Adonis Diaries

Posts Tagged ‘Wilayat fakih

Two negations don’t constitute a nation?

What if the list of these pairs is ridiculously long?

What if the political system is structure as Mafia organization and turfs? How “citizens” can institute a pseudo State?

Lebanon never managed to constitute a viable State, even if recognized by the UN in 1946, before Israel existed as a State.

On March 10, 1949, Georges Naccache, the Lebanese journalist and owner of the daily L’Orient, published his editorial stating that reaching a political consensus that Lebanon is neither a Western state Nor an Arabic state cannot be a viable basis to forming a nation.

Actually, this consensus was the consequence of two foreign negations relative to Lebanon:

1. The Christians realized that the West will never seriously consider Lebanon society and composition as anything close to western culture and civilization

2. The Moslems admitted that the larger and more populous Arabic States have no misgiving about Lebanon adopting Arabic culture and sticking to general Arabic political positions.

But the list of pairs of negations is very long, and most of them are not in the hand and possibilities of Lebanon to close the gap.

Actually the two halves of Lebanese communities (currently three parts) on each issue cannot fathom any commonality between themselves: It is hard to figured out any common grounds to unite the Lebanese on a single issue, political or otherwise.

For examples:

1. Lebanon is neither a Capitalist economic system Nor a Socialist.

Tiny Lebanon in size and population will never be capable to build any infrastructure that cater to a capitalistic system of production and exportation.

Whatever fortune a certain middle-class managed to accumulate before the civil war in 1975 (that lasted 13 years) was Not made by simple and straightforward transit exchange of goods and services from the West to the neighboring Arabic nations. It was the small added value in “packaging” the imported goods before re-shipping them.

Currently, and for the last 2 decades, the political system catered to the Gulf Emirates and Saudi real estates development in Beirut. The Downtown of Beirut and its seashore are no longer accessible to the common people.

In any case, not a single political party in Lebanon, even the oldest communist party formed in 1920’s, believes that the caste system of Lebanon will consider any kinds of socialist ideology.

2. Lebanon is neither a centralized state nor a decentralized institution.

Actually, even the most basic of decisions (relative to municipality responsibilities) has to be taken by consensus in the government. And the decisions executed by the militia leaders of each sectarian canton.

The central government collect the dues of the municipalities and refuse to relinquish them back. In the last two decades, the municipalities dues in the $billions have vanished in the pockets of the militia leaders.

Garbage collection and management was handled as the Italian mafia did 2 decades ago. Our mafia is the government and the Parliament themselves.

3. Lebanon has neither and independent legal system nor a totally submissive justice system in the hands of the politicians.

By the constitution, the legal system is the 3rd separate power in the land. Experiences have demonstrated that justice is a phone call away by any politician.

4. Lebanon is neither pan-Arabic nor an Islamic caliphate.

Many Sunnis are rallying to this notion of Islamic caliphate that was upheld by Daesh or ISIS. This reaction was brought by the failure of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser of realizing a sustainable pan-Arabic reality.

The Shi3a of Iran have their Wilayat Fakih.

The Shi3a of Iraq have their Murshed Ayatollah Sistani

India has the largest Shi3a-kind of believers way over 200 million due to the Mogul occupation who revered the direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad

5. Lebanon is neither a State-owned nor a totally privatised economic system.

In the last 2 decades, the system has been doing its best to bankrupt all the profitable publicly owned enterprises in order to buy them cheap for the militia-run private parties.

The Lebanese are forced to pay twice for electricity, water and every basic facility: Once for the State and once for the private providers owned by the militia mafia organizations

6. Lebanon is neither with Hezbollah for national resistance to Israel nor with Saudi Arabia for allying with the enemy.

7. Lebanon was neither with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) nor with Syria of Hafez Assad

8. Lebanon is neither a strong bureaucracy nor a weak one…

The bureaucracy in Lebanon is meant to bribe the public servants so that the citizens pay for what the State should be doing. Bribery and corruption at all levels and in all the institutions in order to have a simple lousy transaction be stamped.

9. Lebanon is neither a democracy nor a pseudo democracy.

Lebanon is ruled by 19 officially recognized religious sects who have the responsibility of keeping track of the citizen private status from birth to death.

Since 1946, Lebanon failed to institute a valid State to all its citizens.

And diplomats wants the world to believe that our political system is a very stable one and immune to radical extremism.

Genesis of Hezbollah in Lebanon: The background and Accounts of Robert Fisk

My knowledge of my country and the reports and field accounts of Robert Fisk in his book “Affliction of a Nation” permitted me to join the dot of how the Moslem Shias resistance movement of Hezbollah in Lebanon emerged, and developed to becoming the main resistance force to the Israel occupation of the land.

Robert Fisk was a correspondent to the British “The Times” in Beirut for nine years during Lebanon civil war,

This part of the post will lay the background of the political and social conditions in Lebanon so that the follow-up article could be dedicated to strictly the chronological reports and accounts of the development of the Lebanese resistance movement to Israel occupation, after the preemptive war of 1982.

Background: Imam Moussa Sadr was born in the town of Qom (Iran) and was dispatched by the Iranian clergy (Ayatollah Khomeini, residing in Iraq) to Lebanon in the early 70’s to head the clergy of the Moslem Shias.  Sadr settled in Tyr and his sister Rabab married to a prominent family in the south.

The Shias in Lebanon were majority in the south and in the Bekaa Valley, but were under represented in the public services.  South Lebanon was almost forgotten in the allocation of budget for development, infrastructure, and public services such as schooling and health facilities.

Tacitly, the successive Lebanese governments, since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948,  estimated that Israel is intent on occupying south Lebanon, and that Israel had the tacit support of the US and the western European States for implicitly reaping the water resources and rich fertile land of South Lebanon.

South Lebanon was firmly ruled by the feudal landlords such as the Sharaf el Dine, the Baydun, the Solh...and particularly the Al Asaad clan, called the Beiks… Many of these feudal landlords sold their properties in Palestine to Israeli Jews, and settled in Beirut to run for political offices…

Sadr was in fact the link between the opposition forces in Iran and Khomeini, and the city of Tyr became the hotbed of Shia religious teaching , beside al Najaf in Iraq.

In fact, most leaders of the Iranian Islamic revolution, before the success of the Khomeini revolution in 1979, studied and taught in the city of Tyr in Lebanon and its neighborhoods.  For example, Mahdi Bazerkan (a later prime minister to Khomeini) followed religious courses and taught at the religious clerical school of Jabal Aamel (3amel) , which was established by Moussa Sadr.

Also, studied in Tyr Sadek Tabtabai (a later vice PM to Bazerkan and one of the closest right hands of Khomeini); Ayatollah Mohammad Baheshti (later minister of Justice and the head of the Islamic Republic Party); Sadek Kotb Zadah (later minister of foreign affairs and who was the first counselor to Khomeini while the latter was residing in Paris); Mustafa Shomran (later minister of defense, and one of the members who instituted the Jabal Amel clerical school).  All these leaders visited Tyr, at least once a year, after the success of the Iranian revolution.

As Imam Moussa Sadr landed in Lebanon, the inhabitants in South Lebanon were flocking to the southern suburbs of Beirut called Dahiya, quickly becoming a shantytown suburbs of “belt of poverty“.  These neighborhoods were adjacent to many Palestinian camps of Borj al Barajneh, Sabra, Chatila

The Shia of the south were fleeing the constant shelling of Israel on their towns and villages, under the smokescreen of retaliating to Palestinian missile Katyusha or infiltrations across the borders…

Before 1968, the Lebanese army was in control of the south, and then the Palestinian Resistance Organization (PLO) in Jordan was defeated militarily by King Hussein in 1970, and a political agreement was struck by the Lebanese government with Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser and many Arab leaders to allocate the south-east region of Arkoub to the PLO.

Explicitly, preventing the Lebanese army from harassing the PLO training camps in that region.  The PLO was not to launch attacks from the Arkoub or fire missiles, but implicitly, the Lebanese army had to have prior consent from the government for any intervention in the Arkoub, consents that were never given.

Slowly but surely, the PLO, headed by Yasser Arafat, became the main military power in Lebanon and effectively controlled and ruled in West Beirut and South Lebanon. Moussa Sadr created the Shias political party called AMAL for the “disinherited of south Lebanon” and in West Beirut, and encouraged the Shias to own arms as “symbol of manhood” and protect their properties and villages…

By the time the civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975, the Amal movement and militias were a substantial power to reckon to in Beirut and in the south.

Qadhafi assassinated Moussa Sadr in August 1978 while on visit to Libya, after Algeria President Boumedien pressured him to visit Qadhafi during his visit to Algeria.  It is known that the Shah of Iran and Israel were keeping close watch on Sadr movement: The Shah knew the direct link of Sadr to Khomeini, and the Shah was the most powerful ally to Israel in the region…

The goal of the leaders of Iran revolution was to overthrow the absolute Shah who ended considering the treasury of the State as his own and for his megalomania aggrandizement. Besides the implicit purpose of Khomeini, although religion was a fundamental sources of inspiration, the political objective of the leaders of the revolution was not the imposition of a theocratic State.

In fact, the source and origin of the Khomeini revolution didn’t start in Qom or Iran, but in South Lebanon and Tyr, since the early 70’s.

In 1980, at the instigation of the US, France, and Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein of Iraq found the opportunity of “recapturing” lands in Iran that he claimed was “Arabic” and belonged to the “Arab Nation”.  Saudi Arabia and the US goal was to incite the Iranians to deposing Khomeini, and as a revenge for taking American hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran…

Within a year, Iraqi troops were withdrawing to Iraqi borders, but Khomeini had decided to resume the war of liberation by occupying portions of Iraq and get done with Saddam.

Khomeini decision was a strategic shift in the doctrine of the Iranian revolution: It was to become Islamic and no longer a Republic with Islamic sources of how to rule and to instituting justice (Sharia).  Consequently, this extended state of war, which lasted 8 more years, was an excuse to eliminate all power leaders who begged to differ with Khomeini’s ideology.

All the aforementioned leaders who visited Tyr of Lebanon every years were assassinated and disappeared from the political scene (See note 3).

The factions of the new theocratic regime in Iran won the internal war and had to implement that success in Lebanon.  The US, France, and Israel were the “axe of evil” and the “US the great Satan”. It is in that perspective that the wave of abduction of foreign journalists, correspondent, and personalities is to be understood.

The prisoners were for the keep until negotiations with Iran are undertaken.  The kidnappers were known as “Islamic Jihad” and Fisk had no idea who they were until much later.  It is reported that Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadl Allah was the spiritual leader of that Shia faction, and the CIA attempted to assassinate him in March 9, 1985, but the bomb killed 80 civilians instead.

The Shias “Islamic Jihad” faction was re-baptized Hezbollah and the Moslem extremist Sunnis, under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden or Al Qaeda, and funded by Saudi Arabia, adopted the name of “Islamic Jihad”

Consequently, the new theocratic factions in Iran created a new movement among the Shias in Lebanon in order to replace Nabih Berri, leader of AMAL, after the disappearance of Moussa Sadr in Libya. The new movement, first called “Jihad Islamic”, focused on military resistance against the Israeli occupation forces in Lebanon.

The Amal movement (and militias) under Nabih Berri was stooges force to Syria and attacked Palestinian camps, under the excuse of preventing the return of the military wing of Yasser Arafat and their establishment in the camps. Berri militias also attacked the militias of the Druze leader Walid Jumblat in Beirut for dominance of West Beirut.  However, Berri comprehended that, unless he joins forces in resisting Israel, he will lose the leadership of the Shias.

Note 1: A cease-fire in the Iran/Iraq war took hold in 1989, shortly before Khomeini died.  It is reported that Khomeini, knowing he is to die shortly, he decided to put an end to the war while still alive.  Otherwise, the war of attrition would go on indefinitely and ultimately defeat the theocratic regime.

Note 2: By 1984, after Imam Moussa Sadr disappeared on a visit to Qadhafi of Libya in 1982, Nabih Berry became the leader of AMAL, and a formidable militia leader, totally backed by Syria of Hafez Assad,  and holding the ministry of Justice in the Lebanese government.

After the civil war in 1993, Berri will head the successive Lebanese Parliaments, till today.  Actually, all militia leaders will be members in governments and the deputies in the Parliament, in recompense for devastating Lebanon and killing over 200,000 and three-fold that numbers in injured casualties.

Note 3: Kotb Zada was condemned and executed.  Shomran was accounted dead on the Iraqi front. The headquarter of the political party of Mohammad Baheshti was blown up during a general convention: All the leaders of the party died.

Rafsanjani (one of the richest, and later President of Iran) was 15 minutes late for the start of the convention (Was he participating in the plot? Had he been forewarned of the bombing?). Baheshti was next in line to succeed Khomeini in the Wilayat Fakih, but he opposed Khomeini decisions to eradicate the communist Tudeh party, as well as the two left leaning political parties of Mujahedeen and Fidaiyee Khalq.

I had witnessed the activist Iranian students at the University of Oklahoma at Norman in 1978: They were mostly constituted of Mujahedeen and Fidaiyee Khalq parties, and kept the pressure with frequent demonstrations, marches and public meetings on campus… And the bloody leaders who didn’t plan and work for the revolution at its beginning came to power.

Note 4: You may read my article

Third Sunday Marches: Lebanese Youth movement unfurling its sails 

The youth movement in Lebanon has demonstrated for the third consecutive Sunday.  The ranks and files of youth have grown from 5, to 10, to 20 thousands, converging to public ministries and public institutions.

The power-to-be of sectarian and feudal political parties have been diffusing clever tactics to dissuading youth from participating in the marches.  For example,

First, claiming that well-established secular parties are at the origin of the demonstrations and have infiltrated with ready-made ideological programs.

Second, disseminating leaflets that Hezbollah is encouraging its members to joining the demonstration.

Third, that the movement’s goal is hijacked in order to ultimately give advantage to the Moslem citizens in any political reforms structure, or that the ultimate purpose is driving Lebanon into the Shia theocratic ideology of Wilayat Fakih, or the establishment of a Sunni Caliphate system… Ridiculous.

The youth movement in Lebanon are demonstrating with a unified banner: “Delete religious affiliation from all official documents”.

It is simple, straightforward, and clear to all Lebanese citizens.

First step first:  We cannot jump steps before we discuss the next step to saveguard our unity as a vast movement.

It is normal that secular political parties insert their political programs and bring in a basket-full of demands that are very relevant, but not within the current first demand of the youth movement.

Youth in Lebanon have begun serious demonstrations, on regular schedule, once every week, demanding reforms in the sectarian political and social structure in Lebanon.

What is happening is that political parties and even sectarian parties (both Christians and Moslems) might be infiltrating the youth movement and disseminating their programs, burning many steps that the movement has not discussed fully and decided upon.

For example, you have demonstrators talking to the media that Nabih Berry’s “Amal” Party has asked its youth to join in.

The power-to-be factions will keep their efficient tactics in pushing youths away from participating in the demonstrations or getting engaged in further serious discussions with other youths.

It is normal that “elite youth citizens” or those who are not necessary cultured, but believe that they come from a family or clan superior to the “rif-raf” masses of common citizens will invent all kinds of excuses not to demonstrate.

Our society structure is sick and needs long-term educational process.

It is normal that many youth will self-appoint themselves as members of the organizing committee and many youth will feel angry and disappointed with particular figures in the movement and disengage from any participation…

There are many excuses and factors to dissuading youth from joining the youth movement. The fact is:  You either get active and participate or let others decide for you.

Youth have many demands related to survival, living conditions, educational reforms, opportunities to work…

The youth demand civil marriage, non-discriminating laws based on gender or religious affiliation, fair and equitable election laws that represent all section of the communities…

The list of demands is unending but the movement for secular reforms has to acquire a specific target, independent of the huge basket for change and successive reforms.

Remember, first step first: “Delete religious affiliation from all official documents”.   This is our main demand for the time being until we obtain it hands down.

The next demonstration will set the tone: If youth carry banners showing a wide range of demands with no specific pragmatic demand to focus attention at, and unite everyone around it then, it is legitimate to suspect that the youth movement is not in control and further engagements of youth must come to the rescue to saving the movement from being hijacked by sectarian factions.

I have no qualm that political parties with definite ideological agenda take the lead in the beginning, but it is the youth that have got to take over the movement.

Obviously, marches and demonstrations for other demands must take place, but when the secular youth call for their marches, a single demand should take precedent as the utmost priority:  We want religious affiliation to be deleted from all official documents.

“Elgha2 taifiya min kul al noussouss al rasmiyah”.

Once this demand is obtained, the next step of the movement is to agree on the follow-up next demand.  We don’t have to be divided before we win our first step toward change and reforms.

If we start separating with irrelevant arguments at the first stage then, it is the sectarian regime that will be disturbing the youth movement.  The only dialogue with the political system must be focused on deleting religious affiliation from all official documents and agreeing on a timeline for that execution.

That is the goal in the first step and the only one until we move forward to the next pragmatic step in our list of demands.

For example, although any individual could request that his religion should not be mentioned on an official document, the movement as a force should undertake a campaign of enlisting citizens to change their official documents.

The youth movement should pressure the government and the Parliament to officially generalize and automatically drop religious affiliation from documents, as a law.

The ways the first demand was won will play a great factor in the selection of the next focused demand.

I suggest that youth movement plans and organizes small marches in every village and towns in Lebanon with a unified banner: “Delete religion from official documents”.

By the by, the movement will be ready to organize a nationwide marches, at specific dates, all over Lebanon.  That would be a success story that proves that the youth are in complete control of the movement.

I have confidence that this process will encourage youth into eliminating sectarian mentality and behaviors from their habits and spirit.

The Arabic World is looking apprehensively and analyzing seriously our drastic demand and how our movement is unfolding.

Let us be leaders for the next revolution in the Arab World.

Iran: Hussein, Karbala, Ashura, Shias, Ayatollah marjaa, Wilayat fakih,…

Prophet Muhammad refused to designate a successor:  He was aware of his fragile health condition 8 days before he died and he was mentally conscious and able to make this decision.

When Muhammad died, his close relatives such as his 8 wives, his remaining two daughters and his sons-in-laws got in charge of the burial procedures and ceremony.

The leading companions such as Abu Bakr and Omar negotiated transition with the original leading tribes of Medina, called Ansars.  The ansars are those who welcomed the Moslems to settle in their city as the tribes of Mecca started persecuting the Moslems in 632.

Abu Bakr was selected Caliph.

The Sunni sect in Islam is this branch that doesn’t mind caliphs not being direct descendants of Muhammad, as long as they are considered from “noble” tribes of Mecca.  The Shia sect insisted that caliphs should be direct descended of Muhammad.

Abu Bakr, Omar bin Khattab, Uthman bin Affan, and Abi bin Abi Taleb were the four caliphs called Rashidun, meaning adult companions who followed Muhammad from the start and fought all his battles.  They were all from tribes of Mecca, which upset the ansar tribes who welcomed the Moslems and saved them from persecution and permitted them to establishing their first City-State in Yathreb named Medina later on.

It is to be noted that all male sons of Muhammad died in very young age and he had four married daughters.

Two daughters died before him.  The youngest daughter Fatima married Ali, his nephew and later son-in-law.  One of his daughters had married Uthman bin Affan.  Hassan and Hussein were the grandsons of Muhammad from Fatima and Ali who were born while the Prophet was alive.

Caliph Muawiya bin Ummaya (from the richest tribe in Mecca) was named governor of Damascus by Uthman and contested the caliphat with Ali.

Ali’s troops had the advantage of vanquishing Muawiya troops but Ali decided to negotiate.  Thus, those against the negotiation as victory was near were called “khawarej” (the ones who aabandoned Ali’s troops); they may as well be the first Shias (those who disagreed).

Ali might have been the most promising Imam, but he was no political statesman.  A few khawarej met in Mecca and decided to assassinate both Ali and Muawiya on the same day.  Muawiya’s assassin barely wounded him, but Ali’s assassin was successful as Ali was leading the prayer in Kufa.

After the assassination of Ali, Muawiya established the first hereditary dynasty in Islam with capital Damascus.  Muawiya struck a deal with Hassan.  The deal was that Hassan will be the next caliph after the death of Muawiya.  In a sense, the deal was sharing power between the Sunnis and the Shias in turn.

Muawiya poisoned Hassan:  He cooperated with Hassan’s wife to convince Hassan to wearing a poisoned expensive robe that Muawiya sent as gift for the deal.  Then, Muawiya killed Hassan’s wife and eliminated direct witnesses.

Hussein continued with the deal and left Muawiya at peace from political upheavals.  Muawiya died and his son Yazid succeeded him as caliph.  Hussein didn’t appreciate this treachery and reclaimed his right according to the deal and moved from Mecca with his family and 72 followers intending to settle in Kufa (southern Iraq).

Three months of marches in the desert brought Hussein in Karbala.

By dawn, Hussein realized that the troops of Yazid had surrounded his small party and cut off the way to the main water sources at the Euphrates River. Hussein negotiated for 10 days, hoping that the citizens of Kufa will come to the rescue, at no avail.  Hussein was beheaded and his head sent to Caliph Yazid on a spear in 680.

The uneven battle of Karbala was waged during Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram.

The Shias adopted the account story of the engagement in Karbala as written by Hussein Kashefi in his “Garden of Martyrs” and which was widely circulated in the 15th century.  The story goes as follows:

“Hussein was hit by an arrow in the neck while trying to drink from the river.  Ten cavalry men from Yazid army rushed to achieve Hussein so that to receiving huge rewards.  Hussein was lying for dead and every time Hussein opened his eyes and looked at the coming killer then, the knight would feel shame and retreat.

Commander Chemr was decided to finish the job and sat at Hussein chest.  Hussein asked Chemr to remove his iron mask and show his face, which he did and Hussein said: “This is the first veritable sign.”  Chemr’s face looked porcupine with two incisive shooting out his lips.  Hussein asked Chemr to open his shirt and said: “This is the second veritable sign”  Chemr’s chest showed scars of leprosy.  Hussein said: “I had a vision last night by the Prophet and He told me how my assassin would look like.”

Hussein asked Chemr: “What day it is?”  Chmer said: “This is the Friday of Ashura”  Hussein asked “What time is it?”  Chemr replied: “This is the time of prayer.”  Hussein said: “The believers are praying and you are indulging in killing me.  Get off my chest and do your job while I am praying facing Mecca.”

The surviving family members of Hussein were given a roundabout three-month long trip up north Iraq, then north Syria before descending to Damascus and suffered hardship and humiliation.

Muawiya made sure to assassinating all males of direct descendant to Muhammad, including the surviving husbands of his daughters and even Muhammad’s wives.

Aicha, the most learned and beloved of Muhammad’s wives, was spared humiliation and assassination for two reasons:

First, she sided with him against Ali after the assassination of the third caliph Uthman and

Second, Aicha was the prime eminent in Islam jurisprudence.  She had gathered all the verses of the Prophet and confronted the Hadith that were lies and incorrect.  Uthman manipulated many verses and officially published the current Koran.

The Shias believe that the Abbassid caliph Al Maamoun assassinated Imam Rida in 817 in the city of Mashhad by poison.

All the streets in Mashhad converge to Imam Rida’s mausoleum and the city welcome 20 million pilgrims per year. The Abbassid dynasty are descendent of one of Muhammad’s uncle Abbas.

Kufa was not spared persecution, even though it didn’t come to succor Hussein.

The new governor Hajaj bin Youssef made the citizens of Kufa check their necks as his first speech started: “I see heads ripening and ready for the harvest…”  Kufa is renowned for its bad luck of supporting the losing party:  It supported Aicha, the youngest and most beloved wife of Muhammad, against the troops of Ali in the first civil-war battle of the “Camel” around Kufa.

Iran was Sunni before the 16th century.  An Azeri prince, Shah Ismail, took power of Iran in 1502.

The successor of Ismail decided to have the Shia sect as the kingdom official religion in order to unite Iran against his nemesis the Caliph of the  Ottoman Empire.  The ottoman Empire crushed the Iranian army but didn’t venture in resuming the war inside Iran.  The ottoman Empire just got Iraq as one of the wilayyats  of the Empire.

The Shia sect has a highly structured hierarchy and the curriculum for religious proficiency is lengthy and passes by degrees of study programs. There are currently 12 “ayatollah marjaa” among the Shias, two them died recently: Montazari and Fadhlallah of Lebanon.  An ayatollah marjaa is the highest cleric who can institute his school of jurisprudence and proclaim fatwas (interpretation opinion on an Islamic law).

The followers of other Ayatollah marjaa do not have to agree with the fatwas of one ayatollah.

Ayatollah Khomeini didn’t vehemently refuse the title of Imam, a title reserved for the “hidden Mahdi” who was declared hidden at the age of 5 in 874.  The successor of Khomeini, Kamenei, was not even ayatollah and still, he is considered “Supreme Guide” of the “Wilayat fakih” or the rule of the highest religious cleric in jurisprudence.

Note:  I read a few articles of Khomeini’s fatwas and I must say that so many years of learning theology and Islamic laws left something to be desired.  I think an ayatollah must have also a PhD in a scientific field in addition to religious knowledge.




September 2020

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