Posts Tagged ‘Litany River’
Why Israel begged for an immediate cease fire in its preemptive July War of 2006?
Posted on: August 26, 2013
Why Israel begged for an immediate cease fire in its preemptive July War of 2006?
If you want to know the context of the July War that lasted 33 days, you may read the Note first.
“Why Hezbollah of Lebanon pissed me off “: GW. Bush explains
GWBush wrote in his biography:
“On July 12, 2006, Laura and I had a stop-over in Germany on our way to the G8 at St. Petersburg. Angela Merkel recounted her childhood during the communist era in East Germany. Angela had a happy childhood, but her mother never ceased to warn her of mentioning family discussions in public: The Stasi (internal intelligence services) was everywhere.
News of Hezbollah capturing Israeli soldiers as hostages (and killing 8 Israeli soldiers who arrived promptly to the rescue and fell in the trap) triggered a strong reaction from Israel.
Israel bombed Hezbollah targets in South Lebanon, and bombed the civilian airport in Beirut to prevent further weapon supplies.
Hezbollah launched missiles on Israeli towns and cities
(How simplistic are the recollection of Bush Jr. on this important preemptive war on Lebanon! In a paragraph, Bush Jr. summarized the various attacks of Hezbollah on American targets within Lebanon in 1983…)
At the G8 summit, all members condemned Hezbollah for starting Israel reactive war. (
It was proven later on that Bush and Israel had finalized a plan of attack to begin in September, and thus Hezbollah preempted this planned war, but was not aware of the violent all-war reaction of Israel).
I was frustrated that Israel declined to attack Syria, thus facilitating communication and movement of Hezbollah.
Israel military targets in Lebanon were mostly doubtful, especially targets in Beirut and north Lebanon. The immense damages to the infrastructure in Lebanon and the over 1,500 casualties among the Lebanese civilian were widely disseminated in the news media, and hampered the long-term prosecution of the war.
(In the first week, Israel failed to capture the first small town on the border called Maroun el Ras)
On the second violent week of Israel war, many members in the G8 demanded a cease-fire. I didn’t side with their request: I wanted to continue the war until Hezbollah military power is eradicated. Fundamentally, the war on Hezbollah was to sending a strong message to Iran and Syria.
Unfortunately, Israel behavior in the third week of the war plan exacerbated the world community and the Lebanese government headed by Seniora, which was a strong ally to the US drive for democracy and liberty…
Israel bombed a building in Qana and killed over 30 civilians huddled in the basement.
(Israel had bombed Qana in 1996 where civilians took refuge in a UN compound and killed over 30o civilians).
Seniora was furious and was about to resign if the war resumed. The Arab leaders were afraid that the carnage in the pictures and video, circulating 24 hours on TV, could foment strong reactions of the people in the streets.
I convened the National Security Council, and the debate was hot.
Dick Cheney said: “We have to let Israel finish off Hezbollah.”
Condoleezza Rice replied: “If we allow that, you may kiss good-bye to the presence of the US in the Middle-East region” and she proposed a cease-fire resolution in the UN and dispatching a multinational UN force to the Litany River.
I was for the resumption of the war, but I feared that lodging a veto in the UN will lead to isolating the US, instead of Syria and Iran. Consequently, I figured out that long-term pressures on Syria and Iran out-weight the short-term successes on Hezbollah. I dispatched Condi to the UN to iron out resolution 1701.
A cease-fire took hold on August 14, Israel reactive and approximate war decisions, cost its precious and remaining credibility in the world community, even though Hezbollah was seriously weakened militarily.”
Four days before the voting on a resolution, Israel attempted a last, all-out advance of just 3 miles toward the Litany River.
Hezbollah destroyed 50 Merkava tanks and forced the Israeli troops to retreat every which way to the border.
(Interestingly, in the third day of the war, the delegates of Lebanon to the UN demanded to submit a cease-fire resolution. The UN ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, informed them haughtily and in no uncertain terms that there will be no resolution before Israel annihilate Hezbollah.
Three days before the actual cease-fire, it was Bolton hurrying up to the Lebanese delegates and begging them to present a resolution. He explained: “The Israelis are horribly harassing us for a cease-fire resolution, at any cost…”)
Note 1: The July war 2006, covered only three pages of the 484-page of the autobiographical book “Decisive moments: GW.Bush” Amazingly, this war was the turning moment for the total failure of the US strategic plan of the “Greater Middle East.
Israel was reduced to defensive position, licking its wounds, examining its failures…
The Arab dictators and absolute monarchs who encouraged Israel to prosecute the war in order to eradicate Hezbollah military power were judged traitors by the Arab masses.
Turkey and the European States were pissed off with GW.Bush insistence of continuing the war for over 4 weeks. It was evident after the first week that the strategic goals have fizzled. The remaining 3 weeks of the war were total liability to the US administration and Israel.
Hezbollah was on the offensive and frustrated all the haphazard attempts of Israel to getting back on the driver seat.
Note 2: Three days before the decided cease-fire, Israel imported cluster bombs from England of Tony Blair and launched 3 million bombs in south Lebanon (kids are still being killed and injured six years later).
This behavior was in retaliation of huge frustration and with the hope that the tiny bombs will delay the return of the inhabitants to their homes.
Amazingly, the next day of the cease-fire, the citizens in the south returned in mass, irrespective of official warnings and the destruction of all bridges…
Israel goals failed on all front, and Hezbollah emerged as the first resistance force to checking Israel offensive all-out war.
Note 3: You may read the follow-up article How I spread liberty...https://adonis49.wordpress.com/2011/09/07/how-i-spread-liberty-george-w-bush-explains/
Note 4: Why Israel begged for a cease fire? https://adonis49.wordpress.com/2013/08/26/why-israel-begged-for-an-immediate-cease-fire-in-its-preemptive-july-war-of-2006/
So, who won? Israel or Hezbollah?
Posted on: June 20, 2010
So, who won? Israel or Hezbollah? Or are we asking the wrong question?
Note: I decided to re-publish an article posted on May 14, 2007 in order to get a perspective for newer analysis of the situation
Thomas Friedman has written an article a few days ago claiming that Israel has won the July 2006 War tactically, strategically and politically. The Israeli daily Yedeot Ahronot is adopting this position in an attempt to win over the shattered Israeli morale. That Israel had won tactically by destroying extensively and hatefully the headquarters and the military and social installations and institutions of Hezbollah and weakening it temporarily is not a big feat, given the military imbalance in the kind of air and naval superiority with the full backing of the US and the treachery of the Arab States. Israel foreign minister Sevy Livney declared that in the first two days all the targets in the Israeli intelligence “data bank” have been exhausted and she urged Olmert PM to end the war on the third day. That Olmert felt emboldened to resume the war for another 30 days, and then, accepting a cease fire without effectively reaching the Litany River (two miles away) means that the purpose of the war was modified at the urge of external powers to eradicate the Lebanese Resistance and shatter the image of the invincible Hezbollah.
That Israel had won strategically because its northern borders have been very quiet for seven months after the war is a half truth; the international UN forces are there because Hezbollah allowed its deployment. Fact is, the borders have been very quiet since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 24, 2000. The few encroachments were the results of Israeli incursions in Lebanon: Hezbollah reacted only on these infiltrations or attacks within our borders. That Israel had to stop its incursion in Lebanon with all the backing it was enjoying from the US, Europe ans “moderate” Arab States proves that its strategy was foiled and severely checked.
Friedman claims that Israel has won politically because the Lebanese army has entered the south is also a half truth: Hezbollah didn’t mind the deployment of the Lebanese army which saved it from further escalations and unwanted pressures from the UN and the need to focus more on the internal political affairs of Lebanon. The immeasurable popular support from all the Arab and Moslem citizens for Hezbollah’s valiant resistance is by no means a political victory for Israel; it is a severe defeat because it rekindled the resistance spirit in the Arabs. The inability of Israel to squelch the second Palestinian “intifada” is rooted in the rejuvenated spirit of resistance in Palestine as well as in Iraq.
Certainly, Hezbollah has been temporarily weakened militarily and that the “illegitimate” Lebanese Seniora’s government has been doing its utmost to capitalize on that fact and dragging Hezbollah in the morass of Lebanon’s political quagmire. The “illegitimate” Lebanese government is deliberately re-opening tough issues that have been agreed on during the round table before the July War and giving them diabolical twists on the basis that the devil is in the details. The Moderate Arab States (a euphemism for traitors States who encouraged Israel to eradicate Hezbollah) are harnessing their widespread communication media to dissipate the popular support for Hezbollah and labeling it as merely an Iranian stooge and working against the interest of the Arabs who want peace and prosperity with Israel.
Hezbollah must have learned a great deal from this unilateral stand against Israel but there is a most important message that Hezbollah failed to get. It is extremely dangerous for Hezbollah’s charismatic leader Hassan Nasr Allah to swear on promises (Wa3ad) that are long-term in nature for their realizations and then, feeling pressured to deliver them almost immediately. For example, the last promise to repair and rebuild what has been destroyed, almost instantly and with “pure halal” money, is too impractical and fraught with decisions that overextend the capabilities of Hezbollah beyond its limits and weaken it in the process. The other example was a promise before the war to snatch a few more Israeli soldiers as prisoners in order to liberate the remaining three Lebanese who have been detained for more than 15 years; it is laudable to make such kind of promises but when it is uttered in a “divine” revelation by Nasr Allah himself it becomes very binding and communications with Hezbollah’s allies become tenuous. It is dangerous to rely on Nasr Allah to publicly force decisions, as if emanating from a prophet, and to clarify issues that should be left to the leadership and its allies within the political process.
It is inadmissible for Nasr Allah to appear during religious celebration to deliver political speeches that give the opposite results and reflect images of increased weaknesses for relying on the religious faith and passions of its supporters instead on the rational and deliberate mind that our society is in dire need to overcome a strong enemy.
I believe that people are asking the wrong question. It is not whether Hezbollah has won the war because just by getting out strong and effective after 33 days of a savage war of eradication, with no serious support internally or externally, is a striking victory. The question should be whether the US-Israeli-”Moderate” Arabs States objectives have achieved any tangible results. Nasr Allah has claimed that not a single objective came out satisfactorily neither tactically, strategically, nor politically in Lebanon or in the “Greater Middle East region”. The response should be focused on refuting Nasr Allah’s claims, satisfactorily and convincingly. So far, no one discredited Nasr Allah’s claims.
How Superpowers behave
Posted on: June 4, 2009
How Superpowers behave toward the smaller States (June 1, 2009)
The ex-French Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine once told Lebanon ex-President Lahoud: “When our relations with the US Administrations are closer to cooperation than competition we communicate our information to them but they fail to return the honor. When our relations are fine then the US tends to horde the solution. When world politics deteriorate then the US asks us to resolve the problems on their behalves, on conditions that the signing of any agreement is done in Washington, DC.
Bill Clinton insisted on the sick and dying Hafez Assad for a month to meet him in Geneva in February 2000 on the ground that a deal is ready for the return of the occupied Golan Heights. The two Presidents met in March. Clinton knew very well that Assad is not ready to negotiate for less than 100% on the returned land. Clinton proudly declared “Ehud Barak is willing to return 98% of the Golan Heights”. The meeting was over in ten minutes. Clinton lost a golden opportunity for peace in the Middle East.
Madeline Albright, US Foreign Affairs during Clinton tenure, met in Beirut with Lebanon’s Salim Hoss PM in September 1999. It was the first high ranking US emissary in 16 years. Without preambles, Albright ejaculated “The USA wants the two highjackers of the TWA of 1985; the USA wants the perpetrators for the blowing up of the Marines headquarter in 1984; the USA wants those who demolished the US embassy in Beirut and the one who assassinated our Ambassador” Our Prime Minister retorted “When the TWA was high jacked I was subjugated to an assassination attempt and three of my bodyguards died. At the time of this civil war Lebanon witnessed 150,000 civilian victims’ dead and over 400,000 severely injured” The same Albright confronted President Lahoud to desist demanding an accurate demarcation line (The Blue Line) on the southern borders after Israel withdrew in May 24, 2000.
The Syrian young President Bashar Assad described the superpower games saying “The first fundamental principle is that superpowers and especially the USA try hard to convince the smaller States that they are too weak and need urgent aids. They claim that the smaller States have practically no “products” to transact. They insist on “market demand and offer” and barely care about State values or the logic of Statehood. The second principle is that superpowers care to the extent they need to resolve a problem. It does not matter the level of rhetoric or the squeeze of economical and financial embargo on the smaller State; once a superpower is in need then everything is forgotten and relations resume normally.”
In October 2000, Hezbollah took prisoners three Israeli soldiers in the Shabaa Farms and then lured the retired Israeli Colonel El Hanane Tanenboum to Beirut. Israel had withdrawn from south Lebanon unilaterally in May 24, 2000 but had failed to vacate the Shebaa Farms. Albright demanded the release of the Israeli prisoners and Ehub Barak gave an ultimatum of 4 hours. Lahoud answered the US Ambassador Satterfield “Consider the 4 hours have ended. I will not negotiate the release of the Israeli prisoners” Lahoud was in strong position because the Lebanese army was not on the borders so that Israel could not exercise any pressures on the President and Lahoud won his bet and Israel refrained temporarily from any incursions.
Foreign diplomats and officials view the problems of Lebanon from the outside in; they never consider the precarious social and political conditions of Lebanon. Emile Lahoud refused to deploy the army across the Litany River since he was appointed army chief in 1989 and then President of the Republic till July 2006 when Hezbollah agreed under UN resolution 1701 to withdraw his military presence behind the Litany River. During all these years the international community and the Arab States had constantly pressured Lahoud to send the Lebanese army to the borders with Israel. Lahoud kept steadfast and never obeyed any of these orders and he was completely right; he had said: “As long as there are no guarantees that Israel will not violate Lebanon’s integrity and security then the Lebanese army will refrain playing the police force and antagonizing our resistance to easing Israel’s security at the expense of jeopardizing Lebanon internal security.” (To be continued)
