Adonis Diaries

Archive for February 2019

Working backward to solve problems?

Kind you solved it and trying to figure out how you did it?

Patsy Z and TEDxSKE shared a link.
Imagine where you want to be someday. Now, how did you get there? Retrograde analysis is a style of problem solving where you work backwards from the…
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Mon cher Ado. Part 105

Saint Augustin, qui a vécu à cheval sur le quatrième et cinquième siècle de l’ère chrétienne, est considéré comme le fondateur du genre autobiographique .
Après une jeunesse dissipée , qu’il raconte dans les Confessions , il se convertit au Christianisme et devient évêques d’Hippone dans l’actuelle Algérie .

N’oublions pas qu’avant les conquêtes arabes au septième siècle , tout le pourtour méditerranéen faisait partie du grand Empire Romain , christianisé dès le quatrième siècle , suite à la conversion de l’Empereur Constantin .

Plus de mille ans plus tard, Jean-Jacques Rousseau rédige , lui aussi , ses Confessions , où il raconte à son tour l’histoire de sa vie dans ce qu’elle a parfois de plus intime, ouvrant la voie à tous ceux qui après lui vont rédiger leurs autobiographies.

Victor Hugo ,après Rousseau et Chateaubriand, tournant le dos à l’époque classique , qui considérait avec Pascal (le grand Mathématicien et Philosophe du XVII éme siècle) ,que le “moi ” est haïssable , il nous parle de ses émotions , de ce qu’il avait ressentit surtout après la mort de sa fille noyée dans la Seine .

Mais face à ses détracteurs , les classiques qui étaient encore influents au début du XIX éme siècle , il se justifie en disant dans l’une de ses préfaces :

” Ah! Quand je vous parle de moi,je vous parle de vous .
Comment ne le sentez-vous pas ? ”
En effet quand on parle de soi , on parle de tous .
Car qui n’a pas souffert au cours de sa vie ?
Qui n’a pas perdu un être cher qu’il a pleuré , et qu’il pleure encore ?
Qui n’a pas aimé et ressenti un bonheur intense au cours de son existence ?

FRACTURED LANDS: HOW THE ARAB WORLD CAME APART

This is a story unlike any we have previously published. It is much longer than the typical New York Times Magazine feature story; in print, it occupies an entire issue.

The product of some 18 months of reporting, it tells the story of the catastrophe that has fractured the Arab world since the invasion of Iraq 13 years ago, leading to the rise of ISIS and the global refugee crisis. (How about supporting Saddam in his 8 years war against Iran?)

The geography of this catastrophe is broad and its causes are many, but its consequences — war and uncertainty throughout the world — are familiar to us all.

Scott Anderson’s story gives the reader a visceral sense of how it all unfolded, through the eyes of six characters in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Accompanying Anderson’s text are 10 portfolios by the photographer Paolo Pellegrin, drawn from his extensive travels across the region over the last 14 years, as well as a landmark virtual-reality experience that embeds the viewer with the Iraqi fighting forces during the battle to retake Falluja. (The same city that US bombed with depleted uranium and caused the birth of thousands of handicapped and deformed children)

It is unprecedented for us to focus so much energy and attention on a single story, and to ask our readers to do the same. We would not do so were we not convinced that what follows is one of the most clear-eyed, powerful and human explanations of what has gone wrong in this region that you will ever read.

Before driving into northern Iraq, Dr. Azar Mirkhan changed from his Western clothes into the traditional dress of a Kurdish pesh merga warrior: a tightfitting short woolen jacket over his shirt, baggy pantaloons and a wide cummerbund. He also thought to bring along certain accessories. These included a combat knife, tucked neatly into the waist of his cummerbund, as well as sniper binoculars and a loaded .45 semiautomatic. Should matters turn particularly ticklish, an M-4 assault rifle lay within easy reach on the back seat, with extra clips in the foot well. The doctor shrugged. “It’s a bad neighborhood.”

Our destination that day in May 2015 was the place of Azar’s greatest sorrow, one that haunted him still. The previous year, ISIS gunmen had cut a murderous swath through northern Iraq, brushing away an Iraqi Army vastly greater in size, and then turning their attention to the Kurds.

Azar had divined precisely where the ISIS killers were about to strike, knew that tens of thousands of civilians stood helpless in their path, but had been unable to get anyone to heed his warnings. In desperation, he had loaded up his car with guns and raced to the scene, only to come to a spot in the road where he saw he was just hours too late. “It was obvious,” Azar said, “so obvious. But no one wanted to listen.”

On that day, we were returning to the place where the fabled Kurdish warriors of northern Iraq had been outmaneuvered and put to flight, where Dr. Azar Mirkhan had failed to avert a colossal tragedy — and where, for many more months to come, he would continue to battle ISIS.

Azar is a practicing urologist, but even without the firepower and warrior get-up, the 41-year-old would exude the aura of a hunter. He walks with a curious loping gait that produces little sound, and in conversation has a tendency to tuck his chin and stare from beneath heavy-lidded eyes, rather as if he were sighting down a gun. With his prominent nose and jet black pompadour, he bears a passing resemblance to a young Johnny Cash.

The weaponry also complemented the doctor’s personal philosophy, as expressed in a scene from one of his favorite movies, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” when a bathing Eli Wallach is caught off guard by a man seeking to kill him. Rather than immediately shoot Wallach, the would-be assassin goes into a triumphant soliloquy, allowing Wallach to kill him first.

“When you have to shoot, shoot; don’t talk,” Azar quoted from the movie. “That is us Kurds now. This is not the time to talk, but to shoot.”

Azar is one of six people whose lives are chronicled in these pages. The six are from different regions, different cities, different tribes, different families, but they share, along with millions of other people in and from the Middle East, an experience of profound unraveling. Their lives have been forever altered by upheavals that began in 2003 with the American invasion of Iraq, and then accelerated with the series of revolutions and insurrections that have collectively become known in the West as the Arab Spring. They continue today with the depredations of ISIS, with terrorist attacks and with failing states.

For each of these six people, the upheavals were crystallized by a specific, singular event. For Azar Mirkhan, it came on the road to Sinjar, when he saw that his worst fears had come true. For Laila Soueif in Egypt, it came when a young man separated from a sprinting mass of protesters to embrace her, and she thought she knew the revolution would succeed.

For Majdi el-Mangoush in Libya, it came as he walked across a deadly no-man’s-land and, overwhelmed by a sudden euphoria, felt free for the first time in his life.

For Khulood al-Zaidi in Iraq, it came when, with just a few menacing words from a former friend, she finally understood that everything she had worked for was gone.

For Majd Ibrahim in Syria, it came when, watching an interrogator search his cellphone for the identity of his “controller,” he knew his own execution was drawing nearer by the moment.

For Wakaz Hassan in Iraq, a young man with no apparent interest in politics or religion, it came on the day ISIS gunmen showed up in his village and offered him a choice.

As disparate as those moments were, for each of these six people they represented a crossing over, passage to a place from which there will never be a return. Such changes, of course — multiplied by millions of lives — are also transforming their homelands, the greater Middle East and, by inevitable extension, the entire world.

History never flows in a predictable way. It is always a result of seemingly random currents and incidents, the significance of which can be determined — or, more often, disputed — only in hindsight. But even accounting for history’s capricious nature, the event credited with setting off the Arab Spring could hardly have been more improbable: the suicide by immolation of a poor Tunisian fruit-and-vegetable seller in protest over government harassment.

By the time Mohamed Bouazizi succumbed to his injuries on Jan. 4, 2011, the protesters who initially took to Tunisia’s streets calling for economic reform were demanding the resignation of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the nation’s strongman president for 23 years. In subsequent days, those demonstrations grew in size and intensity — and then they jumped Tunisia’s border. By the end of January, anti-government protests had erupted in Algeria, Egypt, Oman and Jordan. That was only the beginning.

By November, just 10 months after Bouazizi’s death, four longstanding Middle Eastern dictatorships had been toppled, a half-dozen other suddenly embattled governments had undergone shake-ups or had promised reforms, and anti-government demonstrations — some peaceful, others violent — had spread in an arc across the Arab world from Mauritania to Bahrain.

As a writer with long experience in the Middle East, I initially welcomed the convulsions of the Arab Spring — indeed, I believed they were long overdue. In the early 1970s, I traveled through the region as a young boy with my father, a journey that sparked both my fascination with Islam and my love of the desert. The Middle East was also the site of my first foray into journalism when, in the summer of 1983, I hopped on a plane to the embattled city Beirut in hopes of finding work as a stringer.

Over the subsequent years, I embedded with a platoon of Israeli commandos conducting raids in the West Bank; dined with Janjaweed raiders in Darfur; interviewed the families of suicide bombers. Ultimately, I took a five-year hiatus from magazine journalism to write a book on the historical origins of the modern Middle East.

In my professional travels over the decades, I had found no other region to rival the Arab world in its utter stagnation. While Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya set a record for longevity in the Middle East with his 42-year dictatorship, it was not that different elsewhere; by 2011, any Egyptian younger than 41 — and that was roughly 75% of the population — had only ever known two heads of state, while a Syrian of the same age had lived his or her entire life under the control of the father-and-son Assad dynasty.

Along with political stasis, in many Arab nations most levers of economic power lay in the hands of small oligarchies or aristocratic families; for everyone else, about the only path to financial security was to wrangle a job within fantastically bloated public-sector bureaucracies, government agencies that were often themselves monuments to nepotism and corruption. While the sheer amount of money pouring into oil-rich, sparsely populated nations like Libya or Kuwait might allow for a degree of economic trickle-down prosperity, this was not the case in more populous but resource-poor nations like Egypt or Syria, where poverty and underemployment were severe and — given the ongoing regional population explosion — ever-worsening problems.

I was heartened, in the Arab Spring’s early days, by the focus of the people’s wrath. One of the Arab world’s most prominent and debilitating features, I had long felt, was a culture of grievance that was defined less by what people aspired to than by what they opposed. They were anti-Zionist, anti-West, anti-imperialist. For generations, the region’s dictators had been adroit at channeling public frustration toward these external “enemies” and away from their own misrule. But with the Arab Spring, that old playbook suddenly didn’t work anymore. Instead, and for the first time on such a mass scale, the people of the Middle East were directing their rage squarely at the regimes themselves.

Then it all went horribly wrong. By the summer of 2012, two of the “freed” nations — Libya and Yemen — were sliding into anarchy and factionalism, while the struggle against the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria had descended into vicious civil war. In Egypt the following summer, the nation’s first democratically elected government was overthrown by the military, a coup cheered on by many of the same young activists who took to the streets to demand democracy two years earlier.

The only truly bright spot among the Arab Spring nations was the place where it started, Tunisia, but even there, terrorist attacks and feuding politicians were a constant threat to a fragile government. Amid the chaos, the remnants of Osama bin Laden’s old outfit, Al Qaeda, gained a new lease on life, resurrected the war in Iraq and then spawned an even more severe and murderous offshoot: the Islamic State, or ISIS.

Why did it turn out this way? Why did a movement begun with such high promise go so terribly awry?

The scattershot nature of the Arab Spring makes it hard to provide a single answer. Some nations were radically transformed, even as others right next door were barely touched. Some of the nations in crisis were relatively wealthy (Libya), others crushingly poor (Yemen). Some countries with comparatively benign dictatorships (Tunisia) blew up along with some of the region’s most brutal (Syria). The same range of political and economic disparity is seen in the nations that remained stable.

Yet one pattern does emerge, and it is striking.

While most of the 22 nations that make up the Arab world have been buffeted to some degree by the Arab Spring, the six most profoundly affected — Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen — are all republics, rather than monarchies.

And of these six, the three that have disintegrated so completely as to raise doubt that they will ever again exist as functioning states — Iraq, Syria and Libya — are all members of that small list of Arab countries created by Western imperial powers in the early 20th century. (Jordan, Saudi Kingdom, Israel, Gulf Emirate… were all been created by the colonial powers too. Actually, mandated France gave away to Turkey Syrian land as vast as its actual size)

In each, little thought was given to national coherence, and even less to tribal or sectarian divisions.

Certainly, these same internal divisions exist in many of the region’s other republics, as well as in its monarchies, but it would seem undeniable that those two factors operating in concert — the lack of an intrinsic sense of national identity joined to a form of government that supplanted the traditional organizing principle of society — left Iraq, Syria and Libya especially vulnerable when the storms of change descended.

In fact, all but one of the six people profiled ahead are from these “artificial states,” and their individual stories are rooted in the larger story of how those nations came to be.

The process began at the end of World War I, when two of the victorious allies, Britain and France, carved up the lands of the defeated Ottoman Empire between themselves as spoils of war. In Mesopotamia, the British joined together three largely autonomous Ottoman provinces and named it Iraq.

The southernmost of these provinces was dominated by Shiite Arabs, the central by Sunni Arabs and the northernmost by non-Arab Kurds. To the west of Iraq, the European powers took the opposite approach, carving the vast lands of “greater Syria” into smaller, more manageable parcels. (Like Lebanon)

Falling under French rule was the smaller rump state of Syria — essentially the nation that exists today — and the coastal enclave of Lebanon, while the British took Palestine and Transjordan, a swath of southern Syria that would eventually become Israel and Jordan.

Coming a bit later to the game, in 1934, Italy joined the three ancient North African regions that it had wrested from the Ottomans in 1912 to form the colony of Libya.

To maintain dominion over these fractious territories, the European powers adopted the same divide-and-conquer approach that served them so well in the colonization of sub-Saharan Africa. This consisted of empowering a local ethnic or religious minority to serve as their local administrators, confident that this minority would never rebel against their foreign overseers lest they be engulfed by the disenfranchised majority.

This was only the most overt level of the Europeans’ divide-and-conquer strategy, however, for just beneath the sectarian and regional divisions in these “nations” there lay extraordinarily complex tapestries of tribes and subtribes and clans, ancient social orders that remained the populations’ principal source of identification and allegiance.

Much as the United States Army and white settlers did with Indian tribes in the conquest of the American West, so the British and French and Italians proved adept at pitting these groups against one another, bestowing favors — weapons or food or sinecures — to one faction in return for fighting another.

The great difference, of course, is that in the American West, the settlers stayed and the tribal system was essentially destroyed. In the Arab world, the Europeans eventually left, but the sectarian and tribal schisms they fueled remained.

Seen in this light, the 2011 suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi seems less the catalyst for the Arab Spring than a culmination of tensions and contradictions that had been simmering under the surface of Arab society for a long time. Indeed, throughout the Arab world, residents are far more likely to point to a different event, one that occurred eight years before Bouazizi’s death, as the moment when the process of disintegration began: the American invasion of Iraq. Many even point to a singular image that embodied that upheaval.

It came on the afternoon of April 9, 2003, in the Firdos Square of downtown Baghdad, when, with the help of a winch and an American M88 armored recovery vehicle, a towering statue of the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, was pulled to the ground.

While today that image is remembered in the Arab world with resentment — the symbolism of this latest Western intervention in their region was quite inescapable — at the time it spurred something far more nuanced. For the first time in their lives, what Syrians and Libyans and other Arabs just as much as Iraqis saw was that a figure as seemingly immovable as Saddam Hussein could be cast aside, that the political and social paralysis that had so long held their collective lands might actually be broken.

Not nearly so apparent was that these strongmen had actually exerted considerable energy to bind up their nations, and in their absence the ancient forces of tribalism and sectarianism would begin to exert their own centrifugal pull. Even less apparent was how these forces would both attract and repel the United States, damaging its power and prestige in the region to an extent from which it might never recover.

At least one man saw this quite clearly. For much of 2002, the Bush administration had laid the groundwork for the Iraq invasion by accusing Saddam Hussein of pursuing a weapons-of-mass-destruction program and obliquely linking him to the Sept. 11 attacks.

In October 2002, six months before Firdos Square, I had a long interview with Muammar el-Qaddafi, and I asked him who would benefit if the Iraq invasion actually occurred. The Libyan dictator had a habit of theatrically pondering before answering my questions, but his reply to that one was instantaneous. “Bin Laden,” he said. “There is no doubt about that. And Iraq could end up becoming the staging ground for Al Qaeda, because if the Saddam government collapses, it will be anarchy in Iraq. If that happens, actions against Americans will be considered jihad.”

Beginning in April 2015, the photographer Paolo Pellegrin and I embarked on a series of extended trips to the Middle East. Separately and as a writer-photographer team, we had covered an array of conflicts in the region over the previous 20 years, and our hope on this new set of journeys was to gain a greater understanding of the so-called Arab Spring and its generally grim aftermath. As the situation continued to deteriorate through 2015 and 2016, our travels expanded: to those islands in Greece bearing the brunt of the migrant exodus from Iraq and Syria; to the front lines in northern Iraq where the battle against ISIS was being most vigorously waged.

We have presented the results of this 16-month project in the form of six individual narratives, which, woven within the larger strands of history, aim to provide a tapestry of an Arab World in revolt.

The account is divided into five parts, which proceed chronologically as they alternate between our principal characters. Along with introducing several of these individuals, Part 1 focuses on three historical factors that are crucial to understanding the current crisis: the inherent instability of the Middle East’s artificial states; the precarious position in which U.S.-allied Arab governments have found themselves when compelled to pursue policies bitterly opposed by their own people; and American involvement in the de facto partitioning of Iraq 25 years ago, an event little remarked upon at the time — and barely more so since — that helped call into question the very legitimacy of the modern Arab nation-state.

Part 2 is primarily devoted to the American invasion of Iraq, and to how it laid the groundwork for the Arab Spring revolts. In Part 3, the narrative quickens, as we follow the explosive outcome of those revolts as they occurred in Egypt, Libya and Syria. By Part 4, which chronicles the rise of ISIS, and Part 5, which tracks the resulting exodus from the region, we are squarely in the present, at the heart of the world’s gravest concern.

I have tried to tell a human story, one that has its share of heroes, even some glimmers of hope. But what follows, ultimately, is a dark warning. Today the tragedy and violence of the Middle East have spilled from its banks, with nearly a million Syrians and Iraqis flooding into Europe to escape the wars in their homelands, and terrorist attacks in Dhaka, Paris and beyond. With the ISIS cause being invoked by mass murderers in San Bernardino and Orlando, the issues of immigration and terrorism have now become conjoined in many Americans’ minds, forming a key political flash point in the coming presidential election.

In some sense, it is fitting that the crisis of the Arab world has its roots in the First World War, for like that war, it is a regional crisis that has come quickly and widely — with little seeming reason or logic — to influence events at every corner of the globe.

Note: I posted many far more detailed articles on this issue on my blog.  Syria and Iraq are bound to become more stable, developed and better equipped to confront further sanctions and pre-emptive wars by Israel or any colonial power, thanks to powerful Iran and is vast potential and integration

The Israel Lobby,” by John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt

The Israel Lobby was one of the most controversial articles in recent memory. Originally published in the London Review of Books in March 2006, it provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy.

Now in a work of major importance, Mearsheimer and Walt deepen and expand their argument and confront recent developments in Lebanon and Iran.

They describe the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel and argues that this support cannot be fully explained on either strategic or moral grounds.

This exceptional relationship is due largely to the political influence of a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.

Mearsheimer and Walt provocatively contend that the lobby has a far-reaching impact on America’s posture throughout the Middle East―in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict―and the policies it has encouraged are in neither America’s national interest nor Israel’s long-term interest. The lobby’s influence also affects America’s relationship with important allies and increases dangers that all states face from global jihadist terror.

Writing in The New York Review of Books, Michael Massing declared, “Not since Foreign Affairs magazine published Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in 1993 has an academic essay detonated with such force.”

The publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy is certain to widen the debate and to be one of the most talked-about books in foreign policy.

What human aid hides in imperialism strategy

Noam Chomsky : ce que l’aide humanitaire cache

Le concept d’aide humanitaire est presque tout acte d’agression commis par une puissance qui, du point de vue de l’agresseur, est de l’aide humanitaire, mais pas du point de vue des victimes, explique le philosophe Noam Chomsky.

Selon le linguiste et politologue, les États-Unis le reconnaissent publiquement et il est bien compris dans le domaine de l’empire traditionnel.

Premier exemple d’aide humanitaire : le bombardement de la Serbie en 1999
Les forces albanaises ont commis des attentats terroristes sur le territoire serbe afin de provoquer une réaction de leur gouvernement qui servirait de justification à l’entrée de l’OTAN dans le pays, à savoir une intervention des Etats-Unis.
Les pertes estimées sont élevées des deux côtés : deux mille victimes. Lorsqu’ils ont assumé l’invasion, le général étasunien en charge, Wesley Clark, a informé Washington que le résultat de l’attaque intensifierait les atrocités, parce que la Serbie n’était pas capable de riposter militairement en bombardant les Etats-Unis, la Serbie a répondu par voie terrestre, expulsant les terroristes albanais du Kosovo, juste après les bombardements étasuniens.
Mais la grande couverture médiatique a été celle de Slobodan Milošević (ancien président serbe) traduit devant la Cour pénale internationale pour des crimes de masse, tous, à une exception près, ont été commis après le bombardement perpétré par les États-Unis. Tout ce qui précède était une intervention humanitaire, note Chomsky.
Les interventions d’aide humanitaire sont-elles légales ?
L’assemblée générale des Nations unies a adopté une résolution sur la responsabilité de protéger, qui stipule explicitement qu’un acte non militaire ne peut être accompli sans l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.
Il est utilisé pour s’assurer que les gouvernements ne répriment pas leurs propres populations. Cependant, il y avait une autre commission, présidée par l’ancien Premier ministre australien Garreth Evans, qui débattait de la « responsabilité de protéger », très similaire à la version de l’ONU, mais avec une différence, si le Conseil de sécurité n’accepte pas l’autorisation d’une intervention, les groupements régionaux peuvent intervenir par la force à leur compte… Quel groupement régional est capable d’intervenir ? Il n’y en a qu’un seul et c’est l’OTAN.
La « responsabilité de protéger » est légale parce que l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies l’a autorisée, mais ce qui régit actuellement, c’est la version autorisée d’Evans, un bon exemple du fonctionnement de la propagande dans un système puissant, qui peut également être constaté dans les médias.
Autre exemple d’aide humanitaire : le bombardement de la Libye en 2011
Une résolution de l’ONU en 2011 appelait à la création d’une zone d’exclusion aérienne en Libye, à l’exception de celles dont les objectifs sont « humanitaires », qui ont fait appel à la diplomatie pour résoudre le problème, et que Mouammar Kadhafi a accepté, déclarant un cessez-le-feu contre les forces opposées à son gouvernement.
Finalement, Washington a choisi de soutenir une résolution beaucoup plus large que celle de la simple zone d’exclusion aérienne, et a opté pour une occupation militaire du pays.
Le Royaume-Uni, la France et les États-Unis sont devenus la force aérienne de l’opposition. L’une de leurs attaques a fini par enterrer Kadhafi et tuer 10.000 personnes, laissant la Libye dans ce qu’elle est aujourd’hui, entre les mains des milices.
Depuis, il y a eu un afflux important de djihadistes armés en Asie de l’Ouest et en Afrique de l’Ouest, qui sont devenus la principale source de terrorisme radical dans le monde, c’est une conséquence de la mal nommée intervention humanitaire  en Libye.
Le pouvoir des États-Unis, avec Donald Trump comme président
Chomsky a également expliqué que la société doit repenser ce que signifie le pouvoir. Les États-Unis, à son avis, demeurent suprêmes. Leur pouvoir est nuisible, mais du point de vue de l’oligarchie, ce pouvoir leur donne tout ce qu’ils demandent, affirme le philosophe.
Rien qu’en termes militaires, ce pays gère 25 % de l’économie mondiale, et il est aussi beaucoup plus avancé sur le plan technologique que le reste du monde. Même si l’économie est en déclin, ce serait une erreur de penser qu’ils ont perdu leur emprise car les multinationales étasuniennes possèdent la moitié du monde, elles sont intégrées à l’État, elles possèdent tous les secteurs : industrie, vente, commerce, finance.
Depuis son élection à la présidence, ce n’est pas seulement Trump qui représente le danger, mais l’ensemble de la direction républicaine, qui nie le phénomène du réchauffement climatique, pour ne citer qu’un problème.
Le Parti républicain est l’une des organisations les plus dangereuses de l’histoire de l’humanité, cela semble scandaleux, mais réfléchissons-y un instant, Hitler n’a pas voulu détruire l’avenir de l’existence humaine, personne n’en avait l’intention. Ce ne sont ni les ignorants ni les fondamentalistes religieux, mais les plus instruits et soutenus dans le monde, qui mettent la société en danger.
Les politiques les plus dangereuses sont à peine discutées, ce sont des menaces existentielles auxquelles nous sommes confrontés, cette génération doit décider si l’existence humaine va continuer, et ce n’est pas une blague, entre le réchauffement climatique ou une guerre nucléaire et les actions de Trump ne font qu’empirer les deux.

Mon cher Ado. Part 93

Georges Bejani posted on Fb. 15 hrs
Image may contain: text

A lawsuit against Allah in Syria in 2005

The 40-year Syrian Abed Razaak Abed Allah filed a lawsuit against Allah in 2005 for failing to deliver on his promises in many verses of the Koran.

When the judge asked him why he waited so long to file his lawsuit Abed Razaak replied: All judges were scared of Allah, but you seem to be a level-headed judge.

Note: If Allah exists, all those who speak in the name of Allah to justify their behaviors and bad actions, Hell was reserved for them

هذا ما حصل في سورية سنة 2005

« دعوى قضائية ضد الله »

، تقدم مواطن سوري يدعى عبد الرزاق عبدالله سنة ٢٠٠٥ بدعوى قضائية إلى المحكمة ضد الله طلب فيها دعوة المدعى عليه للمحاكمة وإلزامه من حيث النتيجة بتسليمه الرزق الذي خصصه به الله وقد جاء في حيثيات الدعوى كما رواها أحدهم وكان حاضراً عندما تقدم عبد الرزاق بدعواه المذكورة إلى قاضي المحكمة:

المدعي : عبد الرزاق عبدالله.المدعى عليه : الله.موضوع

الدعوى : لقد خلقني المدعى عليه الله قبل أربعين عاماً من والدين فقيرين ماتا قبل أن أبلغ العاشرة من عمري، فنشأت وتربيت يتيماً وفقيراً لا مال عندي ولا بيت، وكان الله قد منع اهلي من قتلي بسبب الفقر عندما قال “لاتقتلوا اولادكم من إملاق (الأنعام)/ خشية إملاق ( الإسراء)، نحن نرزقكم وإياهم”، وبذلك اغواهم وخلف وعده..

ولما كان المدعى عليه الله هو الذي خلقني فهو مكلف بتأمين رزقي وإعالتي بدليل قوله في كتابه الكريم: ” نحن خلقناكم ونحن نرزقكم ” ، إلا أن المدعى عليه ورغم مضي أربعين عاماً على ولادتي لم يكفل لي الحد الأدنى للمعيشة، مما اضطرني إلى حاجة الناس حتى ركبني الدين.ولما كان المدعى عليه قد أكد في القرآن الكريم وعلى لسان نبيه الأمين:” رزقكم في السماء وما توعدون ”

في حين احتفظ المدعى عليه بهذا الرزق المخصص لي بموجب ذلك النص بدون وجه حق، ولم يسلمني إياه رغم المطالبة المستمرة له مع الدعاء له كل يوم وكل ساعة.ولما كان المدعى عليه “الله” قد أعطى غيري من الرزق الكثير بما يفوق حاجته، بحيث ترى أن هناك من يملك الملايين والكثير من العقارات والسيارات ويتذوق يومياً ما لذ وطاب من المأكل والمشرب ، بينما أدوخ أنا مع الكثيرين من الجوع والعطش.

وبما أن إسمي هو عبد الرزاق وعبد الله فمعنى ذلك أنني من عبيد المدعى عليه وبالتالي فهو مكلف بإعالتي، لأن العبد وما ملكت يداه لسيده.لهذه الأسباب وغيرها فإنني أطلب:

١- دعوة المدعى عليه للمحاكمة.
٢- إلزامه بإيداع رزقي الموجود لديه في السماء إلى أقرب بنك.
٣- تضمينه الرسوم والمصاريف.

قرأ القاضي استدعاء الدعوى، وقد بدا عليه الإندهاش والغرابة من مضمون هذه الدعوى الأولى من نوعها في العالم ، ثم قال للمدعي هذه الدعوى ساقطة بالتقادم القصير والطويل، فلماذا انتظرت كل هذه المدة لتتقدم بهذه الدعوى؟

فرد عليه المدعي على الفور :” لا لم تسقط هذه الدعوى بالتقادم يا سيدي لأن التزام المدعى عليه هو التزام مستمر ويتجدد يومياً .دُهش القاضي لهذا الجواب ،

ثم سأل المدعي لكن لماذا لم تتقدم بهذه الدعوى من قبل إلى القضاة الذين كانوا قبلي في هذه المحكمة؟

أجاب المدعي: يا سيدي إن القضاة الذين سبقوك كانوا يخافون من المدعى عليه،أما سيادتكم فلم يثبت لدينا ذلك.

 

My Warpy World (2002)

I need to burn off my excess energy,

That stuff I used to have in abundance in my youth.

I burned it bending on desks,

Reading and learning.

About our warped literature and histories,

Warped theories,

Warped philosophies, of a warped world we created.

 

I now need to stretch time in my old age.

I don’t want time to fly by:

I am supposed to be scared

Of the imminent end.

 

No, I have to work double shifts to make ends meet.

I need to work harder to fulfil

Newly discovered dreams.

Hell was created for me

 

I am still an outsider looking in the adult world.

I still abhor the maintenance part of life,

The mechanics of living and lasting relationship.

I am scared of owning a house,

Of getting married and keep maintaining choices

That I feel I can’t sustain for long.

 

May be that I was not trained properly in childhood

To learn taking responsibilities by learning to maintain.

The adult world is still a curiosity to me

Because, when the time was due to step in,

It was too late for me to learn a new set of behaviors,

In a totally different society, alien to me.

 

I like to discover the adult world and pay the price

Of my practical ignorance, but it should be at my own expense.

But, could anyone else not share the expenses in my miseries?

Indeed, the village will bear the upkeep and it refuses to admit it.

I am positive that I never fell in love, love shared.

 

I might not believe in Heaven,

But people like I, Hell was created for them, here on earth.

Hezbollah is pressured to navigate among treacherous and poisonous waters of “Arab’ States

The all encompassing and elevating speech of Hassan Nasrallah

نبيه البرجي
السيد نصرالله يعلم أن هذه منطقة اللامنطق , منطقة اللاعقل , منطقة اللارؤية .

غابة من القبور (البشرية) المشرعة على الرياح الآتية من ليل الأمم , ومن ليل الأزمنة .
ثلاثة قرون , لا ثلاث ساعات , من الكلام , كلام المنطق, وكلام العقل , بل وكلام القلب , لن يؤثر في تلك “الجوراسيك بارك” , حديقة الديناصورات التي أقامتها الامبراطوريات فوق أكتافنا .

ولسوف ترى , أيها الرجل الرائع , أنك تحمل الراية وحيداً في هذه الصحراء , في هذا العراء …
حين كان يتكلم , كان هناك من يمسك بمفاتيح جهنم . عرب ويلقون المفاتيح في وجهنا “أنتم وفلسطين الى جهنم “.

هل تعني فلسطين غير ذلك , في المفهوم الايديولوجي, وفي المفهوم الاستراتيجي , لصفقة القرن ؟ رقصة القهرمانات حول الهيكل , سواء بني بخشب الأرز أم بحجارة الكعبة .

هؤلاء الذين حوّلوا التراجيديا الكبرى الى الكوميديا الكبرى . كم يبدو صائب عريقات بائساً , كم يبدو محمود عباس ضائعاً , حين يكون الرهان على مفاوضات هي مطحنة التراب مثلما هي مطحنة الدم ؟

من لا يدري ما في العقل الاسرائيلي الذي لا يفقه سوى لغة القوة . من بنيامين نتنياهو الذي ورث عن أبيه ثقافة زئيف جابوتنسكي “العرب الحفاة … العرب الذئاب) , الى الملياردير النيويوركي شلدون أدلسون الذي أقسم أمام الملأ , وأمام يهوه , بأنه سيبني الهيكل من عظام العرب .
في نهاية المطاف , ودون الاستئذان من توماس هوبز , العرب ذئاب العرب …

قال السيد …
لو كنا دولة , لو كنا شعباً (ويفترض أن ننحني أمام أولئك المسيحيين الكبار , وآخرهم موريس الجميل , الذين أدركوا ما تعنيه أمبراطورية يهوه في عقر دارنا) , لانحنينا لحسن نصرالله , وهو يتحدث عن الصواريخ التي تصل الى صدر بنيامين نتنياهو (لاحظتم كم كن مضحكاً وساذجاً في تعليقاته), والى صدر أفيف كوخافي , بل والى صدر دافيد بن غوريون وتيودور هرتزل .

حتى في العتابا والميجانا نتغنى بكبريائنا (نحنا والقمر جيران) , ونتغنى بعنفواننا (هاالكم أرزة العاجقين الكون) , قبل أن نكتشف أن بعضنا عبيد العبيد في المنطقة .

هل يتصور السيد أنه لو أتى بمفاتيح بيت المقدس , ووضعها بين ايديهم , سيكون هناك من يقول له بوركت الدماء , وبوركت الأيدي , التي فعلت هذا ؟ ان وحيد القرن ذهب بهم بعيداً في صفقة القرن !

ما قاله الأمين العام لـ”حزب الله” حول الامكانات العسكرية ليس سوى النزر اليسير . ليعلم كوخافي أن طائراته التي يرى فيها الحاخامات الملائكة المدمرة في الميتولوجيا اليهودية , لن تستطيع , قطعاً , أن تفعل ما فعلته منذ عام 1956 وحتى 2006 . هنا الكارثة الاسرائيلية الكبرى .

الأبحاث في معهد جافي هي التي تتحدث عن “المفاجآت التي تحت عباءة نصرالله” . أحد الباحثين تحدث عن اللحظة اتي يجد فيها الجنرالات أنفسهم داخل الدوامة .

ما قاله السيد يفترض أن نتوقف عنده مليّاً . لن يتجرأ نتنياهو أن يشن الحرب (النزهة) على لبنان . يعلم ما ينتظره لا على الأرض اللبنانية فحسب . على الأرض الاسرائيلية أيضاً . هذيان داخل هيئة الأركان …

ارتجاج في العقل الاسبارطي الذي اعتاد أن يرى الدبابات العربية اما محطمة , أو هاربة , أو خاوية . ثمة واقع آخر بعد وادي الحجير . العالم كله شاهد كيف تنتحب الميركافا , وكيف ينتحب قادة الميركافا الذين طالما وصفوها بـ”الدبابة المقدسة” .
هكذا تكلم السيد حسن . يد حديدية الى ما وراء الحدود , ويد حريرية داخل الحدود . الرفاق في الوطن , الاخوة في الوطن , ولطالما هزجوا لتراب الوطن , أنوفهم في مكان آخر , جيوبهم , أيديهم , في مكان آخر .

مللنا من تلك الكليشهات الرثة تعليقاً على كلام السيد . هل ثمة من رجل دولة يتكلم بتلك الشفافية , وبتلك الدماثة ؟ تابعوا تعليقاتهم التي لكأنها استخرجت للتو من مقامات بديع الزمان الهمذاني , أو من أفواه السلاحف .

منذ القرن التاسع عشر الى جمهورية الطائف (جمهورية الطوائف) , لم يكن هناك لا بيسمارك اللبناني , ولا غاريبالدي اللبناني , لكي يجعل منا شعباً , لا شظايا متناثرة. الآن , المنطقة امام مفترق . اما أن نكون ضيوف شرف على سوق النخاسة , أو نكون حملة الراية الذين ننتشل العرب من الركام , لبنان من الركام .

ما تناهى الينا يفترض بنا كلنا , ودون استثناء , أن نرفع رؤوسنا . اسرائيل في مأزق وجودي . أكثر من أن يكون مأزقاً استراتيجياً حين لا يكون في العقل التوراتي مكان للآخر . نحن الآخر الذي يزعزع الهيكل , الآخر الذي يزلزل الهيكل .

هذه ليست باللغة الفولكلورية . كلام السيد كان كلاماً في العقل , وكلاماً في المنطق . ارفعوا رؤوسكم (أطرقوا أبوابهم بالشواكيش) . المنطقة أمام احتمالات البقاء واللابقاء, ونحن في صراع الأرقام والحقائب . أيتها … السيدة الفضيحة !
هنا في لبنان (الذي لم يعد وسادة القمر) , اختزال “الجوراسيك بارك” . لنتوقف أن نكون اللاعبين الصغار في العملية الكبرى (اغتيال الزمن) , كما حذرنا , ذات يوم , فيلسوف الأمل روجيه غارودي .

كلام السيد الذي كما الزلزال في اسرائيل , ما صداه في لبنان؟ اسألوا من يتباهى بـ”ليلة الشامبانيا” في ذلك القصر الملكي !!


adonis49

adonis49

adonis49

February 2019
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