Adonis Diaries

Archive for the ‘death/ terminally ill/ massacres, genocide’ Category

Saudi monarchy has lost its war in Yemen

Its illusory power purchased in malignant medias and with sectarian alliances:

Hassan Nasr Allah (General Secretary of Hezbollah of Lebanon) has manhandled this obscurantist monarchy’s “worthless pride“.

And this Wahhabi monarchy is reacting with virulent counter attacks on any media disseminating the free expressions of Nasr Allah, opinions based on facts that most reasonable person understand and had witnessed for decades, starting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria and Iraq.

Saudi Kingdom started sanctions on Lebanon and a series of internal meddling after the heart felt speech of Al Sayyed

The Arab world most serious descent into ignorance was not during the ottoman Empire dominion, but when the Saudi monarchy acceded to wealth to wreck havoc in the Arabic societies since 1925.

Million of kids are suffering from hunger in Yemen and thousands have succumbed to cholera that affected half a million.

Scores of Saudi reformists are being detained. Head chopping is still the regulation and increasing for other reasons Not mentioned in Shari3a.

Thousands of religious madrassat and mosques are still being erected everywhere, with Wahhabi clerics heading them and teaching extremist and terrorist behaviors to newer generations.

All enlightened leaders (Antoun Saadeh, Boumedian, Abdel Nasser …) have stated that as long as Saudi Kingdom (Wahhabi sect) is standing, there will be no peace or progress in the Arab World.

And this terror mentality (of considering every other belief system other than Wahhabi should be eradicated by death) is spreading all around the world communities via ISIS.

Mind you that the tomb of Prophet Mohammad was destroyed and Al Ka3ba was a target to be blown up until Britain pressured Saud to desist from this objective because its Moslem colonies were in upheaval.

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How Lebanon civil war started and why?

هكذا أشعلت أميركا الحرب الأهليّة: لبنان شرطـة لأمن إسرائيل [2]

يمكنكم متابعة الكاتب عبر تويتر | asadabukhalil@

The Phalanges (Kataeb) party was created whole by the French mandated power in 1936 to counter nationalist organizations who refuted the notion of being mandated, and also to face other sectarian parties, mostly Islamic.

Ever since this fascist party has served well the western nations and Israel, and prevented the establishment of a valid State for all citizens.

Three of its members were elected President of Lebanon, and each one of them brought calamities to Lebanon.

اليمين اللبناني سعى إلى التسلّح بكامل إرادته لا «مُكرهاً» (أ ف ب)

يكشف كتاب صدر حديثاً في الولايات المتحدة دور واشنطن في السياسة اللبنانيّة في بداية الحرب الأهليّة. الكتاب الذي يحمل عنوان «ميادين التدخّل: السياسة الخارجيّة الأميركيّة وانهيار لبنان، ١٩٦٧ ــ ١٩٧٦»، يعتمد على الأرشيف الأميركي من سجلات وزارة الخارجية ودوائر استخبارية وغيرها، ويُظهر في صفحاته ضلوع واشنطن في إشعال الحرب الأهليّة واذكائها وكيفيه تعاملها مع «حلفائها» في بيروت. في ما يأتي، الحلقة الثانية من السلسلة التي تنشرها «الأخبار»

أسعد أبو خليل

ما يكتشفه المرء من هذه الوثائق الأميركيّة الرسميّة حميميّة العلاقة بين حزب الكتائب اللبنانيّة والحكومة الأميركيّة (أي إن مقولة أن حزب الكتائب اضطرّ مرغماً إلى الاستعانة بـ»الشيطان»، أي إسرائيل، في سنوات الحرب الأهليّة لأنه كان معزولاً، ما هي إلا واحدة من أكاذيب الحزب الذي كان يتنعّم مبكراً بدعم خليجي وأردني وأميركي، حتى لا نتكلّم عن دعم غربي آخر لا وثائق عنه إلى الآن).

كذلك إن أحزاب الكتائب والأحرار والكتلة الوطنيّة، أو بالأحرى إن شخص كميل شمعون وبيار الجميّل وريمون إدّة (الذي افترق عن حلفائه في مطلع الحرب والذي لا يبرز في الوثائق كما يبرز شمعون والجميّل، لكن الأخيرين ينطقان في اللقاءات مع الأميركيّين باسم «الحلف الثلاثي» آنذاك) كانوا مشاركين فعليّاً في الحكم في عهد شارل الحلو وسليمان فرنجيّة. يبدو أن زعماء الموارنة تكتّلوا في قيادة جماعيّة عندما بدأ نظام الهيمنة الطائفي الذي زرعه الاستعمار الفرنسي، ورعاه الغرب في ما بعد، يتعرّض للاهتزاز والتهديد المباشر.
وقد ضغط الأحرار والكتائب والكتلة الوطنيّة على شارل حلو لعدم الرضوخ للمزاج الشعبي والرسمي العربي بقطع العلاقة مع دول الغرب بعد حرب ١٩٦٧.

والحلف الثلاثي (الذي فاز بنجاح باهر في انتخابات ١٩٦٨ ــ ومن المُرجّح بقوّة ــ بناءً على العلاقة التي جمعت أحزابه مع حكومات الغرب، أنه تلقّى معونات أميركيّة مباشرة في الحملات الانتخابيّة، لكن الوثائق لم تظهر بعد في ذلك) لم ينتظر إلى نهاية شهر حزيران كي يصدر بياناً يطالب فيه بـ»تدويل لبنان» والحصول على ضمان خارجي لحياده (كأن لبنان كان مُشاركاً في حرب حزيران ــ راجع كتاب جيمس ستوكر، «ميادين التدخّل: السياسة الخارجيّة الأميركيّة وانهيار لبنان، ١٩٦٧-١٩٧٦»، عن دار نشر جامعة كورنيل، ص. ٣٢). لا بل إن الجميّل أصرّ على حلو أن يعود السفير الأميركي على عجل بعد مغادرته ردّاً على إجماع عربي (ولبناني شعبي).

وعرض على الأميركيّين نشر قوّات ميليشيا الكتائب لحماية أمن السفارة الأميركيّة. إن قراءة التقارير من تلك الفترة يؤكّد بصورة قاطعة أن الميثاق الوطني المزعوم لم يكن إلا كذبة انطلت على الزعماء المسلمين في لبنان، وكانت بنودها سارية فقط على فريق واحد، في رفض التحالف أو الاندماج مع المحيط العربي، فيما كان كل رؤساء الجمهوريّة الذين تعاقبوا بعد الاستقلال ــ بالتحالف مع الزعماء الموارنة ــ متحالفين سرّاً وبقوّة مع الدول الغربيّة، مُطالبين على الدوام بتدخّل عسكري أميركي أو فرنسي أو حتّى إسرائيلي في صالحهم. لقد خالف الزعماء الموارنة كل بنود «الميثاق الوطني» فيما كانوا يعظون الغير بجدوى «الميثاق» فقط كي يعزلوا لبنان عن محيطه العربي (ولم يكن المحيط العربي خاضعاً لمشيئة حكّام الخليج آنذاك).
ويرد في الوثائق أن حزب «الأحرار» و»الكتائب» ألحّاً في شهر حزيران وتمّوز من عام ١٩٦٧ على السفارة الأميركيّة للحصول على السلاح والمعونات الماليّة. وكتب السفير الأميركي إلى حكومته في هذا الصدد أنه ــ وإن لم يوصِ بتلبية الطلبات الواردة ــ يوصي بأن تُبلَّغ «اللجان المعنيّة» في الإدارة الأميركيّة بالطلبات في حال تغيُّر توصيته في هذا الشأن.

وفي حزيران من عام ١٩٦٧، طلب شمعون رسميّاً من الحكومة الأميركيّة تسليحاً ومساعدات ماليّة باسمه وباسم بيار الجميّل وريمون إدّه، وذلك للتصدّي لنفوذ كمال جنبلاط «والمتطرّفين المسلمين». حتى شيخ العقل اليزبكي، رشيد حمادة (كان للدروز شيخا عقل يومها، والوثيقة الأميركيّة وستوكر أشارا إلى حمادة فقط كـ»زعيم درزي») طلب سلاحاً ومالاً من السفارة الأميركيّة في بيروت في ذلك الشهر. وكأن الردّ على هزيمة ١٩٦٧ كان عند كل هؤلاء في تعزيز الحضور الميليشاوي لأعداء المقاومة الفلسطينيّة واليسار في لبنان (وحلفاء العدوّ الإسرائيلي كما سيتضح بعد قليل). ولم ينسَ حمادة هذا، المتحالف مع شمعون (والذي ذكّر بتحالفه مع «الحلف الثلاثي») أن يحذّر السفارة الأميركيّة من عواقب تجهيز الاتحاد السوفياتي لميليشيا كمال جنبلاط. والنائب اللبناني في حينه، أندريه طابوريان، التقى بالديبلوماسي الأميركي تالكوت سيلي في واشنطن، أثناء زيارة الأوّل للولايات المتحدة كي يطلب هو الآخر السلاح من أميركا (لم يتضمّن كتاب ستوكر طلب طابوريان هذا، لكنه نشر الوثيقة على صفحته). وورد في الوثيقة أن طابوريان أكّد أن السلاح لن يُستعمل إلّا ضد «المتطرّفين» وأنه سيردع «التحرّك الشيوعي المعادي» (ص. ١ من الوثيقة التي نشرها ستوكر). (وطابوريان هو الوحيد الذي ذكر في لقائه مع الأميركيّين إسرائيل بالسلب، وأشار إلى اقتناع فريق من اللبنانيّين بخطورة المطامع الإسرائيليّة في لبنان).

أما العماد إميل بستاني، قائد الجيش، فقد التقى بالقائم بالأعمال الأميركي ــ بطلب من شارل حلو ــ وسأله عن إمكانيّة مساعدة الحكومة الأميركيّة للجيش اللبناني في السيطرة على «معارضة من قبل عناصر إسلاميّة في لبنان» أو للحدّ من جهود «عناصر شيوعيّة خارج لبنان» للقيام بأعمال «ضد مصالح أميركا أو ضد إسرائيل» (ص. ٣٣). وحذّر بستاني من أن الحكومة يمكن أن تنساق وراء دعوات عربيّة لمقاطعة أميركا وبريطانيا من دون «ضمانة أميركيّة واضحة». وفهم القائم بالأعمال أن طلب المساعدة يشمل طلب مساعدة عسكريّة. وعندما صدرت قرارات عن مجلس الوزراء اللبناني لمقاطعة شركات أميركيّة (مثل «كوكا كولا» و»فورد» و «أر.سي.إي») أكّد شارل حلو للقائم بالأعمال الأميركي أن القرارات لن تنفَّذ أو ستنفَّذ ببطء شديد. واللافت أن الحكومة الأميركيّة لاحظت أن الموقف الإسرائيلي من لبنان لا يتعلّق فقط بوجود الفدائيّين على أرضه، واليسار اللبناني،

بل إن هناك أطماعاً إسرائيليّة في لبنان. وبالرغم من أن لبنان لم يشارك في الحرب بأي صورة من الصور، فإن الحكومة الإسرائيليّة أرهبت لبنان عبر اعتبار اتفاق الهدنة مُلغىً، كذلك لمّح رئيس الحكومة الإسرائيلي في شهر أيلول إلى أطماع إسرائيل في نهر الليطاني.
وعندما قصفت إسرائيل حولا في أيّار ١٩٦٨، حاولت الحكومة الأميركيّة إفهام حليفتها بأن قدرة الحكومة اللبنانيّة على «محاربة الإرهاب» الفلسطيني وعلى الحفاظ على انحياز الحكومة نحو الغرب تضعف. وإلحاح الميليشيات اليمينيّة ذات القيادة المارونيّة في طلب التسلّح لم يتوقّف. ففي أكتوبر من عام ١٩٦٨ أبلغ قيادي كتائبي القائم بالأعمال الأميركي أن الحزب قد يتقدّم بطلب تسلّح لميليشيا الكتائب، وأن للحزب قدرة قتاليّة بعدد ٥٠٠٠ رجل وقوّة كوماندوس بعدد يراوح بين ٥٠ و٧٠ (ص.٣٧).

وأكّد القائد الكتائبي ان للحزب ما يكفيه من السلاح الخفيف، لكنه يحتاج إلى «توحيد معايير التسلّح» وإلى سلاح ثقيل. لكن التقرير أوضح أن الحكومة الأميركيّة لن تلبّي الطلب الكتائبي. حتى النائب الشمعوني، فضل الله تلحوق، طالب الحكومة الأميركيّة بسلاح لمواجهة جنبلاط. (كان هذا في زمن كان فيه الشيوعيّون اللبنانيّون يصرّون فيه على «النضال البرلماني» الصرف).
أما الاعتداء الإسرائيلي على مطار بيروت في ديسمبر عام ١٩٦٨ الذي كان فيه إسكندر غانم قائد منطقة بيروت، وقد تلقّى تحذيرات قبل الاعتداء من أجل حماية المنشآت المدنيّة بما فيها المطار (وغانم هذا كان هو الرجل نفسه الذي لامه صائب سلام على تخاذله في اعتداء نيسان ١٩٧٣ ــ عندما كان قائداً للجيش ــ واغتيال قادة المقاومة في فردان، ما أدّى إلى استقالة سلام بسبب رفض سليمان فرنجيّة صرفه من قيادة الجيش، أو محاسبته على أقلّ تقدير) فقد زاد من قلق الحكومة الأميركيّة على استقرار النظام اللبناني الحليف.

لكن الحكومة الأميركيّة حوّلت الاعتداء الإسرائيلي الإرهابي على لبنان إلى مناسبة لتشجيع التفاوض وتبادل الرسائل بين الحكومة اللبنانيّة والحكومة الإسرائيليّة. ووجّه ليفي أشكول رسالة إلى الحكومة اللبنانيّة نوّه فيها بالسلوك «التعاوني» (ص. ٤١) للحكومة اللبنانيّة (مع العدوّ) على مدى عشرين عاماً، لكنه حذّر من مغبّة من أي اعتداء من لبنان على إسرائيل. وكان شارل حلو، من دون علم رئيس حكومته ومجلس النوّاب، يسعى إلى تدخّل غربي أو نشر قوّات من الأمم المتحدة في الجنوب اللبناني لحماية حدود الكيان الصهيوني من العمليّات الفدائيّة (لكن إسرائيل هي التي رفضت الفكرة التي كان ريمون إدّة من دعاتها العلنيّين).

لكن النيات التخريبيّة والفتنويّة للفريق اليميني تبدّت في أوائل عام ١٩٦٩، عندما طلب كميل شمعون مساعدة عسكريّة أميركيّة (لحزبَي الكتائب والأحرار) من أجل إسقاط حكومة رشيد كرامي عبر الإضرابات والتظاهرات (لكن طلب السلاح يتعدّى فعل التظاهرات، وقد رفض الديبلوماسي الأميركي طلب شمعون هذا ــ حسب الوثيقة). وتقدمّ حزب الكتائب بطلب مماثل في نفس الشهر. وقد طلب شارل حلو من السفير الأميركي ثني الكتائب والأحرار عن خططهم وأنها يمكن أن تؤدّي إلى معركة قد يخسرونها وقد تطيح أيضاً «التوازن الطائفي» في البلد. وحسب ما ورد في تلك الوثائق، فإن موقف رشيد كرامي آنذاك لم يعارض الطلب من الدول الخليجيّة (عبر راعيتها الأميركيّة) التأثير في الفدائيّين لوقف نشاطهم من لبنان، وإن كان يخشى إعلان ذلك. (ص. ٥٦).
وفي شهر حزيران 1969 طالب الجميّل وشمعون (مرّة جديدة) السفير الأميركي بتسليح لميليشياتهم، كذلك تقدّم شمعون بطلب رسمي من نائب رئيس البعثة الأميركيّة بسلاح خفيف لـ «حماية المسيحيّين». وفي لقاء في السفارة، أدان الجميّل تخلّي الحكومة الأميركيّة عن أصدقائها في لبنان،

فيما حذّر فضل الله تلحوق (الذي قدم طلباً هو الآخر للتسلّح) من أخطار تتهدّد لبنان بسبب عدم تلبية طلبيات التسلّح. لكن موقف السفير الأميركي، وفق المداولات في داخل الإدارة الأميركيّة، بدأ بالتغيّر لمصلحة تسليح «المسيحيّين». لكن المسؤول الأميركي تالكوت سيلي (عمل في ما بعد سفيراً في دمشق وبادر للاتصال بمنظمّة التحرير الفلسطينيّة في السبعينيات، مخالفاً تعليمات كيسنجر) رفض فكرة السفير وحثّ على إقناع الزعماء الموارنة بانتهاج الاعتدال والتعايش مع المسلمين.
لكن شارل حلو كان يتواصل سرّاً مع الإسرائيليّين، كما أخبر أبا إيبان الحكومة الأميركيّة في شهر أيلول. وفي رسالة سريّة ومباشرة وجّهها الرئيس اللبناني إلى إسرائيل، قال لهم إنه «يتفهّم المشكلة التي يُشكّلها الفدائيّون ضد إسرائيل، لكن الحكومة لا تستطيع أن توقف التسلّل كليّاً»
(ص. ٥٨). وعندما وصل الجواب الإسرائيلي إلى حلو، ومفاده أن الحكومة الإسرائيليّة ستتخذ «الإجراءات الدنيا لحماية مواطنيها»، وصفه بأنه «يُظهر تطوّراً إيجابيّاً في الموقف الإسرائيلي».

وقد أخبرت الحكومة الإسرائيليّة الحكومة الأميركيّة أن «لبنانيّين مرموقين» كانوا يتواصلون معها سرّاً وأنهم «يرحّبون باعتداءات إسرائيليّة على قواعد الفدائيّين بين الحين والآخر».
لكن الموقف الأميركي تغيّر بحلول شهر أكتوبر من عام ١٩٦٩، حين عقدت «مجموعة العمليّات الخاصّة في واشنطن»، وهي لجنة حكوميّة تجتمع للتعامل مع الأزمات، اجتماعاً خاصّاً للتباحث في شأن التدخّل في لبنان. وتركّز البحث على المفاضلة بين تسليح الجيش اللبناني وتسليح «الميليشيات المسيحيّة». ووافق كل المجتمعين على وضع خطة تكون موضع التنفيذ لتسليح الميليشيات اليمينيّة، لكن لم يكن واضحاً الظروف التي يمكن فيها مباشرة عمليّة التسليح. وزارة الخارجيّة رأت أن سقوط الحكم في لبنان يمكن أن يكون الحافز للتسليح. أما ممثّل وكالة المخابرات الأميركيّة، فاقترح تسليح الميليشيات عبر شركة أميركيّة خاصّة (مثل «إنترأرمكو») لمدّ الميليشيات بالسلاح، على أن تتكفّل الحكومة الأميركيّة بالنفقات. وبُحث في أمر التسليح عبر عمليّات إسقاط من الجوّ (ص. ٦٣).

وعندما تساءل مسؤول أميركي عن سبب عدم المباشرة بتسليح الكتائب على الفور، أجابه كيسنجر بأن تسليح الجيش اللبناني مماثل لتسليح الكتائب، لأن الجيش واقع تحت «سيطرة ضبّاط متعاطفين مع الكتائب».

لا نعرف حسب الوثائق ماذا حصل بعد هذا الاجتماع، لكن الاستنتاج بمباشرة التسليح يكون منطقيّاً، خصوصاً أن كيسنجر أخبر نيكسون بأنه بالإضافة إلى التسليح، فإن الحكومة الأميركيّة ستقوم أيضاً بـ»عمليّات سريّة». لكن وزارة الدفاع حذّرت من أن تسليح الكتائب سيؤدّي إلى صراع طائفي. ومن الأكيد أن الحكومة الأميركيّة قامت بتحريك أساطيلها في البحر على بعد ٤٥٠ ميلاً من لبنان لدعم النظام اللبناني. وفضّل كيسنجر تدخّلاً إسرائيليّاً على التدخّل الأميركي المباشر في لبنان.

وفي موازاة المفاوضات التي أدّت إلى اتفاقيّة القاهرة، قامت الحكومة الأميركيّة بالاستعانة بتاجر السلاح الأميركي ــ اللبناني المعروف، سركيس سوغانليان (الذي لعب دوراً كبيراً في تسليح الميليشيات اليمينيّة في سنوات الحرب في ما بعد، ولنا عودة إليه) لإمداد قوى الأمن الداخلي بوسائل عسكريّة «للسيطرة على المخيّمات وعلى التظاهرات» (ص. ٧١). ورأت السفارة الأميركيّة في تسليح قوى الأمن والجيش أنه لا يختلف عن تسليح الميليشيات، وأكدت قيادة الجيش اللبناني أنها ستتولّى هي تسليح الميليشيات وتجهيزها عندما يحين الوقت. وكان ممثّلون عن الجميّل وشمعون وإدّة وسليمان فرنجيّة يسعون إلى التسلّح في لبنان، أو في خارجه. (قدّمت الميليشيات طلبات تسلّح من الحكومة الفرنسيّة أيضاً).
ومن العمليّات السريّة التي اتفقت عليها الحكومتان الأميركيّة واللبنانيّة (عبر لقاء بين ميشال خوري والسفير الأميركي) محاولة «إحداث الشقاق» (ص. ٧٣) بين الفدائيّين والأهالي في جنوب لبنان.

وقدّم ميشال خوري في كانون الثاني ١٩٧٠ طلباً رسميّاً من أميركا في هذا الشأن، عبر تقديم مساعدات ماليّة سريّة لـ»مؤسّسات دينيّة وسياسيّة» في جنوب لبنان، أو عبر الحصول على مساعدات من شاه إيران بوساطة أميركيّة. لكننا لا نعرف طبيعة تلك العمليّات السريّة لإشعال الفتنة بين الأهالي والفدائيّين (قد يكون قصف العدوّ للقرى من نتاج تلك العمليّات).
وعندما صعّد العدوّ الإسرائيلي من غاراته على لبنان في الأشهر الثلاثة الأولى من عام ١٩٧٠، لم تتوقّف الاتصالات الرسميّة المباشرة بين الحكومة اللبنانيّة وحكومة العدوّ. ونقل «مطران مقيم في القدس من أصل لبناني» (لم يرد اسمه في الوثائق)، وكان يلعب دور الرسول بين حكومة العدوّ ورئيس الجمهوريّة اللبنانيّة تهديداً من موشي دايان بتحويل لبنان إلى صحراء.

لكن شارل حلو ردّ على التهديد المباشر بالودّ والاحترام لإسرائيل (وقال إنه كان متحفّظاً في ودّه خشية تسرّب مضمون الرسالة التي بعثها إلى دايان.) وفي رسالته، أوضح حلو أن لبنان يلعب في الماضي والحاضر دور «شرطي إسرائيل»، مع أنه لا يستطيع أن يعترف بذلك. وأضاف حلو أن تدمير لبنان سيكون بمثابة تدمير إدارة شرطة حيفا. وزاد حلو عاملاً طائفيّاً يحمل تعاطفاً مع الصهيونيّة، إذ قال «إنه ليست في مصلحة إسرائيل تدمير الدولة الديموقراطيّة غير الإسلاميّة الوحيدة وذات التنوّع الديني في المنطقة. وإن اللبنانيّين بالرغم من مشاكل تعتري تفهّمهم، فإنهم على الأقل يفهمون مشاكل إسرائيل، وأن هذا قد يشكّل رصيداً قيّماً لإسرائيل عندما تقرّر أن تندمج ــ وليس فقط أن تكون في ــ الشرق الأوسط».
(يتبع السبت المقبل)

إسرائيل تحترم فؤاد شهاب

طلب فؤاد شهاب أن تزيد قوّات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي من دوريّاتها على الحدود مع لبنان لمنع الفدائيّين من الحركة (مروان طحطح)

في أزمة نيسان 1969، هنأت الحكومة الأميركيّة رئيس الجمهورية شارل حلو على استعمال القوّة لقمع المتظاهرين. وزاد شارل حلو من رغبته في طلب تدخّل عسكري أميركي (أو «آخر»)، لكن السفير الأميركي أبلغ ميشال خوري، مبعوث حلو الشخصي، أن عليهم ألّا يتوقّعوا تدخّلاً عسكريّاً أميركيّاً في لبنان (ليس مباشراً، على الأقل). عندها، أجابه خوري بأنهم تلقّوا نفس الجواب من فرنسا، ما يوحي أن حلو كان قد طلب تدخلاً عسكريّاً فرنسيّاً ضد الفدائيّين واليسار في لبنان. لكن حلو لم يكتفِ بالأجوبة الفرنسيّة والأميركيّة، إذ هو أرسل في سؤال عاجل إلى السفير الأميركي سائلاً: «في حالة القلاقل المدنيّة التي قد تكون فوق طاقة قدرات قوى الأمن اللبنانيّة المحدودة، ما هو احتمال المساعدة الخارجيّة لمساعدته في إعادة الاستقرار؟» (ص. ٥٠). لكن جواب السفير خيّب آماله مرّة أخرى.
وفي الوقت الذي كانت فيه الحكومة الأميركيّة تخيّب فيه آمال الزعماء الموارنة (وحلفائهم) في طلب تدخّل عسكري أميركي، كان الرئيس الأميركي،

ريتشارد نيكسون، يعقد اجتماعاً لمجلس الأمن القومي لدراسة إمكانيّة القيام بتدخّل عسكري أميركي مباشر على غرار تدخّل ١٩٥٨ في لبنان (ص. ٥٠). وأخبره وزير دفاعه أن القوّات الأميركيّة جاهزة للقيام بمهمّة كهذه. لكن ستوكر يستنت أن الحكومة الأميركيّة تخلّت عن فكرة التدخّل إلّا في حالات يتعرّض فيها «المسيحيّون أو الأجانب» لأخطار أو لترحيل الأميركيّين. لكن حلو لم يتوقّف بالرغم من الإجابات الأميركيّة عن تكرار طلب المساعدة أو طلب التدخّل، لأن ذلك يقوّيه، ولو من باب «الخيار الأخير». وبناءً على إلحاح حلو، بدأت الحكومة الأميركيّة بالبحث في سيناريوهات تدخّل عسكري من نوع إرسال الأسطول السادس. وعلّق السفير الأميركي على موقف حلو بأنه كان يفكّر «كرئيس مسيحي» يسعى لحماية المسيحيّين.

وكانت الحكومة الأميركيّة تحثّ حلو على طلب قوّة تدخّل تابعة للأمم المتحدّة للحدّ من نشاط الفدائيّين، لكن حلو طالب أيضاً بقوّة تدخّل أميركيّة تمهّد لتدخّل الأمم المتحدة. وبحثت الحكومة الأميركيّة مع مدير «الأنروا» في إمكانيّة لعب المنظمّة «الإنسانيّة» دوراً أمنيّاً ضد الفدائيّين، لكن الاعتراض القوي من مقرّ الأمم المتحدة قضى على الفكرة الأميركيّة.
واجتمع كميل شمعون وبيار الجميّل في شهر نيسان مع السفير الأميركي ضمن الحملة المستمرّة في طلب المساعدة (لكن شمعون تحفّظ في اللقاء لعلمه من الجميّل برفض الطلب من قبل أميركا). لكن شمعون ذهب أبعد من ذلك، إذ اقترح على السفير الأميركي أن تقوم الحكومة الإسرائيليّة بتوجيه تحذير مباشر وعلني إلى لبنان حول نشاط الفدائيّين «لعلّ ذلك يؤثّر في المسلمين المتطرّفين الذين يطالبون بحريّة حركة مطلقة للفدائيّين».

وبعد اللقاء مع شمعون، التقى السفير الأميركي مع فؤاد شهاب وسأله رأيه في أن تقوم الحكومة الإسرائيليّة بتحذير لبنان لتخويف مؤيّدي العمل الفدائي فيه. وطلب شهاب مهلة ٢٤ ساعة للردّ، ثم أخبر السفير بأن التحذير الإسرائيلي هذا سيساعد (ص. ٥٣). لكن السفير الأميركي امتنع عن نقل الطلب اللبناني خوفاً من تأليب الرأي العام العربي ضد إسرائيل والحكومة الأميركيّة. ولم يكتفِ فؤاد شهاب بهذا، لا بل طلب أن تزيد قوّات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي من دوريّاتها على الحدود مع لبنان لمنع الفدائيّين من الحركة (سبق فؤاد شهاب جماعة ١٤ آذار في تقديم النصح للعدوّ الإسرائيلي في عدوانه). وعبّرت الحكومة الإسرائيليّة، من خلال سفارتها في واشنطن، عن «احترامها» لشهاب.

وفي هذا السياق، وبعد أن فقد شارل حلو الأمل في تدخّل عسكري أميركي لمصلحة النظام الطائفي الحاكم في لبنان، قرّر التفاوض مع الفدائيّين.

Forcing face-to-face negotiations with extremist factions are bearing fruits

Question: Can you resume fighting, with the same abstract zeal, after you were squarely militarily defeated, surrendered and negotiated for your life and potential freedom?

Facts on the ground are proving that after surrender negotiation you become more reflective on your previous behavior and start a respectful communication with your previous hated enemy.

USA/Israel strategy and purpose is to maintain this abstract hatred within the extremist factions and prevent any face-to-face communication and negotiations. Iran discovered this evil strategy and worked to counter it.

USA/Israel are scared shit of Iran because it demonstrated the determined capacity to sustain long-term strategies against current obstacles and sustained campaign of “denigrement” (heaping on them all kinds of evil behavior)

Iran has infused to Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Syrian army and Russia this patient capacity to sustain long-term strategy consequences against short-term impatient reactions that the world community is pressuring them to behave accordingly.

USA/Israel can plan for the long-term, but their arrogance in the last 3 decades robbed them from the capacity to sustain any long-term planning with any consistency to destabilizing the Middle-East.

The Syrian regime negotiated countless agreements with extremist factions, after they were militarily and economically cornered, to transfer to the province of Edleb (north-west province of Syria bordering Turkey) and secure its internal security and start the reconstruction.

Hezbollah of Lebanon defeated Al Nusra in the eastern mountain chains of Lebanon (Jroud Ersaal) and negotiated with 1,000 fighters, and 7,000 other extremist supporters, to move to Edlib with their families.

The same happened with Daesh on Lebanon borders (Jroud Al Qaa3) and negotiations allowed 300 fighters to transfer with their families to the border city with Iraq of Boukamal.

USA expressed its ire with this negotiation that it bombed the bridge on the way to prevent the convoy to resume its transfer across the eastern desert stretch in the Euphrates.

In all these negotiations, Syria agreed upon them and provided the necessary buses to accomplish the transfer across her territory.

In the Edleb province, those factions that were allowed to transfer are putting the pressure on the “original” Al Nusra faction to ease up on its control and restrictions on the daily life of the people.

Eventually, with sustained period of peace, Al Nusra there will eventually sit down for meaningful political settlement with Syria administration. Regardless of Turkey refusal, but simply because the people got used to a peaceful life and refuse to resume this mindless war.

Additionally, the Syrian army and its allies are barely finding mush stubborn Daesh fighters’ resistance in their advances. Daesh fighters, when receiving order from their leaders in Raqq to resist, prefer to flee to neighboring towns, hoping that their eventual surrender to Syria Army will save their families from extermination.

Iraq, under the influence of USA, refrained to open channels of communications with Daesh (ISIS) and its victories and liberation of towns and cities resulted in countless casualties on both sides.

It is Not realistic to believe that military victories can eradicate the latent extremist abstract ideology.

While Syria and Lebanon managed to open lines of communications with extremist factions and secure the long-term appeasement of these factions, Iraq may still frequently face reactions of terrorist suicide attacks from Daesh for many years to come.

Note: On August 28, 2017, Lebanon celebrated its Second Liberation Day from concentrations of terrorist factions on all its borders. It can boast to be the first State of achieving this result, with enormous engagement of Hezbollah resistance forces and the Syrian army.

The First Liberation Day is on May 24, 2000 when Israel withdrew unilaterally from south Lebanon without any negotiation after 27 years of occupation since 1982. Israel suffered huge casualties by the Lebanese resistance forces

 

 

ISRAEL’S NEW LEGALIZATION LAW

Cathy Sultan blog

Israel’s new Legalization Law legitimizes under Israeli law dozens of so-called settlement “outposts” that were built without official approval from Israeli authorities but were tacitly supported by successive Israeli governments as part of an effort to colonize as much Palestinian land as possible.

This new law follows Israel’s approval of 6,000 new settlement units in just the last two weeks and the announcement that Israel plans to build its first entirely new settlement on occupied Palestinian land in more than two decades.

According to Jonathan Cook writing in The National on February 8, 2017, the Legalization Law was the right’s forceful response to the eviction in early February of 40 families from a settlement “outpost” called Amona.

The eviction of these families was transformed into an expensive piece of political theatre, costing an estimated $40 million. It was choreographed as a national trauma to ensure such an event is never repeated.

As the evicted families clashed with police, sending several dozen to the hospital, Naftali Bennett, the Education Minister and leader of the settler party Jewish Home called Amona’s families “heroes.” Netanyahu added: “We all understand the extent of their pain,” and promised them an enlarged replacement settlement along with monetary compensation.

The real prize for Bennett and his far right party was the legalization law itself. It reverses a restriction imposed in the 1970s and designed to prevent a free-for-all by the settlers. International law is clear that an occupying force can take land only for military needs.

Israel committed a war crime in transferring more than 600,000 Jewish civilians into the Occupied Territories. (Millions of Palestinians were forced transferred after each war)

Israel’s Attorney General has refused to defend the law should it be brought before Israel’s Supreme Court. Very belatedly the lower courts drew the line in land confiscation in Amona and demanded that the land be returned to its Palestinian owners.

This new law overrules the judges in the lower courts, allowing private land stolen from Palestinians to be laundered as Israeli state property.

In practice there has never been a serious limit on theft of Palestinian land but now government support for the plunder will be explicit in law. It will be impossible to blame the outposts on “rogue” settlers or claim that Israel is trying to safeguard Palestinian property rights.

I saw this injustice for the first time in March 2002 when my Palestinian guide, Naim, on our way to Bethlehem, stopped his car and pointed off to the left.

“My family used to live here,” he said, and began to tell me his story. One of the things which upset me was the part about the ancient olive grove. No one knew how old the hundreds of trees really were. Some of the old-timers swore the olive grove was 300 years old or perhaps even older. The trees probably didn’t need irrigation because they’d been there so long. Their roots intermingled with the rich, dark dirt and delved deeply into the earth. A small village nearby had an olive press and every day during the season the villagers brought their freshly-picked crop to be pressed for oil.

Naim still remembered the exact location of his house, what time the sun shone through the kitchen window, and where each tree was planted. He remembered because he was the one who scurried up the trees and shook the branches at harvest time, carefully aiming for the sheet spread around the base of each tree to catch the olives as they fell.

Now there is no sign of a Palestinian presence. The villagers, if not already dead, have been dispersed to one of the many refugee camps. As for the ancient olive grove, it was uprooted to make way for Har Homa, a massive Israeli settlement. It sits atop Abu Ghnaim Mountain, once a forest of some 60,000 pine trees and a refuge for wild animals and plants.

One the southwest edge of Bethlehem, this entire area was stripped bare to build 7,000 identical red-roofed, multi-storied square housing units, arranged in layers some two kilometers in circumference. When completed, the project looked from afar like asymmetrical Lego blocks. Gilo, another Israeli settlement, dominates the eastern perimeter of Bethlehem, sandwiching the Christian village between these two Israeli colossi. These and other stories can be found in Israeli and Palestinian Voices: A Dialogue with both Sides.

As opposition leader Isaac Herzog said: “The train departing from here has only one stop–the Hague, home of the International Criminal Court. If ICC judges take their duties seriously, we could see Prime Minister Netanyahu tried for complicity in the war crime of establishing illegal settlements on stolen Palestinian land.

This book is available for purchase here: Amazon

A DEADLY DELUSION: WERE SYRIA’S REBELS EVER GOING TO DEFEAT THE JIHADISTS?

AUGUST 10, 2017

President Donald Trump’s decision last month to shutter America’s covert program to arm and train Syrian rebels fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad was likely inevitable, and in any case overdue.

The program was premised on applying proxy military pressure to realize an unworkable political outcome – a negotiated resolution that removed Assad. And particularly in its late stages, it was feeding al-Qaeda-type jihadists who had infiltrated and co-opted large sections of the opposition.

The end of America’s “massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad” — in Trump’s own words — has sparked sharp debate over whether the move will benefit jihadists in al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

It will not. But the decision has also provoked a second, derivative argument over whether and how much Syria’s rebels were ever willing and able, historically, to stand up to the jihadists who hijacked Syria’s revolutionary insurgency.

This debate has policy implications — at least counterfactual ones — insofar as U.S.-backed rebels were apparently meant to out-compete and counterbalance jihadists. With a few exceptions, they proved unable to do so. (No exceptions so far)

As Syria’s war dragged on, America’s other policy priorities in the war were gradually subsumed by “counter-terrorism” — a shorthand term for the defeat of the jihadists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Arguments for backing the array of nationalist and Islamist rebel factions collectively termed the “Free Syrian Army” were increasingly recast in those interests-based terms.

Into 2017, some were still retailing U.S.-backed rebels as “an already extremely vetted, truly indigenous, potential counter-terrorism force.” (Vetted by whom? Those Not on the ground for long terms?)

This did not comport with the historical record.

The fact of rebel cooperation with jihadists was consistently excused away as a tactical necessity, or as a function of insufficient U.S. support.

But there were only so many times U.S.-backed rebels could function as jihadists’ battlefield auxiliaries, sit and watch as jihadists liquidated other rebel factions, or prove generally unmotivated to fight jihadists before it became impossible to take them seriously as a counter-terrorism force.

(Actually, the extremist factions waited for the weapons to arrive to the “moderate” and launch an attack and take them away)

Rebels were more interested in going at the Assad regime – even if that meant fighting alongside jihadists, or under their command – than standing up to jihadists.

The factional dysfunction and personal entanglements of the rebels meant that jihadists were more central and powerful within the armed opposition than Washington and other rebel backers appreciated or acknowledged.

In the end, that not only meant that rebels were useless for counter-terrorism, but also that they couldn’t serve as a viable tool of pressure on the Assad regime or represent a realistic alternative to Assad’s rule. The whole logical edifice of U.S. support for Syria’s insurgency was wormy and rotten.

The counter-terrorism case for backing Syria’s rebels was bogus — an implausible claim by the Syrian opposition that was uncritically and irresponsibly repeated by opposition backers. Policymakers and analysts should have taken jihadist entanglement with Syria’s insurgency more seriously, much earlier. Instead, the policy debate was, for years, built on mythology and tall tales.

The Crux: January 2014 and Rebels’ Fight Against ISIL

The historical argument over the rebel fight against jihadists played out recently in an acrid Twitter back-and-forth between University of Oklahoma professor and longtime Syria expert Joshua Landis and the Middle East Institute’s Charles Lister.

The former argued rebels mostly refused to fight al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and more often fought alongside them. Lister called Landis’s arguments “misinformation” and “lies,” minimizing rebels’ ties with the Islamic State and other jihadists and pointing to their collective fight against the Islamic State in January 2014. (The jihadists had strong backing, financially, in weapons and in logistics through Turkey from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, with tacit support of the western States, particularly France and Britain and USA)

The case for the armed opposition as a counterterrorism force hinges, to a large extent, on this single episode in January 2014. Yet a more critical reading of that one event, especially in the context of rebels’ subsequent fight against the Islamic State, tends to reframe rebels’ utility as a U.S. partner against the Islamic State. Landis’s arguments are an oversimplification, in parts, and occasionally unfair. But the reality sides more with Landis than Lister.

In April 2013, ISIL’s Iraqi predecessor announced it would re-absorb its advance team in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and expand into Syria.

ISIL quickly got to work abducting opposition activistseliminating smaller, ill-reputed rebel factions, and seizing effective control of border crossings and other sources of revenue. Finally, after months of shocking, brutal provocations and escalating clashes with other rebels, open war erupted in January 2014 between rebels and ISIL in the west Aleppo countryside and then spread across the opposition-held north.

This has been spun, uncritically, into a legend of how rebels expelled ISIL from the northwest. Lister has been among those retailing a fairy-tale version of January 2014. In his 2016 paper, The Free Syrian Army: A decentralized insurgent brand, Lister acknowledges some of the complications in this episode, but nonetheless casts it in hagiographic terms:

The scale of [the opposition’s] success in forcing [ISIL] out of four provinces in 12 weeks is incomparably more significant than what the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have achieved in northeastern Syria in over two years of operations backed by U.S. air support. (Does he means Al Nusra of Al Qaeda faction?)

Yet the reality of January 2014 was substantially more complicated than Lister would have us believe. In retrospect, ISIL’s withdrawal from the northwest now seems less a rout at rebel hands than a decision by an overstretched, exposed ISIL to regroup in Syria’s desert east. From its new strongholds in the east, ISIL consolidated its forces and resurged in all directions, including into Iraq.

Though brigades in some sections of the north such as Jeish al-Mujahideen and Jamal Ma’rouf’s Syrian Revolutionaries Front launched pitched battles against ISIL in January 2014, elsewhere in the northwest, ISIL departed with a mix of local handshake deals and deliberate, tactical retreats.

Other powerful brigades — including Jabhat al-Nusrah and Ahrar al-Sham — absorbed or sheltered ISIL membersand facilitated their passage to safe areas in Syria’s east. The horrific death-by-torture of Ahrar commander Hussein “Abu Rayyan” al-Suleiman at ISIL’s hands had been one of the most proximate sparks for the January fighting, but much of Ahrar still couldn’t accept the idea of fighting fellow Islamist militants.

In Raqqa, Ahrar al-Sham fighters confused by ISIL’s religious slogans left local rebels to face ISIL reinforcements alone, only for those same Ahrar fighters to be executed in the dozens at an ISIL checkpoint north of the city. In the Aleppo countryside, gullible local rebel commanders agreed to parlay with ISIL representatives to halt the bloodshed.

An ISIL negotiator set off his suicide belt in time with a car bomb, killing the local commander and more than a dozen others. Local rebel resistance folded. ISIL captured and held east Aleppo until Turkey launched its Operation Euphrates Shield intervention more than two years later.

In eastern Deir al-Zour province, Jabhat al-Nusrah and other rebels fought a fierce, losing battle from February to July 2014 as the Islamic State closed in around them. Then ISIL overran Mosul and, swollen with new weapons and materiel it had taken from the Iraqi military, turned west towards Deir al-Zour. Faced with an overwhelming ISIL force, the Deiri opposition split and collapsed. Critically — and characteristically — rebels in Syria’s west left Deir al-Zour alone to lose against ISIL.

After summer 2014, and with the exception of some stubborn Deiris who tried to claw their way back, most of Syria’s rebels gave up on the east.

To be fair, rebels in  west Syria’s were trying to fend off the Assad regime and, from 2015, hold out against an overwhelming Russian intervention. But the longer the Islamic State occupied Syria’s east, the clearer it became that western rebels were not sufficiently motivated to liberate what had been revolutionary, opposition-held areas from the Islamic State’s brutality and terror, and the less immediate and compelling the example of January 2014 became.

The whole reason the United States opportunistically struck up a tactical partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — including, as Lister noted in his paper, providing U.S. air support — was because the SDF’s core Kurdish elements were motivated and able to kill the Islamic State in eastern Syria.

This set them apart in a way that Lister and other rebel boosters have yet to fully acknowledge. Helpfully, the SDF also was not infiltrated by jihadists, which meant it was possible safely deploy combat advisors and forward air controllers alongside them.

Attempts by the U.S. Department of Defense to build a similar partner force out of Syria’s Arab rebels mostly failed. The most capable rebels were already participating in the CIA’s covert arms program and committed to fighting the Assad regime rather than the Islamic State. Many of the remaining rebels available and willing to partner with the United States were refugees who had fled the battlefield.

Deir al-Zour rebels could not be recruited in more than paltry numbers or unified under a single commander. In Syria’s north, the first batch of U.S.-trained rebels to enter the country in 2015 was almost immediately torn apart by Jabhat al-Nusrah. Notably, no other rebel factions intervened to protect them – it was Kurdish-led forces that came to their defense and then sheltered them.

The second batch surrendered its U.S.-supplied weapons to Jabhat al-Nusrah. The Department of Defense counter-Islamic State program was amended to integrate small, Pentagon-trained units capable of calling in U.S. airstrikes into a larger mass of CIA-armed rebels, but even with substantial U.S. air support, rebels proved unable to do more than ping-pong back and forth across the Aleppo countryside until Turkey invaded.

Turkey’s own role inside Aleppo progressively scaled up over the course of Operation Euphrates Shield, until it had committed thousands of regular forces and taken the lead in the battle for the city of al-Bab.

Even then, American and Western officials told me, the Turkish-led capture of al-Bab went poorly enough to push U.S. planners towards alternatives in the battle for al-Raqqa. By the time rebels who had already lost in Syria’s west were appealing for a role in the battles against the Islamic State in Raqqa and Deir al-Zour in 2017, it was too late.

The Long Black Thread, Before and After the Islamic State

The politically convenient timeline for the Islamic State’s incubation inside the Syrian opposition is short. It starts with the Islamic State’s announced entry in April 2013 and ends with its rupture with Syria’s rebels in January 2014, roughly nine months. But this too is a false narrative.

The reality is that the Syrian opposition’s entanglement with the Islamic State and jihadists broadly didn’t start in April 2013, and it didn’t end in January 2014. It’s not a single, bracketed episode. Rather, it is a black thread that’s run through the opposition almost from the start until the present day.

The Islamic State did not just appear from nothing in April 2013. Though it announced itself in 2013, its advance force — Jabhat al-Nusrah — and other future constituent parts were inside Syria and playing an active, leading role in the insurgency from the start of 2012.

And even after the break with the Islamic State, its jihadist derivatives continued to poison the opposition. Again and again, the opposition — and the armed opposition in particular — proved unable to recognize the jihadist threat in their own ranks until it was too late.

From Jabhat al-Nusrah’s first acknowledged operation in Syria — a January 2012 car bomb in Damascus’s al-Meidan neighborhood — and the group’s video debut later that month, it should have been clear that it was either a manifestation of al-Qaeda or something al-Qaeda-like. But as Nusrah pivoted from terrorist bombings to a vanguard role on the battlefield alongside other rebels, it was accepted, only months after its terrorist opening act, as an integral part of the opposition. Important segments of the opposition went from denying al-Qaeda was even in Syria and claiming Nusrah’s early bombings were false flag attacks to closing ranks around an obvious al-Qaeda derivative.

In July of that year, the opposition stormed Aleppo, in their boldest, most ambitious blow against the regime to date. In the aftermath, Jabhat al-Nusrah was one of the four leading Islamist factions that came together in December 2012 to establish the Aleppo Shari’ah Commission, a joint judicial-administrative body to govern the city’s rebel-held east.

When the United States designated Jabhat al-Nusrah a terrorist organization and identified it, correctly, as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq, leading voices in Syria’s opposition loudly refused to acknowledge reality. The then-head of the opposition’s political leadership-in-exile said the decision “had to be reconsidered.” The following Friday, opposition activists organized protests across the country under the slogan, “There Is No Terrorism in Syria Except Assad’s.”

It was only the announcement of the Islamic State in April 2013 that obliged Jabhat al-Nusrah — and everyone else — to acknowledge exactly what it was, forcing Nusrah to defensively pledge direct, public allegiance to al-Qaeda (Even then, armed opposition members argued to me, as late as 2016 and 2017, that Jabhat al-Nusrah wasn’t really al-Qaeda).

Between the April 2013 announcement of the Islamic State and the break with ISIL in January 2014, Syria’s rebels coexisted with ISIL and — though it’s true ISIL was never integrated into the mass rebellion the way Jabhat al-Nusrah was — operated alongside them on at least several fronts.

The most prominent instance of rebel-ISIL cooperation was the 2013 capture of Aleppo’s Minagh Airbase, in which an ISIL suicide bomber cleared the way for a joint rebel assault. But rebels also seem to have fought alongside or in parallel with ISIL elsewhere, including in Lattakia, in the northern Damascus countryside, and against Kurdish forces across the Syrian north.

When ISIL began picking off individual half-criminal rebel factions in 2013 — in Aleppo citythe Aleppo countrysideor in Raqqa — other rebels mostly left them to die.

After ISIL was finally run out of Syria’s northwest in 2014 and concentrated in Syria’s east, the northwest became the rebellion’s center of gravity. It also became Jabhat al-Nusrah’s main power base, as the group rallied in the northwest starting in summer 2014.

And when Jabhat al-Nusrah started to eliminate nationalist rivals, not unlike ISIL had, northern rebels again sat on their hands. Northern rebels suffered from the same weaknesses and contradictions that plagued rebels nationwide. They had limited, local horizons. They were divided by faction, geography, and individual personalities. And they had problematic ideological sympathies and interpersonal ties with jihadists.

Altogether, they were incapable of mounting a collective resistance to a predatory Jabhat al-Nusrah. It is unclear how more U.S. support would have fixed that, particularly when the United States started targeting al-Qaeda external operations cells and Nusrah began targeting factions it deemed “Western tools.”

Jabhat al-Nusrah wiped out Jamal Ma’rouf’s ill-reputed Syrian Revolutionaries Front in October 2014, plus an assortment of Ma’rouf-linked factions. Other local factions, including Ahrar al-Sham, either joined in or were quietly complicit.

When CIA-backed Harakat Hazm tried to intervene to slow Nusrah’s campaign on Ma’arouf, Nusrah eliminated Hazm’s Idlib section. After escalating tensions between Nusrah and what was left of Hazm in Aleppo, Hazm defensively joined a larger Islamist faction. But Hazm kept causing problems, so its Islamist patron and other local factions decided Hazm had run its course. In February 2015, they stood aside while Nusrah snuffed it out.

Jabhat al-Nusrah was abetted in liquidating these factions by an ultra-extreme, Islamic State-leaning splinter called Jund al-Aqsa. Nusrah sheltered Jund al-Aqsa as it assassinated other rebels and — as what rebels called “[ISIL’s] Embassy in the North” — ferried would-be foreign fighters from Turkey to the Islamic State’s home base in al-Raqqa.

When Ahrar al-Sham attempted to uproot Jund in late 2016, it suffered heavy losses and accepted a face-saving settlement brokered by Jabhat al-Nusrah. In February 2017, Jabhat al-Nusrah (by then renamed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) finally moved on what was left of Jund al-Aqsa — but, even then, Nusrah “defeated” Jund by giving its fighters safe passage to Islamic State-held Raqqa.

In March 2016, Nusrah broke a locally popular Free Syrian Army faction. In January 2017, it broke several factions that agreed to attend the Astana talks co-sponsored by Turkey, forcing the remaining fragments to join Ahrar al-Sham.

And in July 2017, Nusrah broke Ahrar al-Sham, its sole remaining rival for power in Syria’s northwest. Ahrar had historically been a key ally and enabler of Jabhat al-Nusrah, and it had played a central role in bringing the same extremist foreign fighters into Syria who would later repeatedly betray it.

The dust has yet to fully settle, but it seems as if enough of Ahrar’s local subfactions stuck to their home areas — cutting deals to declare their towns neutral, or only running Nusrah out of their own sectors — that Nusrah was able to overwhelm Ahrar at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. Bab al-Hawa had been Ahrar’s stronghold and its main source of revenue and power. No longer.

The next-biggest rebel factions said they’d send a buffer force to interrupt the fighting around Bab al-Hawa, then didn’t, then blamed each other. One has already endorsed Jabhat al-Nusrah’s planned “civil administration” in the Syrian north.

CIA-backed Free Syrian Army factions played no part in the fighting between Nusrah and Ahrar al-Sham, except as a tame buffer force. The CIA had encouraged them to unite to form a counterweight to Jabhat al-Nusrah months earlier. They refused, recognizing, correctly, that Nusrah would view their unification as a menace and destroy them. Instead, they formed a nonthreatening “operations room” meant solely to fight the regime.

From 2012 to 2017, all these rebels continued to coordinate with and fight alongside Jabhat al-Nusrah. And the intra-rebel power dynamic had been inverted in ways outsiders seem to have misapprehended. By some point — certainly from 2015, but probably earlier — most northern rebels were not operating alongside either Jabhat al-Nusrah or Ahrar al-Sham as autonomous peers, but rather as jihadists’ fire support and force-multiplying auxiliaries. Nusrah was also siphoning off these factions’ U.S. material support, either by taking a regular cut or crushing these factions and pillaging their weapon stocks.

Lister has claimed that “[Free Syrian Army] groups who fought [al-Qaeda] were abandoned to lose.” But there’s only so much the United States could do when fragmented, basically local rebels abandoned each other, over and over again.

Flawed, Nationwide

Syria’s northwest — which, as rebels lost more of Aleppo, became increasingly centered on Islamist- and jihadist-dominated Idlib province — has been the most extreme example nationwide of how jihadists have run roughshod over Syria’s opposition. But rebels nationwide suffered from the same flaws, only to lesser degrees. It’s those flaws that, even when they didn’t leave other rebels vulnerable to outright jihadist control, meant they also couldn’t really expunge pernicious extremist actors and tendencies.

The closest thing to an anti-jihadist success story has been the rebel southwest, where Jordan’s tight management of its northern border with Syria and of its local rebel clients seem to have kept Jabhat al-Nusrah from blossoming the way it did in Syria’s north.

“Southern Front” rebels officially renounced cooperation with Jabhat al-Nusrah in 2015, and the group has apparently been kept mostly isolated and small. It also seems to have suffered because of one particularly bloodthirsty, unlikeable Jordanian emir, now since moved elsewhere in the country.

But even in the south, Jabhat al-Nusrah has survived, protected by its members’ local clan ties and their tactical utility to other rebels as shock troops, and it has continued to play a key role on hot fronts. There have been reports that local rebels have told Nusrah to either dissolve itself or leave the south, against the backdrop of the United States and Russia imposing a “de-escalation zone” over the area, but it remains to be seen how convincing rebels are and how willing Nusrah is to be convinced.

Under the de-escalation agreement, southern rebels will likely have to fight the local Islamic State force that stubbornly holds the area’s valley corner and against which they have been unable to mobilize effectively.

The “Euphrates Shield” northern Aleppo countryside is mostly free of Jabhat al-Nusrah because of Nusrah’s 2015 withdrawal from the area, the presence of Turkish forces on the ground, and a geographic accident — this rebel enclave is disconnected from the Nusrah-dominated rebel northwest, and really from anything other than Turkey’s Gaziantep province. Still, there is some reason for concern.

In June, dozens were reportedly killed in intra-rebel clashes that erupted — according to one party to the infighting — after one rogue rebel sub-faction starting chanting Nusrah slogans and then opened fire on residents who objected. And rebels have struggled to deal with continuing Islamic State infiltration. Local rebels told me in interviews that Islamic State cells in this area continue to commit acts of sabotage and carry out bombings.

In the besieged East Ghouta pocket outside Damascus, dominant local Islamist faction Jeish al-Islam eliminated the Islamic State in 2014 and, in 2016, turned its fire on Jabhat al-Nusrah. But that seemed to have as much to do with local factional balancing and economic interests as with anti-jihadist religious doctrine. And the rest of the Ghouta’s factions just balanced back, as Jabhat al-Nusrah opportunistically partnered with a local Free Syrian Army faction against Jeish al-Islam.

In terms of extremist influence and relative moderates’ inability to effectively organize against jihadists, Idlib and the rebel-held northwest have been the worst. But these are not Idlib problems; they are problems with Syria’s revolutionary opposition writ large.

Policy Implosion

This accounting of when Syria’s rebels did and did not resist jihadists is by no means a complete or comprehensive one. If someone wanted to get maximally granular — to dig down to the individual or village level — it’s probably possible to produce unlimited examples of rebels’ tangled-up relationships with jihadists.

The Assad regime itself had a hand in engineering jihadist influence within the opposition. From releasing dangerous jihadist detainees early in the uprising, apparently deliberately, to dumping rebels from elsewhere in the country into jihadist-dominated Idlib, Assad seems to have done everything he could to make his opposition toxic and unpalatable.

But Syria’s rebels themselves never really proved capable of policing themselves and purging their ranks of extremists. And by the time Trump had decided to end the CIA’s covert arms program, the geographic and numerical core of the armed opposition in Syria’s northwest was unsalvageable. It was dominated by factions like Ahrar al-Sham that were problematic, ideologically confused, and incapable of being productive counter-terrorism partners, and by Jabhat al-Nusrah, which is itself a counter-terrorism problem.

That meant rebels were never a really useful implement of U.S. or allied policy. So long as the most powerful factions espoused either Islamist, sectarian-majoritarian chauvinism, or straight black-flag jihadism, rebels could not represent an alternative political vision for a diverse Syria or be used effectively to press for a negotiated end to the conflict. The opposition also could not be a reliable counterterrorism partner, and support for opposition rebels was in fact boosting jihadists militarily and materially.

The conventional wisdom that the Syrian opposition was indispensable for counter-terrorism was a product of sentimentality and addled thinking. In particular, many opposition backers fell into a sort of over-reading of sectarian identity politics. They allowed themselves to be convinced that Syria’s jihadists had to be defeated by a force that looked basically like those jihadists, drawn exclusively from a demographic community defined in jihadists’ own sectarian terms.

One report called for America to stand up “the moderate Sunni Arab resistance needed to defeat the ISIS and al-Qaeda insurgencies,” a “partner by, with, and through which to conduct a population-centric counterinsurgency.” Another set of analysts and activists argued Washington needed to support Syrian opposition “indigenous counter-terrorism forces” in the most simplistic sectarian terms: “This counter-terrorism force needs to be led by moderate Sunni Arab fighters as Syria is a majority Sunni Arab country.”

This uncomplicated sectarian logic meant recommitting to a Syrian opposition force that had demonstrated consistently that it could not challenge jihadists and that, in any case, did not have a monopoly on Sunni Arab representation in Syria. Counting on the Syrian fighting force that, besides the Islamic State itself, was most riddled with jihadists to combat jihadists did not make sense.

And when rebels repeatedly made clear that their priority was fighting the Assad regime instead of jihadists, opposition backers rewrote their own interests and objectives to suit their clients’ needs. They tied themselves up in contortive logical knots to explain how, if they wanted to defeat jihadists, first they had to give the opposition everything it wanted.

These counter-terrorism-appropriate rationales for supporting the opposition should not have been taken seriously. The idea that Free Syrian Army rebels could somehow outcompete jihadists on the battlefield, or that they had to backfill and provide fire support for jihadists just to maintain their own independent relevance, was not real.

The idea that opposition rebels, if delivered to victory or to a negotiated solution on their preferred, victorious terms, would then team with the Syrian military to eliminate their jihadist cousins and comrades-in-arms was similarly unreal. And finally, the idea that if the opposition won, jihadists would just demobilize and rejoin anything like a normal, safe society was also not real.

Take this section of Lister’s policy opus for War on the Rocks, in which he argued for a compulsory ceasefire and political transition imposed at the end of America’s superpower arsenal:

Assuming that the credible introduction of an enforcement mechanism did guarantee a more durable period of calm in Syria, the influence of extremist groups would almost certainly decline after a period of months. As that trend developed, the likelihood for tensions to develop between Syria’s mainstream opposition and extremists alongside them would rise, thereby presenting opportunities to encourage their isolation.

Over an undeterminable period of time, this process could eventually “re-sort” insurgents, whereby all those willing to abide by a continued ceasefire and engage in an eventual political process would become more and more distinguishable from those who would not. It would only be after such a process played out that external military strikes could be considered against those unsalvageable extremists more clearly delineated on the ground.

“An undeterminable period of time” is a Syrian opposition-dictated fantasy, not policy.

There were non-counter-terrorism-related reasons to like and support the Syrian opposition. But as counter-terrorism gradually crowded out America and the West’s other priorities in Syria, the interests of the opposition terminally diverged from those of their Western backers, including the United States.

I don’t blame the opposition for these sorts of rationalizations, although we shouldn’t infantilize them or deny them agency, either. They certainly bear their share of responsibility. Still, as events turned against them, these arguments were all they had left.

I am angry at outsiders who affirmed and repeated these sorts of excuses, and particularly government officials and decision-makers. These people should have known better, and they should have communicated the political realities and consequences of the opposition’s extremist links clearly to their Syrian clients. They did the Syrian opposition, and Syrians broadly, a terrible disservice.

The opposition was not, with time, learning usefully, and its backers were not obliging it to learn. When rebels took Aleppo’s eastern half in summer 2012, lazily disguised Syrian al-Qaeda and other unacceptably hard factions assumed control of its governance. When rebels took Idlib in spring 2015, openly avowed Syrian al-Qaeda and other unacceptably hard factions assumed control of its governance, again.

When rebels broke the siege of Aleppo in summer 2016, it was the same radioactive, jihadist-led coalition that blazed the path. The same patterns kept playing out, only more intense and worse, and still enabled by opposition sponsors.

In retrospect, optimism among rebel backers about the Jeish al-Fateh (Army of Conquest) coalition’s 2015 offensive in Syria’s northwest — channeled by The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, for example — seems to be where the opposition’s backers really worked themselves into peak delusion.

It is mind-boggling that anyone was bullish about the political leverage to be gained from a provincial capital’s fall to a force jointly led by Ahrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda, which then blazed a path south into the regime’s sectarian heartlandmassacring Alawite villagersand featuring their children in hostage videos.

The “al-Fateh” in Jeish al-Fateh literally means “open.” Historically, it connotes a Muslim army’s “opening” of new, non-Muslim lands to Islam. A Sunni-supremacist, foreign fighter-laden “Jeish al-Fateh” — reinforced by U.S.-supported Free Syrian Army factions — rampaging through the minority farming villages of Hama’s Ghab Valley should have been deeply alarming. It certainly seems to have alarmed Russia, which directly and decisively intervened in Syria on behalf of the regime months later.

Opposition backers probably should have figured this out. Instead, they repeated their opposition clients’ rationalizations and superstitions, which conveniently flattered those backers’ own policy preferences and analytical misapprehensions.

The opposition’s state backers and friendly analysts did not take the problem of jihadist infiltration of the opposition seriously. And in part because they coddled the opposition instead of forcing a real, corrective reckoning, things got out of hand.

Ultimately, it fell on Trump to kill U.S. support for Syria’s opposition rebels and to state the obvious: “It turns out it’s — a lot of al-Qaida we’re giving these weapons to,” he told The Wall Street Journal last month.

Opposition backers’ magical thinking helped lead their clients into a dead end. But those foreign opposition boosters can at least disengage and walk away, even if they’ll feel some angst about it. It’s mainly the opposition itself — the admirable parts of it, and some good people who made mistakes — who are going to pay.

Sam Heller is a fellow at The Century Foundation and a Beirut-based writer and analyst focused on Syria. Follow Sam on Twitter: @AbuJamajem.

Note1 : Since January 2017, 700,000 Syrians returned to their hometowns, mostly to Aleppo. Hezbollah kicked out Al Nusra from Lebanon eastern mountain chains and over 8,000 Syrians returned to Syria. The fighters were dispatched to Edleb, Al Nusra fiefdom in north west Syria by Turkey, the main supporter of this faction, along with Qatar.

Note 2: ISIS will be done with within a few months, But Al Nusra (backed by Turkey) will be there in north west Syria by the border.

Note 3: The US is still delaying the defeat of ISIS in Syria and obstructing the Syrian army to liberate all the eastern desert. to reach the Iraq borders.

What happened in Nov. 1979 at the Grand Mosque of Mecca?

I watched the BBC documentary on this event and had to refresh my memory and explain a few consequences from this monumental insurgency.

In Nov. 1979, over 200 Wahhabi salafists occupied the Grand Mosque on Mecca and proclaimed the arrival of the Mahdi Mohamad bin Abdalallah Kahtan.

Total blackout of world media for 15 days.  

The Grand Mosque is a huge 3-story edifice, with corridors running for 400 meters. The Zamzam Well is located in its basement. It is the well the pilgrims need to drink its water to get the full benefit of the pilgrimage.

Led by Jouhaynman, out of food, water and ammunition and dazed by the CS gaz used by the French special team, they surrendered.

The surviving fighters were later executed in 8 cities.

And Saudi Kingdom stopped the public modernization of the kingdom and reverted to the Wahhabit restrictions as they started their rule.

As as expected, the female gender was first to experience the brutal restriction of this renewed religious extremism.

Female public presence on TV and institutions were prohibited.

The door was wide opened for all these virulent extremists to be transferred to Afghanistan  supposedly to resist the Soviets.

The like of Ben Laden and supporters were encouraged to leave the Kingdom and participate in the Jihad.

The Kingdom supported these extremist movements with finances, weapons and opening countless religious madrassat, headed by Wahhabi Imam clergy.

Jouhaynman and Mohamad bin Abdalallah Kahtan are young, tall and handsom men. Many of their followers were the descendants of those early military leaders of the Wahhabi Okhouwan movement that brought the Saud family into the throne.

Saud followed the US and British orders to tame the military wing of the Okhouwan movement in order to support his kingdom. Saud had brutally assassinated and exiled the former military leaders.

The Wahhabi Okhouwan movement has devastated Medina and demolished the Prophet tomb and the mosque. When they entered Mecca, they intended to demolish Al Ka3ba. The Moslems in India, Turkey and Egypt were up in arms and the British didn’t want to handle all these uprising at the same time.

Note 1: I was in the USA and followed world news religiously, but the media blackout enabled me to know about this insurgency only the fighters surrendered, 15 days later.

Note 2: Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammad Ali of Egypt in the 19th century and after many persistent orders of the Ottoman Sultan, had crushed the Wahhabi military virulence and entered their capital. The Wahhabis used to frequently launch razzias on the outskirt of Damascus and terrify the tribes by mass slaughterhood. The British were the main supporters of this Wahhabi movement through money and weapons.

Note 3: The current wrath of Saudi Kingdom of Qatar is mainly against the channel Al Jazeera that covers bad and harmful news seeping out of the Kingdom.

Which Dictator Killed The Most People?

Note 1:  All dictators, even the most charismatic, are but symbols of a system (dogmatic/ ideological) that the political leaders and society were ripe to adopt.  The silent majority who initially didn’t care, succumbed to the violent and radical minority.

They say that it takes compassion for humanity, love for country and a strong pursuit of justice and mercy, to become a strong and respected leader of the masses.

However, every once in a while, there are politicians or generals who decide to do things their own way. These cold-blooded dictators do not care for the value of life as much as they do for achieving their selfish motives of domination, power and immortality.

This infographic shows worldwide dictators ordered by the number of killings: 1 drop, 1 million dead. (Click the picture for a larger version)

Apparently, Hitler and Stalin combined killed less people that Mao Zedong…

Can you fill in this blank for me?
Adolf Hitler == Holocaust of minorities, gypsies, including Jews. The war brought to execution the racist view of Nazism. Empirial Germany committed and supported genocides before Nazism in their colonies and in Turkey

Lenine: The great famine (1917-22). The western nations at war with Germany blockaded Russia and supported with weapons and mercenaries the Tsarist military that encircled the Soviet rebels on all fronts, except Germany.
Joseph Stalin == Purges, Goulac…before the German invasion
Mao Zedong == Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution (1966-70)
Chiang Kai Check = massacre of communists before Japan occupied China (1933-37)

Young Turk Revolution of 1908: genocide of Christians and Armenians (1915-18)

Japan: massacres in Korea, Manchouria,

Pol Pot of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia: 2 million

George Bush Jr: 1.5 million Iraqis

Rwanda genocide, supported by France

Republican France killed one million Algerian

Belgium killed and maimed 5 millions in its Congo colony for collecting rubber

One commentator said: This graph is just old argument to blame socialism not by ideology but number of dead, those number are taken from books like “The Black Book of Communism” written by obsessed people against communism, over-exaggeration of estimates (there’s no real base for the number)

Note: The USA has proven to have committed the worst crimes against humanity since its inception and continues to be top on the list as the worst White racist system of all times.

It wanted to maintain slave system and took arms against England who had banned it.

It massacred every Indian tribe that resisted expansion.

It slaughtered the Mexicans to rob their lands.

It dropped 2 atomic bombs and frequently exploded atomic bombs in open air

The bodies of the Blacks are still disposable at any second. Blacks live in constant fear of ever ready police forces and white gangs shouting at them for minor excuses

The countless pre-emptive wars around the world have caused mind-boggling atrocities and no one ever was put to trial. At the turn of the century, the US occupied the Philippines, Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, and many islands snatched from Spain on the excuse of failing to repaying its debts. All these activities under to guise of encouraging democracy.

It exacted millions of dead in Viet Nam and Korea

Over one million Iraqi civilians died in the 2003 occupation of Iraq. Depleated uranium bombs are still causing babies to be born deformed.

It invited ISIS to move in and occupy Mosul after Iraq refused to extend the presence of US troops in 2013 and after Russia denied US from bombing Syria during Obama.

Read More: http://www.trueactivist.com/which-dictator-killed-the-most-people/

 


adonis49

adonis49

adonis49

September 2017
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