Posts Tagged ‘Suleiman Frangieh’
AounPhobia versus AounIdolatry
Posted by: adonis49 on: May 28, 2010
AounPhobia versus AounIdolatry
Note: I received this e-mail in French and decided to translate it, and repost it, within context and clarify a few issues.
First, a few clarifications:
General Aoun was ousted as Prime Minister in 1989 by the Syrian forces with a US green light. Aoun became a political refugee in France till 2005.
As the Syrians troops were getting ready to leave Lebanon in 2005, Aoun was getting ready to return to Lebanon. France did its best to discourage Aoun to return to Lebanon at the urge and strong pressures from all political parties in Lebanon, mostly the sectarian and feudal parties, that felt that Aoun might take center stage with Lebanese anxious of Syria withdrawal.
As Aoun landed he proclaimed: “Now that the Syrian army is out of Lebanon then I no longer has any qualms with Syria”
All political parties refrained from allying with the Tayyar of Aoun during the Parliamentary election of 2005, both the March 8 and the March 14 alliances, respectively with the US or Syria interference in Lebanon. And yet, Aoun’s party won hands down the election with a landslide majority of the Christian voters.
Now the e-mail.
“The current principal Lebanese cleavage seems to be between what separate the two political groups: AounPhobia (or March 14 political alliances) versus AounIdolatry (or March 8 alliances).
(That was before Aoun allied with Hezbollah in order to break this separation among the religious sects, specifically between the Sunni and Shia that Israel/USA has been inflaming for decades)
You are under the impression that we got over the old quarrels between Arabists and Phoenicians origins of the Lebanese; that we got over pro Bush Junior or Bashar Assad of Syria, and that March 8 or 14 alliances are old and insipid tales.
All the fracturing lines are AounDeluvian. (Especially when Aoun was elected President of the Republic in 2017 and currently when all the Big mafia/militia Rodents are out of the government after the mass upheaval in October 17 2019)
You can no longer sit for dinner without AounPhobia group AounLambasts AounIdolaters. The evening is thus ruined for the rare AounNeutrals
The worst part is that the actual staunchest AounPhobias were the most AounIdolaters when General Michel Aoun was the designated Prime Minister in 1988 and fighting the Syrian troops in Lebanon as invaders. (No, not the leaders: they were the most ass-liking of Syrian mandated power)
AounPhobia people are irremediably AounPsychaitrists: their diagnostics are AounChrist (antichrist), AounMegalomania, and Aounarcisist. AounPhobia people are under AounDepressents and proud to be AountPhobia addicted….”
An Aounxieted citizen
In 2006, before Israel’ pre-preemptive war on Lebanon, Aoun had a rapprochement with Hezbollah that upset all alliances and made the alliances of the majority of Christians with the Muslim Shias during the 2005 parliamentary election an unbeatable political power pressure.
Syria then welcomed Aoun officially as a major State personality for an entire week.
It seems that Syria is trying currently to clip the advances of Aoun’s party by ordering political leaders who sided staunchly with Aoun to desist from total support rhetoric.
For example, the Maronite Suleiman Frangieh of Zogarta, the Druze Erslan of Aley, and Skaf of Zahle have been showing lukewarm enthusiasm for Aoun during the latest municipal election.
Even Hezbollah, through its alliance with AMAL of Nabih Berry, has been implicitly trying to weaken the Tayyar influence.
Still, the Tayyar of Aoun managed to win big time in both the Parliamentary and municipal elections.
Lebanon Election Day:Bi-Weekly Report (#25)
Posted by: adonis49 on: June 9, 2009
Sunday, June 7, 2009 Election Day in Lebanon
I got up at 4 a.m. on Sunday June 7, 2009; it is Election Day for the Parliament in Lebanon.
I wrote and published the post “I have a position: I am voting today”.
As my parents were ready we drove around 8:15 to one of the three election centers in the town of Beit-Chabab. Our center was located in the previous private school that the municipality has purchased five years ago and didn’t move in yet.
This is the first time in Lebanon that election is done in one day: Parliamentary elections were performed in two successive Sundays until the last election proved that parties with heavier financial muscles could regroup, focus, and swing elections to their advantages by chastising parties that didn’t stick to the alliance terms in the previous Election Sunday.
I was shocked by the long line that did not move. The army was positioned outside the perimeter and the internal security forces within the enclosed place.
You had first to exhibit your ID to enter the only entrance/exit “door”. You wait for a security officer to call on a range of numbers corresponding to your family civil record. The elder people were given priority and my parents voted within half an hour.
The urn assigned to my category was very slow in processing voters. I sat and ate a loaf of “mankoush bi zaatar” that one party was distributing. I asked my parents to hitchhike home. I waited for an hour and a half and the line never budged. I lost any hope for my turn to come in the morning.
I returned home hoping to come back after lunch for the line to get moving. Those who arrived at 7 a.m. made it nicely. My brother-in-law, a retired military officer, voted for the first time as well as one of his eligible daughters.
I returned at 1:30 after lunch to the voting urns and had to wait another hour before I managed to vote. There were too many voters for the reduced number of urns (kalam ektira3). Citizens complained that they lined up as if they were receiving rations “i3asha/e7ssan”.
General Michel Aoun of the Tayyar Party has warned a couple of months ago on the strong possibility of this problem and had suggested that election be resumed on two successive days.
The opposition claimed that the slow process was intentional to discourage their voters from exercising patience. Apparently, the slow processing of voter lines is due mainly, in addition to the first reason, to the decrease in numbers of urns because of shortage in personnel.
By law, any voter within the enclosed voting area was eligible to vote after 7 p.m. Dozens of election monitoring groups from around the world were gathered in Lebanon to take notes of the proceedings; the groups of ex-US President Jimmy Carter, the European Union, and the Arab League were present weeks before that well “observed” and critical day.
News are that over 100 thousands Lebanese immigrants flew in to participate in the election process.
Monday Morning, June 8, 2009
I got up at 4 a.m. and watched TV for any crumbs of news on the election results and removed to my study to read. Official results will not be in before noon but I got a good idea of the trend.
Our neighborhood and the districts of Metn and Kesrouan are very calm and not because people are not up. The government coalition parties that usually are the loudest and the most trouble makers have lost the election in these two districts.
Unofficial results indicate that the government allies received a majority of 67 deputies to 57 for the opposition.
Actually, the results were already known before midnight. The minister of the interior Ziad Baroud had announced previously not to expect any official results before late afternoon.
My contention is that, in addition to waiting for formal arrival of evidences, the minister of the interior was asked to delay official results for 18 hours. The purpose of that delay is first, to permit negotiations for swapping deputies from losers to winners as the implicit entente of the Doha agreement demanded, so that the main leaders represented there will re-enter Parliament and second, so that the difference between opposition and government coalition deputies would not exceed more than 5 deputies.
The opposition coalition major defeats were in the districts of Batroun, Koura, Zahle, and Ashrafieh (Beirut 1). The government coalition lost Baabda and Zgharta districts.
The main leaders on both sides are winners; Saad Hariri, Michel Aoun, Walid Jumblatt, and Hezbollah.
Thus, any government has to be formed of the three major blocks representing the three main religious sects (Maronite, Shiaa, and Sunni) with practically even power politically in the parliament.
Basically, the Tayyar of Michel Aoun has increased the number of its deputies from 20 to over 27; the Tayyar gained the leader Suleiman Frangieh of Zgharta and lost Skaf of Zahle.
Michel Aoun strengthened his unchallenged Maronite leadership in Mount Lebanon (the district of Jubail, Kesrouan, Metn, Baabda, and Jezzine). The block of General Michel Aoun represents two third of the Maronite deputies and 50% of the Christian deputies and an overwhelming popular support in all Lebanon.
Hezbollah gained the strategic district of Baabda because it is an extension to its headquarters in south Beirut (Dahiyat).
Consequently, the resistance had secured internal political backing of all Mount Lebanon to the southern borders. Obviously, Hezbollah prevails militarily and Lebanon policy of defense cannot circumvent Hezbollah’s concerns for its internal security.
Saad Hariri emerged as the unchallenged leader of the Sunni sect in Beirut, Saida, North Lebanon, and the central Bekaa Valley. Fouad Siniora PM got a seat in Saida.
The main losers are the President of the Republic, Michel Suleiman, because the opposition coalition badly defeated the President’s implicit list of candidates in the district of Jubail.
The Maronite Patriarch lost because he can no longer claim any political weight in Mount Lebanon since he publicly supported the parties challenging Michel Aoun. Thus, Michel Aoun is practically the political leader of the Maronite sect according to Lebanon’s caste system.
One fact stands out in this tough election: it is my contention that the sacerdotal caste of the Christian Greek Orthodox did its best to challenge Michel Aoun as the pre-eminent representative of all the Christians in Lebanon.
The Greek Orthodox clergy played politics big time by defeating the Tayyar in Koura, Betroun, and Ashrafieh. I am not worried about this positioning at this phase because the Greek Orthodox citizens are the staunchest Lebanese patriots against our main enemy Israel: Most of the secular and national founders of political parties were Greek Orthodox.
Michel Aoun will have to temper his zeal and negotiate with this Christian sect as an equal. In any event, Saad Hariri will owe the Christian Orthodox big time for the next four years otherwise he is doomed to lose the majority in next Parliamentary election.
The Christian Armenians could swing victory only in the Metn district because they failed in Ashrafieh and Zahle to make any difference facing the outnumbered Sunni voters.
Actually, the 4,000 Sunni voters in Koura reversed a sure win for the opposition to a defeat by less than one thousand votes.
The opposition lost the district of Zahle because the government had transferred the registration of over 25 thousands of Sunnis to Zahle in preparation for this election. This election was an exacerbation of Sunni confessional rallying cry as the other religious sects were distancing from confessional rhetoric. Saudi Kingdom monarchy is deeply immersed in an ugly and dirty confessional battle.
Monday Evening
Ziad Baroud returned partial official results of 15 out of 26 districts (kada2) by noon and a full declaration by 6 p.m.
The trick that there were discussions going on for swapping deputies did not take off in Lebanon’s archaic confessional political system. For example, I considered that at least two losing traditional deputies in Zahle would be declared winners in return for two traditional losers in the Metn District. Lebanon election experienced high turn out averaging over 60%.
Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah delivered a speech by 8:30 p.m. He reminded the citizens of the lies of the government coalition leaders who used scare tactics claiming that the resistance would use its military power to affect election procedures and results.
In any case, if the new political power sharing is to take off then any discussion of Hezbollah military reality should be restricted to the special conference table on defense strategies.
Iran is having its Presidential election on June 12, 2009.
The candidates Ahmadinejad and Moussawi faced off in a television debate. Moussawi suckered to the public opinion of the western nations’ demands: he is speaking as a foreign affairs minister and not a candidate to win the presidency.
The attitude of appeasing the western public opinions is considered very disgusting in Iran and not the characteristic of a vast “Empire”.
The largest, widest, and lengthiest military exercise conducted by Israel for 5 days and which started on May 31 faltered and was a failure.
The Israeli citizens did not respond as expected and went on to their daily routine as if nothing is happening, regardless of the loud and frequent siren alarms.
Those five days were a holiday and not of any serious exigencies. The Israelis on the Lebanese borders were the least concerned. The message was clear and louder than the siren alarms “Governments of Israel, we want peace. We no longer believe than security should take priority over peace treaty. For 61 years you have driven us hard to countless pre-emptive and expansionist wars. Enough is enough. We paid dearly for mindless and losing priorities and we want your policy to do the right thing. We want peace, period”
President Barack Obama has to deliver something tangible in the Middle East and very soon, and not six months from now as he is planning.
Periods of sweet talking with nothing tangible in return are gone. The Palestinian Statehood is due now! The return of the Golan Heights to Syria is due now! Direct negotiations with Palestinian Hamas and Lebanon Hezbollah are due now! Stabilizing Pakistan is due now! The return of the Shebaa Farms and the Hills of Kfar Shouba to Lebanon is due now!
A specific schedule for the return of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to Palestine is due now!
Why my urgency to resolving decades of roadblocks in the Middle East?
Simple: the Middle East has been steadily catching on to extremist confessional attitudes as the absolution of Israel’s horrors and genocides has been the trademark of the western nations.
Lebanon is catching on quickly to isolationist confessional extremism and if Lebanon is no longer a viable experiment for democracy, then the USA and Europe will have no one to blame but themselves for laxity in executing and enforcing what is the right thing to do in this region.
Important Event: June 7, 2009 (Lebanon)
Posted by: adonis49 on: June 5, 2009
What is Legitimate, Temporary, and Necessary? All is Temporary and Necessary in Lebanon and Nothing is Legitimate.
(June 5, 2009)
On June 7, 2009 the Lebanese will vote for a new Parliament. (Another bogus election will be held on May 15, 2022 according to an election law Not fit for the most reactionary political system)
Two groups of citizens will vote: The group constituted of the so-called “patriotic, secular, and reformists” and the group of an amalgam of statue-quo confessionals, feudalists, isolationists, and “colonial cow-towing minded” mentalities.
The “colonial minded” citizens follow leaders who invariably rely on foreign interventions (regional or superpower States) to balance out a broken alliance among the confessional castes system and perpetrate the conditions for weak central governments.
A brief current history might elucidate this drastic splitting among the Lebanese citizens.
In May 24, 2000, Ehud Barak PM of Israel withdrew from most of south Lebanon with no preconditions, the first ever decision of Israel in 61 years history. The joint strategy of Lebanon President Emil Lahoud and Hafiz Assad of Syria enabled Hezbollah a resounding victory, (after neutralizing the amalgam of Lebanese resistance forces to Israel occupation of Lebanon since 1982).
The Arab League decided to hold its annual meeting in Beirut in August 2002 as a good gesture for its acknowledgment of the victory in 2000 of this tiny State.
In 2003, Syria had plans for partial withdrawal to the Bekaa Valley but the vehement rhetoric from the Druze leader Walid Jumblat and the Patriarch of the Maronite Christian sect slowed down the execution process.
Before the assassination of Rafic Hariri in February 14, 2005, the Bush Jr. Administration and Jacque Chirac of France issued the UN resolution 1559 for the retreat of the Syrian forces from Lebanon and the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military wing and the delivery of its heavy armament to the USA.
The withdrawal of the Syrian troops was Not the main objective of this resolution because the international community and the main Arab States wanted and kept high hopes that Syria will ultimately be pressured to do the dirty work of taming Hezbollah, because Syria was only in the field power to do any kinds of pressure .
The Syrian government factored in many variables to oppose the frequent lures and pressures of what is expected of her to do in order to remain in Lebanon.
The targeting of Rafiq Hariri for assassination by the US, France, Saudi Arabia, and Israel was not one of the variables considered by Syria; and Syria strategy was shaken violently.
In fact, Rafic Hariri received so many encouragements and acted in such confidence that the Syrian government forgot to contemplate such an evil and drastic eventuality.
The mass demonstration on February 14, 2005 was Not a threat to Syria: General Aoun was still in exile in France and was pressured by the French government not to return to Lebanon.
What Syria comprehended the loudest was the mass demonstration by Hezbollah on March 8, 2005. Hezbollah thanked Syria for its sacrifices, which meant “Now it is time for your complete withdrawal”: Hezbollah was always nervous of the Syrian presence in Lebanon because it was the only power capable of restraining its activities.
Hezbollah was sending the message to Bashar Assad “We can take care of ourselves and still continue the resistance against Israel if you definitely put an end to the international pressures on you by getting out of Lebanon”
The mass demonstration on March 14, fortified by the supporters of General Aoun (The Tayyar Horr), was not even a threat to Syria. It was the realization of Syria that its continued presence in Lebanon will ultimately confront its army directly as the Lebanese government lost control over events and cowered under uncertainties.
Syria withdrew quickly to the frustration of the US and France who realized that they wasted Hariri on the demand of Israel and for nothing in return: Hariri could still be of greater benefit to their policies in the Middle East region alive, rather than dead.
The International Community, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia fell back to plan B: re-kindling the civil war in Lebanon.
They initiated a series of bombing in Christian quarters hoping that the Christian will side en mass with the Sunni/Mustakbal/Hariri clan. Plan B petered out.
They came back with more vigorous scare tactics by assassinating Christian personalities who criticized the Syrian presence like Samir Kassir, George Hawi, and Jubran Tweiny. These journalists were marked as potentially not reliable and could shift sides because they were independent minded and honest characters.
This wave of select assassination backfired because General Aoun signed a pact with Hezbollah and de-activated a potential civil war targeting the Christians.
Plan C also failed and civil war did not flare out.
Thus, direct intervention from outside was considered and Israel trained its forces for incursion into Lebanon with the US total aids and support in all phases of war preparation.
Hezbollah, intentionally or by coincidence, preempted the completion of the plan in June 12, 2006.
Israel launched its offensive for 33 days and failed miserably in all the goals. The attack backfired and the stature of Hezbollah ballooned and overflowed to all the Arab and Moslem populations.
The International Community, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia did not desist in their resolve to weaken Hezbollah attraction to the “Arabic” masses.
Plan D was to re-enforce the Sunnis with a military wing of extremist salafists called “Jund Al Sham” and financed by Bandar Bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia.
In the summer of 2007 a few ignorant and violent Sunni extremists preempted the timing of Israel war on Lebanon by slaughtering Lebanese soldiers: the army pride and dignity reacted with an all out attack and crushed this insurrection in the northern Nahr Al Bared Palestinian camp after 6 months and many martyrs.
The International Community, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia studied for two years to dismantle Hezbollah’s secured communication lines and to start a mini civil war in Beirut between the Shiaa and Sunnis.
Plan E backfired again on May 8, 2008 and the Lebanese leaders had to meet in Dowha (Qatar) and agreed on the election of a President to the Republic, an election law for the Parliament, and the constitution of a national government.
Lebanon has suffered for 4 years of an incompetent and illegitimate government; the Lebanese lived in a totally insecure political vacuum; the economy was farmed out to the size of the Hariri clan and the financial debt skyrocketed to $60 billions.
This lavish “political” debt was intended to pressure the Lebanese government into accepting the settling of the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in return for debt cancellation.
We need to compare 4 categories of leaders along the two dimensions of principled leaders and pragmatists.
In the dimension of principled leaders we can discriminate the hate monger isolationist leaders versus the principled for the public and State good.
In the pragmatic dimension we have the “individual interest oriented” and the public/State pragmatists. For example: Walid Jumblat, Merwan Hamadeh, Amine Gemayel, Samir Geaja, and the Patriarch of the Christian Maronite sect can be categorized in the isolationist, confessional, and personal minded leaders.
Ex-President Emile Lahoud, General Michel Aoun, Suleiman Frangieh, and Hassan Nasr Allah could be classified as the principled and public/State oriented pragmatists.
The classification of the remainder of the semi-leaders I leave it to the readers as exercises.
The Mufti of Beirut is a non entity: he is the bugle of Saad Hariri. Saad Hariri is a non entity: he re-edited the slogan of the chairman of General Motors to say “What is good for the Saudi Monarchs is good for Lebanon”. General Motors has declared bankruptcy; the Hariri/Seniora clan will declare bankruptcy on June 8, 2009.
With the exception of General Aoun who refused any kind of occupation, all leaders welcomed the mandate of Syria for 20 years; they kept repeating the mantra “The presence of Syria in Lebanon is “Legitimate, Temporary, and Necessary”.
Merwan Hamadeh and all the actual ministers were the ones repeating this mantra to the nauseating public.
The Maronite Patriarch Sfeir was against the Syrian presence but was pretty cool regarding Israel’s occupation.
The members of the Seniora PM government (USA agents) did not voice out their refusal of Israel’s occupation of part of south Lebanon and constantly conspired to weaken the resistance forces against the Israeli occupiers on the basis that only international diplomacy can pressure Israel!
Only President Lahoud stood steadfast with Hezbollah and refused to deploy the army in areas of the resistance’s operations.
Thanks to Hassan Nasr Allah and President Lahoud Lebanon managed to secure its integrity and unify of its army. Thanks to Hassan Nasr Allah and General Michel Aoun Lebanon buried any likelihood for the resurgence of a civil war.
My spirit went to statesman General Aoun who said, once the Syrian troops crossed the borders back to Syria, “Syria is now out of Lebanon. I have no qualms with Syria anymore. This is the time to open a new page in our relations”.
This position stands in contrast to those who begged Syria for crumbs and privileges for 20 years and once Syria withdrew they refrained from normalizing relations with Syria; the fictitious excuses to antagonizing Syria were dictated by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. What kind of state leadership is that?
The election results of June 7, 2009 should fortify Lebanon as a Nation and project the image of a solid central government with serious reforms and changes to the archaic political system.
That are my wishes but I know the struggle will be long and protracted. Sweet revolutions need time to mature in this diversified Lebanon.
Quick, the Third Republic of Lebanon
Posted by: adonis49 on: June 5, 2009
The Third Republic of Lebanon: The Tayyar of Michel Aoun (June 1, 2009)
The formal and extensive visits of Michel Aoun to Iran and then to Syria had three purposes. First, it was symbolic of “breaking bread and sharing salt” which meant that confidence is established and hidden agendas will be stated clearly among friends. The second purpose was to focus attention on the ethnic and religious minorities so that Iran and Syria would exercise more leverage to preserving the persecuted minorities in Iraq. The third purpose was to exposing the draft program of the Third Republic that need to be instituted in Lebanon in order to relieve Iran and Syria from constant worries on the potential political and strategic orientation of Lebanon; thus, relying on Iran and Syria to exercise their influence toward stabilizing an environment of security and peace within Lebanon.
General and Deputy Aoun had absorbed the various failures of other Christian Lebanese leaders for establishing a lasting stable political system that would save Lebanon of recurring civil wars. A unified Christian front in Lebanon is not enough to bringing peace and security; this fact Michel Aoun experienced when he was appointed Prime Minister in 1988 and ended in his exile to France. The most striking recent experiment was the tenure of ex-President Emile Lahoud.
Lahoud intended to eradicate corruption in the State while maintaining strategic relations with Syria and supporting the Lebanese resistance in the south against Israel’s occupation. Lahoud failed in his attempts for reforms of the social and political system because he had no civilian political movement and had no previous communication with the deputies in the Parliament. Lahoud managed to press forward on the corruption front in the first 3 years until Syria realized that the reforms were going too far and driving its Lebanese political supporters to frantic seizures. The incarcerated officials indicted with corruption and stealing the treasury were released from prison and Rafic Hariri returned as Prime Minister to resume his service and real estate economy based on heavy borrowing.
As Syria was under pressure in 2005 to withdraw its troops then it decided to extend the tenure of Lahoud another 3 years. The UN resolution 1559 for Syria withdrawal, the Lebanese army to expand to the southern borders, and Hezbollah to turn over its heavy artillery to the army pointed to a dramatic clash which culminated in the assassination of Rafic Hariri. External interventions bolstered the internal confessional forces to side track reforms and forced the Presidency into a defensive corner; thus, not only clipping any remnant of official power but eliminating the role of the Presidency and the Christian necessity for a stable Lebanon among its religious affiliations.
What is the Third Republic and what is its strategy? First, the new Republic will bolster the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the President of the Republic and reduce the exclusive privileges of the Prime Minister to administering several “black boxes” such as emergency funds, development and construction council, repatriation of Lebanese refugees’ box, and disaster box that should be returned to the relevant ministries. These reforms do not require any amendments to the Taef Constitution.
Second, the Third Republic wants to desist on reducing the economy of Lebanon to the service sector that it can no longer compete with newer and powerful centers in the region like Dubai, Cyprus, Jordan, and Egypt. The economy has to revert to basics and develop on industrial and agricultural production, exploiting our water resources, managing better our electrical power generation, and expanding and modernizing our communication facilities. Health for all and education for all at affordable costs are priorities.
Third, the reduction of our heavy borrowing policy that reached over 60 billions dollars with the purpose of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon in return of canceling this mighty debt will be tackled in earnest. I lean to the possibility that if negotiations with the lending parties are not successful then the new government will decree the cancellation of any lending that was politically motivated. I doubt that reactions would extend beyond the rhetorical recriminations because the case is strong that Lebanon had no collateral economical generation potentials for these generous lending. As a consequence, the Third Republic will put an end to any international policies attempts to reside the Palestinians in Lebanon.
Fourth, the Third Republic will relieve Hezbollah from the constant pressures of international plans targeted at coercing the disarmament of the resistance by coordinate activities with non-patriotic governments that are wiling to cohabitate with the enemy Israel. This united front will force Israel to desist from any further incursions into Lebanon.
Fifth, the Third Republic will move ahead with an alternative election law based on proportionality and revisiting laws that deny equality between genders and secular national civil status laws.
Sixth, the Third Republic will demand joint negotiations with Syria relative peace agreements with Israel after recapturing the Shebaa Farms and the Hills of Kfarshouba.
The first step in the strategy was for the Christians to regain confidence and stand up to their responsibilities and acknowledging that Israel is the enemy. This was done. The second step was an alliance with Hezbollah which defeated many plans to resurrect the specter of the civil war. The third step was direct contacts with States as representing the largest Christian Parliamentary bloc and opening channels of communications and entente. The fourth step is wining the majority seats in the Parliament.
Lebanon Parliament was expanded in 1992 to include 128 deputies; 64 Christians and 64 Moslems. The election in June 7 is calling on 3, 260,000 voters to participate and most probably more than 50% will effectively vote. Among the eligible voters of over 21 years of age 888,000 are Moslem Shiaas (27 deputies in total), 874,000 Moslem Sunnis (27 deputies), 698,000 Christian Maronites (34 deputies), 243,000 Christian Greek Orthodox (concentrated in the districts of Ashrafieh and Koura), 186, 000 Moslem Druze (8 deputies concentrated in the districts of Chouf, Aley, and Hasbaya), 163, 000 Greek Catholics, and dozen of other Christian minorities and Armenians (concentrated in Ashrafieh, Burj Hammoud, and Anjar). The Moslem Alawis of about 27,000 are entitled to 2 deputies.
In the previous election of 2005, the Tayyar of Michel Aoun without the support of any alliances managed to secure 20 Christian deputies representing 70% of the Christian voters but the Lebanese political system denied this large bloc any governmental representation for 4 years until the Dawha agreement. The law of this election that correspond to the law of 1960 divides Lebanon into 26 districts called “Kada2” and most of the Christians candidates do not have to rely on Moslem voters for their election. With the alliance of the “Marada Party” of Suleiman Frangieh in Zghorta, Betroun, and Koura the Tayyar can secure additional 8 deputies. With the alliance of the Hezbollah the Tayyar can add 3 deputies in the district of B3abda and two more in Jezzine. Thus, if the Tayyar of Michel Aoun sustains the previous election victory then he should expect no less than 27 deputies and over 40 Christian deputies allied to the Tayyar or one third of the Parliament. If we add to this Christian bloc the deputies of Hezbollah and AMAL (over 24 deputies) and the Syrian National Social Party (about 4 deputies) and the Druze and Sunni deputies then the opposition will clearly win the majority of the Parliament. Thus the Prime Minister will be selected from the opposition and most of the key ministerial posts would revert to the opposition along with a reshuffling of the main first order administrative officials.
The Tayyar is taking the shape of a popular revolution intended to defeating the privileges of the feudal, caste, confessional, and monopolist system. It has no alternative but to follow the legitimate democratic route under this complex social diversity.
As I mentioned in another post, if the Christians do not emerge in this election with a unified and powerful centralized bloc then the chances are that a system based on splitting power among Shiaa, Sunni, and Christians (muthalateh) would be inevitable, even at the expense of a short civil war. Most probably the civil war would start between Shiaas and Sunnis but will quickly degenerate to fighting between Christians and Sunnis because the Shiaas have already their cantons. This alternative system would be legitimate demographically and the Christian would contend with third of the administration and political power offices.
Note 1: My spirit went to statesman General Aoun who said once the Syrian troops crossed the borders in April 2005 “Syria is now out of Lebanon. I have no qualms with Syria anymore. This is the time to open a new page in our relations”. The Tayyar has a TV channel and a blog; it has established a radio channe a couple of days ago; but I am under the impression that, excluding the members of the Tayyar, the supporters are on the one way communication receiving end. The brochure of the program of the Tayyar has no phone numbers, no email addresses and no central mailing address. I once sent a hand written letter to Deputy Ibrahim Kanaan and it had to go through two intermediaries of the Tayyar; obviously, I never received a reply.
Note 2: I am suggesting to the Tayyar to install central mediating centers in each district so that deputies would handle the various complaints from their respective constituencies, sort of “wassit al kada2”.
Quick,The Third Republic: For Lebanon?
Posted by: adonis49 on: June 2, 2009
The Third Republic of Lebanon: The Tayyar of General Michel Aoun (June 1, 2009)
The formal and extensive visits of Michel Aoun to Iran and then to Syria had three purposes. First purpose was symbolic of “breaking bread and sharing salt” which meant that confidence is established and hidden agendas will be stated clearly among friends.
The second purpose was to focus attention on the ethnic and religious minorities so that Iran and Syria would exercise more leverage to preserving the persecuted minorities in Iraq.
The third purpose was to exposing the draft program of the Third Republic that need to be instituted in Lebanon in order to relieve Iran and Syria from constant worries on the potential political and strategic orientation of Lebanon; thus, relying on Iran and Syria to exercise their influence toward stabilizing an environment of security and peace within Lebanon.
General and Deputy Aoun had absorbed the various failures of other Christian Lebanese leaders for establishing a lasting stable political system that would save Lebanon of recurring civil wars. A unified Christian front in Lebanon is not enough to bringing peace and security: this fact, Michel Aoun experienced when he was appointed Prime Minister in 1988 and ended in his exile to France. The most striking recent experiment was the tenure of ex-President Emile Lahoud.
Lahoud intended to eradicate corruption in the State while maintaining strategic relations with Syria and supporting the Lebanese resistance in the south against Israel’s occupation. Lahoud failed in his attempts for reforms of the social and political system because he had no civilian political movement and had no previous communication with the deputies in the Parliament. Lahoud managed to press forward on the corruption front in the first 3 years until Syria realized that the reforms were going too far and driving its Lebanese political supporters to frantic seizures. The incarcerated officials indicted with corruption and stealing the treasury were released from prison and Rafic Hariri returned as Prime Minister to resume his service and real estate economy based on heavy borrowing.
As Syria was under pressure in 2005 to withdraw its troops then it decided to extend the tenure of Lahoud another 3 years. The UN resolution 1559 for Syria withdrawal, the Lebanese army to expand to the southern borders, and Hezbollah to turn over its heavy artillery to the army pointed to a dramatic clash which culminated in the assassination of Rafic Hariri.
External interventions bolstered the internal confessional forces to side track reforms and forced the Presidency into a defensive corner; thus, not only clipping any remnant of official power, but eliminating the role of the Presidency and the Christian necessity for a stable Lebanon among its religious affiliations.
What is the Third Republic and what is its strategy?
First, the new Republic will bolster the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the President of the Republic and reduce the exclusive privileges of the Prime Minister to administering several “black boxes” such as emergency funds, development and construction council, repatriation of Lebanese refugees’ box, and disaster box that should be returned to the relevant ministries. These reforms do not require any amendments to the Taef Constitution.
Second, the Third Republic wants to desist on reducing the economy of Lebanon to the service sector that it can no longer compete with newer and powerful centers in the region like Dubai, Cyprus, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt. The economy has to revert to basics and develop on industrial and agricultural production, exploiting our water resources, managing better our electrical power generation, and expanding and modernizing our communication facilities. Health for all and education for all at affordable costs are priorities.
Third, the reduction of our heavy borrowing policy that reached over 60 billions dollars with the purpose of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon in return of canceling this mighty debt will be tackled in earnest. I lean to the possibility that if negotiations with the lending parties are not successful, then the new government will decree the cancellation of any lending that was politically motivated. I doubt that reactions would extend beyond the rhetorical recriminations because the case is strong that Lebanon had no collateral economical generation potentials for these generous lending. As a consequence, the Third Republic will put an end to any international policies attempts to reside the Palestinians in Lebanon.
Fourth, the Third Republic will relieve Hezbollah from the constant pressures of international plans targeted at coercing the disarmament of the resistance by coordinate activities with non-patriotic governments that are wiling to cohabitate with the enemy Israel. This united front will force Israel to desist from any further incursions into Lebanon.
Fifth, the Third Republic will move ahead with an alternative election law based on proportionality and revisiting laws that deny equality between genders and secular national civil status laws.
Sixth, the Third Republic will demand joint negotiations with Syria relative peace agreements with Israel after recapturing the Shebaa Farms and the Hills of Kfarshouba.
The first step in the strategy of Michel Aoun was for the Christians to regain confidence and stand up to their responsibilities and acknowledging that Israel is the enemy. This was done.
The second step was an alliance with Hezbollah which defeated many plans to resurrect the specter of the civil war.
The third step was direct contacts with regional power States, since the Tayyar represents the largest Christian Parliamentary bloc, and opening channels of communications and entente.
The fourth step is wining the majority seats in the Parliament. Done, with the opposition gaining the power.
Note 1: Lebanon Parliament was expanded in 1992 to include 128 deputies; 64 Christians and 64 Moslems. The election in June 7 is calling on 3, 260,000 voters to participate and most probably more than 50% will effectively vote. Among the eligible voters of over 21 years of age 888,000 are Moslem Shiaas (27 deputies in total), 874,000 Moslem Sunnis (27 deputies), 698,000 Christian Maronites (34 deputies), 243,000 Christian Greek Orthodox (concentrated in the districts of Ashrafieh and Koura), 186, 000 Moslem Druze (concentrated in the districts of Chouf, Aley, and Hasbaya), 163, 000 Greek Catholics, and dozen of other Christian minorities and Armenians (concentrated in Ashrafieh, Burj Hammoud, and Anjar). The Moslem Alawis of about 27,000 are entitled to 2 deputies.
In the previous election of 2005, the Tayyar of Michel Aoun without the support of any alliances managed to secure 20 Christian deputies representing 70% of the Christian voters but the Lebanese political system denied this large bloc any governmental representation for 4 years until the Dawha agreement. The law of this election that correspond to the law of 1960 divides Lebanon into 26 districts called “Kada2” and most of the Christians candidates do not have to rely on Moslem voters for their election. With the alliance of the “Marada Party” of Suleiman Frangieh in Zghorta, Betroun, and Koura the Tayyar can secure additional 8 deputies. With the alliance of the Hezbollah the Tayyar can add 3 deputies in the district of B3abda and two more in Jezzine. Thus, if the Tayyar of Michel Aoun sustains the previous election victory then he should expect no less than 27 deputies and over 40 Christian deputies allied to the Tayyar or one third of the Parliament. If we add to this Christian bloc the deputies of Hezbollah and AMAL (over 24 deputies) and the Syrian National Social Party (about 4 deputies) and the Druze and Sunni deputies then the opposition will clearly win the majority of the Parliament. Thus the Prime Minister will be selected from the opposition and most of the key ministerial posts would revert to the opposition along with a reshuffling of the main first order administrative officials.
The Tayyar is taking the shape of a popular revolution intended to defeating the privileges of the feudal, caste, confessional, and monopolist system. It has no alternative but to follow the legitimate democratic route under this complex social diversity.
Note 2: As I mentioned in another post, if the Christians do not emerge in this election with a unified and powerful centralized bloc then the chances are that a system based on splitting power among Shiaa, Sunni, and Christians (muthalateh) would be inevitable, even at the expense of a short civil war. Most probably the civil war would start between Shiaas and Sunnis but will quickly degenerate to fighting between Christians and Sunnis because the Shiaas have already their cantons. This alternative system would be legitimate demographically and the Christian would contend with third of the administration and political power offices.
Note 3: The Tayyar has a TV channel and a blog; soon it will establish a radio channel but I am under the impression that, excluding the members of the Tayyar, the supporters are on the one way communication receiving end. The brochure of the program of the Tayyar has no phone numbers, no email addresses and no central mailing address. I once sent a hand written letter to Deputy Ibrahim Kanaan through two intermediaries of the Tayyar; obviously, I never received a reply.
Testimonials of Lebanon civil war: How the city of Tripoli fared during the war?
Posted by: adonis49 on: October 22, 2008
Testimonials of a civil war in Lebanon: How the city of Tripoli (Lebanon) fared during the war?
From The issue of the daily Al Balad, April 25, 2005
The northern city port of Tripoli (Lebanon) has been an Arab nationalist stronghold before the civil war.
The majority of its inhabitants are Moslem Sunnis and have more trade relation with Syria than the rest of Lebanon.. Dramatic events will allow the Islamists to take control for a long period.
Tripoli kept its loyalty to the Palestinian Resistance Movement, even allowing Arafat to return to Tripoli in 1983 after the Palestinian military forces were evacuated from Beirut in 1982, under the pressure of the Israeli occupying forces that encircled Beirut.
When the war started, Suleiman Frangieh was President of the Republic and from the neighboring town of Zgorta. Frangieh has shown hostility to the armed Palestinian factions in Lebanon and appointed General Rifai Prime Minister. A mass opposition to that appointment brought back Rashid Karami, a Tripoli traditional and conservative leader, to the premiership.
During this constitutional upheaval, fighting started in Kubat Majdlaya between the “Marada” of the Frangieh militia and the Moslem movement of 24 of November.
Mass relocation movements of Christians from Tripoli to Zgorta and from the Christian villages of Ehden, Bchari and Hadath Jebeh to Tripoli were common sights.
When the Lebanese army split up because Karami refused to allow the army to get involved, many Moslems relocated from the villages of Deddeh and Ras Maskat in the Koura region back to Tripoli.
In July 1978, the Maronite Phalanges Party assassinated Tony Frangieh, the son of former president Sulieman Frangieh, who was a staunch supporter of the Assad Syrian regime, along with 33 residents in Ehden. The counter-offensive forced the Falangist and their supporters to evacuate to the neighboring region to Betroun, and eventually toward East Beirut.
Tripoli experienced the heaviest fighting and destruction when Arafat returned to Tripoli in the autumn of 1983.
Arafat attempted to regain his power bases in Lebanon from the North. The Islamist Movement of Saeed Shaaban supported Arafat, whereas most Leftist parties supported the Syrian troops to force Arafat out of the city and back to Tunisia, and succeeded after hundreds of civilians were killed and severely injured..
This mini war called the “Abu Amar war” ended with the evacuation of Arafat and his 5,000 fighters and 100 families after 48 days of fighting. This localized war left 900 dead and 1500 wounded, half of these casualties were Lebanese citizens.
Although the Islamists lost the support of the Palestinian fighters, they still managed to evacuate the supporters of all the leftist parties from Tripoli.
A period of strict application of the Koran rules were enforced; they cracked down on alcoholic consumption, betting activities, and appointed Emirs in various parts of the city. Khalil Ekawe, with a war name of “Abu Arab” and formerly a leftist activist, was one of these Emirs who administered the Bab Tebani area. Ekawe fought the Alawit, a Shiaa faction that support the Syrian regime, in the area of Jabal Mohsen.
However, in the autumn of 1985, the Syrian troops, backed by the Lebanese party called the Syrian National Social Party, had the upper hand and put an end to the Islamists control and administration of the city.
Adonis Diaries 