting to take any risks regarding the election outcome, warned his Druze followers that Mukhtara may “fall” if his list was not elected. Of course, FPM chief Gebran Bassil did not miss the chance to associate himself with “the rights of Christians” (what you mean by rights here?).

It is no surprise then that many voters were not eager to go to the polls last Sunday. (Especially those earning a living in the Gulf States, of about 400,000 voters)

While turnout was expected to be higher under a proportional representation system compared to a majoritarian system, this was not the case in Lebanon, where it fell by 2%. (Just 2%? In many districts it barely reached 35%)

Sensing voters’ apathy and worried that low turnout may bring the threshold down and give smaller parties or new political groups the chance to grab a few seats, two of the larger political parties—the Future Movement and Hezbollah—even considered extending the voting period but chose not to as it would threaten to delegitimize the election results.

Instead, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities issued a decision that classified the vicinity of polling stations as part of voting areas, which meant that any voter who was within that perimeter could vote, even after the official cutoff time. This effectively extended the duration of voting, in violation of the spirit of the law.

In the case of Baalbek-Hermel, the absence of a courtyard in some schools led to a wider interpretation of the vicinity of the polling station, leading to a larger defined area. To compliment this, political parties also opted to mobilize voters in the remaining few hours that polls were opened.

While the Future Movement attempted to do so softly using TV and radio messages, Hezbollah employed its strong organizational capabilities to get voters to the polling booths.

Despite voter apathy, political parties and the media went to great lengths to paint the election as a “wedding”, conveniently disregarding the violations that took place before and during the election.

Voting secrecy was not respected in many instances as elderly voters were carried to polling stations and were assisted by party delegates under the pretext that they are either illiterate or in need of physical assistance to cast their ballot.

Several anecdotes were shared by citizens whose votes apparently evaporated from specific polling stations. (Particularly In district Beirut #2, where Mashnouk and the Future were extremely worried of the turnout. Actually, the governor of Beirut reneged on his signature to permit Independent lists to have representatives in the polling stations)

As for ballot boxes, some went missing, others were not sealed, and one video showed two people rummaging through one. The inability or unwillingness of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities to address these violations or at least to openly communicate with the public made things worse.

In total, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Election (LADE) reported 950 violations, which is higher than the number recorded in 2009, including 222 that are very serious and involve intimidation.

Furthermore, the commission overseeing the election was hardly present. A lack of resources, lack of serious responsibilities, and the resignation of one of its civil society members cast a shadow on the commission’s credibility in undertaking its role.

The electoral law and the 2018 elections can hardly be called a success.

Political parties and their elite backers managed to steal the election to gain legitimacy for another four years using a range of tricks and gimmicks. While some political parties won a few seats and others lost, the biggest loser in this election is the Lebanese voter, who either voted for or was forced to vote for the same parties that have managed to do little more than impoverish them.

This election cast a shadow on how the PR system was designed and implemented. There is a serious need to revise the electoral law based on the PR system, particularly the high threshold it imposes and the use of preferential voting, which reduced voting in many regions to a confessional contest.

More than ever, there is a need to establish an independent commission with wide responsibilities and the human and financial resources to establish an even playing field across competing groups as well as prevent voter intimidation.

Lastly, there is a strong need for political parties to campaign on public policy proposals as opposed to fiery, fear-inducing discourse laced with the same, played out sectarian themes.

The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies
“…This #election showed that while #electoral reform is necessary, it is Not sufficient. There is an urgent need to address electoral strategies that parties have resorted to in order to manipulate voters’ behavior. This brings us to key questions regarding political party reforms and whether parties can transform themselves from being clientelistic to programmatic by forwarding and promoting

You’re not capable of doing what? Not even once?

Seth Godin posted this July 17, 2013

It’s so easy to have a black and white list of the things you’re not capable of doing.

A hard limit, a boundary that says you just don’t have the genes to make art, speak up, write, give a speech, be funny, be charming, be memorable, come through in the clutch, survive an ordeal like this one… it’s easy to give up.

In response, we ask, “not even once?”

Never once have you been funny or inspired or connected?

Not even once have you been trusted, eager or original?

Not even once have you written a sentence that someone else was happy to read, or asked a question that needed to be


Is there a difference between “I want people to talk about this,” and “I want to control what people say”?

Controlling the Ideavirus

Dennis O. Smith wrote in with this question about Unleashing the Ideavirus: “I understand the concept of spreading the idea, but how can you control or direct that growth? ‘Going viral’ is great for fast growth and sharing of your idea, but are there mechanisms to steer it, trim it, shape it, etc.”

The reason that so many people catch a cold every year is that no one is trying to control where it goes. The reason that Wikipedia is so robust is that control is decentralized.

The reason that there’s a huge disconnect between corporate marketing and ideas that spread is that the culture of contagious ideas is anathema to the command, control and responsibility mindset of the industrial marketer.

There’s a huge difference between, “I want people to talk about this,” and “I want to control what people say.”

But, and it’s a huge but: the marketer decides where the virus starts. She decides who the first sneezers will be.

She decides on what easy-to-use tools may be made available to the group that she’s identified. These decisions go a very long way to determining what happens next.

Napster and Facebook were both optimized for college students and were intentionally seeded there. Sure, the founders could have picked nursing homes or military academies, but the character and culture of the college campus ensured that not only would these ideas spread, but that they would spread in the desired direction.

If you want to spread an idea among policy wonks, don’t involve People-magazine style celebrities, or aim for big numbers.

Instead, find the hive that matches the group you’d like to be discussing your idea, and (this is the big and) create an idea that not only interests this group, but is easy and fun to spread precisely among this group.

[When I launched this book, I knew which group I wanted to read it. So I wrote in a tone that appealed to this group, placed a long excerpt in Fast Company, which was sort of patient zero for this group, and then gave the book away for free (it’s still free online) with explicit instructions to share and email it to people who might become engaged with it.

No, I couldn’t control what would happen, or where it would go, or what the impact might be, but by picking the 3,000 people who got it first, and then making it easy for this group to share it, it quickly got to over a million readers.

This wasn’t the fastest way to get to a big number, but it was the best way to get to the right number and kind of people.

The temptation is to be big, when the real goal ought to be effective.]

PS: Last time I checked, you can get a used copy of the 13-year old edition of the book for a penny.

You may notice that I’ve chosen not to update past blog posts, past books or past websites.That’s because each is a testament to when it was written, as opposed to being a constantly updating resource. Even so, I hope these older books can add value and give you perspective.

PPS: Fritz Lieber wrote about the out of control ideavirus in his short story “Rump-Titty-Titty-Tum-TAH-Tee” published more than fifty years ago.




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